Peer Group Effects on Student Outcomes: Evidence from Randomized Lotteries by Liu, Keke
PEER GROUP EFFECTS ON STUDENT OUTCOMES:  
EVIDENCE FROM RANDOMIZED LOTTERIES 
 
By 
Keke Liu 
 
Dissertation  
Submitted to the Faculty of the  
Graduate School of Vanderbilt University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
in 
Leadership and Policy Studies 
 
December, 2010 
Nashville, Tennessee 
 
Approved: 
Professor R. Dale Ballou 
Professor Adam Gamoran 
Professor Matthew G. Springer 
Professor Ron W. Zimmer 
 ii
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To my husband, Dr. Haitao Hu, unconditional love and support 
 
 
To my children Kevin and Emma Hu, unending inspiration 
 
And  
 
To my parents, Guosheng Liu and Jianyue Song, ceaseless encouragement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I am deeply indebted to my advisor, Professor Dale Ballou, for his guidance, support, 
patience, and trust. As a remarkable mentor, Dale always put in time and energy to help 
me whenever I needed help. As an outstanding scholar, Dale not only taught me different 
ways to approach research problems; more importantly, he showed me the invaluable 
traits as a researcher: dedication, perseverance, and discipline. I am very fortunate to have 
had the opportunity to work with Dale over the past years. 
I am very grateful to other members of my dissertation committee --- Professors 
Adam Gamoran, Matthew Springer, and Ron Zimmer, whose insightful suggestions are 
greatly appreciated. I also wish to acknowledge Professors Ellen Goldring, Julie Berry 
Cullen, and Steve Rivkin, for their helpful discussions on this project.  
Special thanks go to my friends and colleagues at Peabody College of Vanderbilt 
University for their friendship and encouragement. I especially thank Meisha Fang, for 
graciously providing accommodation when I came down to Nashville and patiently 
listening to my complaints about the stress of being a mother and a doctorate student.   
Finally, I wish to thank all my family members for their love and support throughout 
this process. To my loving parents, Guosheng Liu and Jianyue Song, whose love and 
encouragement have been with me every step of this journey. To my parents-in-law, 
Wenxuan Hu and Lanxiang Ding, for their understanding and support. Most importantly, 
I wish to again thank my beloved husband Haitao Hu and our precious children, Kevin 
and Emma --- this work would not have been possible without your love, support and 
encouragement. 
 iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Page 
DEDICATION……………………………………………………………………………ii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS………………………………………………………………iii 
LIST OF TABLE………………………………………………………..……………….vii 
Chapter 
I.      INTRODUCTION ..........................................................................................................1 
 
 Paper Organization...................................................................................................6 
 
II.     REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE.................................................................................8 
 
Conceptual Framwork...............................................................................................8 
Previous Research....................................................................................................13 
 
III.    INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND, DATA  
         AND ANALYTICAL STRATEGY ..............................................................................21 
 
Institutional Background..........................................................................................21 
Data Source..............................................................................................................27 
Analytical Strategy...................................................................................................30 
 
IV.    PEER EFFECTS ON ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT  
         ---RESULTS FROM SCHOOL LEVEL ANALYSIS ..................................................66 
 
Descriptive Results ..................................................................................................67 
Magnet School Treatment Effects ...........................................................................73 
Impacts of Average Peer Characteristics .................................................................76 
Impacts from Dispersion of Peer Characteristics.....................................................86 
Heterogeneous Peer Effects .....................................................................................90 
Robustness Checks..................................................................................................101 
 
 v
V.     PEER EFFECTS ON ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT  
         ---RESULTS FROM CLASSROOM LEVEL ANALYSIS.........................................115 
 
Impacts of Average Peer Characteristics ................................................................116 
Impacts from Dispersion of Peer Characteristics....................................................123 
Heterogeneous Peer Effects ....................................................................................129 
Robustness Checks..................................................................................................139 
Differences Between School Level Estimates and  
Classroom Level Estimates of Peer Effects ............................................................141 
 
VI.     PEER EFFECTS ON BEHAVIRORAL OUTCOMES  
          ---RESULTS FROM BOTH SCHOOL AND CLASS LEVEL ANALYSES ............146 
 
Descriptive Results of Outcome Variables .............................................................147 
Magnet School Treatment Effects ..........................................................................150 
Impacts of Average Peer Characteristics ................................................................153 
Impacts from Dispersion of Peer Characteristics....................................................165 
Heterogeneous Peer Effects ....................................................................................171 
Robustness Checks..................................................................................................179 
 
VII.   CONCLUSIONS..........................................................................................................180 
 
Review of Findings .................................................................................................180 
Implications and Limitations ..................................................................................185 
Appendix 
A.     PREDICTION OF PEER CHARACTERISTICS IN  
          NEIGHBORHOOD SCHOOLS ( )NP .........................................................................189 
 
B.     PREDICTION OF ENROLLMENT PROBABILITY ( )ˆiMd  AND 
         CONSTRUCTION OF SCHOOL LEVEL PEER VARIABLE INSTRUMENTS......191 
 
C.     CONSTRUCTION OF INSTRUMENTS FOR                                                               
CLASS LEVEL PEER VARIABLE ............................................................................196 
 
D.     VALIDITY OF THE INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES .............................................199 
 vi
E.     LINEAR COMBINATION RESULTS FOR                                                               
HETEROGENEOUS PEER EFFECTS........................................................................204 
 
F.     READING CLASSROOM PEER EFFECTS ON                                                                           
BEHAVIORAL OUTCOMES......................................................................................213 
 
REFERENCES ......................................................................................................................220 
 
 vii
LIST OF TABLES 
 
3.1             Number of Magnet Programs at Middle School Level ........................................23 
 
3.2             Number of Student Observations in Middle Schools by Cohorts.........................24 
 
3.3             Magnet School Lotteries and Enrollment ............................................................26 
 
3.4             Lottery Outcome Combinations with the Second  
                  Academic School as an Option .............................................................................52 
 
3.5             Classroom Peer Characteristics (Math Class) ......................................................60 
 
3.6             Variance in Class Peer Variables .........................................................................61 
 
4.1             Lottery Participant Characteristics .......................................................................70 
 
4.2             School Peer Characteristics in Grade 5 ................................................................71 
 
4.3             Descriptive Statistics of Academic Achievement ................................................73 
 
4.4             Magnet School Treatment Effects on Academic Achievement............................75 
 
4.5             Average School Peer Effects on Math Achievement ...........................................79 
 
4.6             Average School Peer Effects on Reading Achievement ......................................83 
 
4.7             Heterogeneity of School Peer Characteristics in Grade 5 ....................................87 
 
4.8             Impacts from Dispersion of Peer outcomes on Math Achievement ....................88 
 
4.9             Impacts from Dispersion of Peer outcomes on Reading Achievement ................90 
 
4.10           Heterogeneous School Level Peer Effects on Math Achievement .......................93 
 
4.11           Heterogeneous School Level Peer Effects on Reading Achievement ..................98 
 
 
 viii
4.12           Average School Peer Effects on Math Achievement  
                  (Treatment Reponse Heterogeneity) ....................................................................103 
 
4.13           Average School Peer Effects on Math Achievement  
                  (Teacher Fixed Effect) .........................................................................................105 
 
4.14           Attrition Rates, by Lottery Outcomes ......................................................................107 
 
4.15            Effects of Lottery Outcomes and Peer Characteristics on Attrition ..................111 
 
4.16            Attrition Probabilities as Function of Prior Achievement, Peer Characteristics, 
                   and Lottery Outcomes (Outright Win, Academic Magnet) ................................112 
 
5.1             Average Classroom Peer Effects on Math Achievement  
                  (Math Class).........................................................................................................118 
 
5.2             Average Classroom Peer Effects on Reading Achievement  
                  (Reading Class)....................................................................................................122 
 
5.3             Heterogeneity of Classroom Peer Characteristics ...............................................125 
 
5.4             Impacts from Dispersion of Peer Characteristics on  
                  Math Achievement (Math Class) .........................................................................127 
 
5.5             Impacts from Dispersion of Peer Characteristics on  
                  Reading Achievement (Reading Class) ...............................................................128 
 
5.6            Heterogeneous Class Level Peer Effects on  
                 Math Achievement (Math Class) ..........................................................................130 
 
5.7            Differential Effect from Dispersion of Class Peer Achievement  
                 on Math Achievement (Math Class) .....................................................................134 
 
5.8            Heterogeneous Class Level Peer Effects on  
                 Reading Achievement (Reading Class) ................................................................136 
 
5.9           Differential Effect from Dispersion of Class Peer Achievement  
                on Reading Achievement (Reading Class) ............................................................138 
 ix
 
5.10           Average Classroom Peer Effects on Math Achievement  
                  (Math Class, Teacher Fixed Effect) .....................................................................140 
 
6.1             Descriptive Statistics of the Dependent Variable:  
                  Suspension Times ................................................................................................148 
 
6.2             Descriptive Statistics of the Dependent Variable:  
                  Absence Rate .......................................................................................................149 
 
6.3             Magnet School Treatment Effects on Disciplinary Infractions ...........................151 
 
6.4             Magnet School Treatment Effects on Attendance Behaviors ..............................153 
 
6.5             Average School Peer Effects on Disciplinary Infractions ..................................157 
 
6.6             Average Classroom Peer Effects on Disciplinary Infractions  
                  (Math Class).........................................................................................................160 
 
6.7             Average School Peer Effects on Absence Rate ..................................................162 
 
6.8             Average Classroom Peer Effects on Absnece Rate  
                  (Math Class).........................................................................................................164 
 
6.9             Impacts from Dispersion of Peer Characteristics on 
                  Disciplinary Infractions (School Lelve)...............................................................166 
 
6.10          Impacts from Dispersion of Peer Characteristics on 
                 Disciplinary Infractions (Math Class) ..................................................................168 
 
6.11          Impacts from Dispersion of Peer Characteristics on 
                 Absence Rate (School Lelve)................................................................................169 
 
6.12          Impacts from Dispersion of Peer Characteristics on 
                 Absence Rate (Math Class) ..................................................................................170 
 
 
 x
6.13          Heterogeneous Peer Effects on Disciplinary Infractions  
                 (School Level).......................................................................................................172 
 
6.14          Heterogeneous Peer Effects on Disciplinary Infractions  
                 (Math Class)..........................................................................................................175 
 
6.15          Heterogeneous Peer Effects on Absence Rate  
                 (School Level).......................................................................................................177 
 
6.16          Heterogeneous Peer Effects on Absence Rate  
                 (Math Class)..........................................................................................................178 
 
 
 
 
 
 1
CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This dissertation investigates the peer group effects on middle school students’ 
academic achievement and behavioral outcomes in a mid-size urban district in the South. 
The primary objective of this project is to implement credible methodologies to 
circumvent the endogeneity problems in peer effect estimation and therefore obtain 
unbiased estimates of peer group effects on individual student outcomes.  
Peer qualities and peer behaviors have long been recognized as among the most 
important determinants of student outcomes. As early as 1966, Coleman and his 
colleagues have demonstrated the importance of student composition on individual’s 
achievement. In the well-known report Equality of Educational Opportunity, Coleman et 
al. (1966) write: 
“(Finally), it appears that a pupil’s achievement is strongly related to the educational 
backgrounds and aspirations of the other students in the school. ………” (p.22) 
 
“Attributes of other students account for far more variation in the achievement of 
minority group children than do any attributes of school facilities and slightly more 
than do attributes of staff”(p.302) 
 
Aware of the importance of peer impacts, both families and policy makers have included 
peer quality as a prominent element in educational decision making.  For example, 
parents tend to seek for better companions for their children through residential choices 
and other school choice options. Many controversial education policies, such as vouchers, 
school desegregation, and ability tracking, intend to improve student performance 
through changing the composition of peers.   
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However, identifying peer effects is a very difficult task. The most problematic issue 
is that families and students usually choose schools and peer groups where they share 
similar attributes with other members. Therefore, measures of peer characteristics may 
just signal other unobservable individual factors that also affect the outcomes, such as 
student willingness to work and parental ambition and resources. This endogenous choice 
leads to a selection bias problem.  Another problem is that an individual’s outcome and 
that of his peers are formed simultaneously --- a student’s achievement is impacted by the 
achievement of his classmates and vice versa. This creates a standard simultaneity bias 
problem, also termed as reflection problem by Manski (1993). In addition, inference 
about peer effects is particularly vulnerable to a general misspecification problem --- 
omitted variable bias, due to the fact that both individuals and peers are subject to a 
common environment.  
Studies attempting to measure peer group effects are susceptible to the endogeneity 
biases arising from self-selectivity, simultaneity, and omitted variables correlated with 
peer characteristics. Interestingly, in spite of the fact that theoretical articles on social 
interaction or peer effects have concentrated most attention on the reflection problems (or 
simultaneity bias, e.g. Manski, 1993; Moffit, 2002), selection bias is the most pervasive 
methodological issue discussed in empirical studies. The majority of empirical research 
on peer effects circumvents simultaneity bias by examining only peer demographic 
characteristics (such as race or gender composition) or using lagged values for peer 
behaviors or outcomes. Meanwhile, most peer effect studies have focused on reducing or 
eliminating selection bias by implementing a variety of creative techniques, such as 
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instrumental variables (IV), fixed effect models (FE), and randomization experiments 
(RA).  
In the most recent two decades, efforts to identify peer effects on student outcomes 
span social science. However, thus far, they have not reached a consensus. For example, 
Evans, Shwab, and Oats (1992), using instrumental variable methods, find no significant 
school peer effects on teenager behaviors. Hanushek et al. (2003) estimate moderate peer 
effects on student achievement in Texas schools. They tackle across-school selections by 
implementing fixed effect strategies, and eliminate simultaneity problems by using 
lagged measures of peer achievement. Two studies by Sacerdote (2001) and Zimmerman 
(2003) use randomly assigned college roommate data and find a significant association 
between roommate academic attainment and individual achievement.  
Among all the methods to reduce selection bias, randomization is the most credible 
one. In a randomized experiment with participants arbitrarily assigned to a treatment 
group (for example, a choice school) or a control group (a neighborhood school), 
differences between the individuals in the two groups arise solely by chance, which 
ensures the endogeneity of peer group formation. Peer group effects therefore can be 
ascertained from examining how the peer composition differences between the treatment 
group and the control group influence individual outcomes.  
In recent years, the administration of school choice programs often provides good 
opportunities of studying peer effects with randomization approach. In many school 
choice programs, the admissions are conducted through lottery when the choice schools 
are oversubscribed --- the unsuccessful lottery participants who enroll in the 
neighborhood school can then serve as the natural control group for the purpose of 
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measuring the peer group effects on student outcomes. This approach is used in the study 
by Cullen and Jacob (2007), who find no evidences that lottery winners to higher quality 
schools (measured by average peer achievement) are better off in academic achievement 
than those who lost the opportunity to go to the selective schools.  
In this study, I will exploit randomization via magnet school admission lotteries to 
examine the peer group effects on student outcomes at both school and classroom levels. 
The district studied operates magnet programs at three levels---elementary, middle, and 
high school. This study will focus the peer effect investigation on middle school students 
(from grade 5 to grade 8) because the state end-of-year assessments have been most 
consistent from grade 3 to 8. The district conducts separate lotteries for each magnet 
school to determine admission. Students who apply for the district-operated magnet 
schools are randomly assigned to either a choice school or a neighborhood school; 
conditional on the attendance zone, students are also randomly assigned to the peers in 
either the choice school or the neighborhood school. Randomized lotteries therefore bring 
an exogenous source of variation in peer characteristics and will be exploited to 
overcome the critical issue of selection bias in identifying peer effects.  
Under an ideal situation when there is only one magnet school and one neighborhood 
school and all participants fully comply with the lottery assignment, peer effects can be 
estimated directly from the average differences between the treatment group (magnet 
school) and the control group (neighborhood school). However, similar to many other 
social experiments, the lottery-induced admission process in the district studied also has a 
lot of complications. First, the lottery school enrollment process is voluntary and 
participants do not fully comply with the lottery assignment. For example, lottery winners 
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may not enroll in the choice school; lottery losers seek for other options like private 
school. With the existence of non-compliance, the lottery-induced admission can no 
longer be considered as a pure randomized experiment. Second, the district operates more 
than one magnet programs at middle school level. Although a student can only enroll in 
one magnet school, a lot of students applied for multiple lotteries. Third, in the years of 
investigation, there are significant student attritions among the lottery participants. 
Particularly, the attrition rate is higher among lottery losers than lottery winners. Forth, 
peer effects may be confounded with student’s heterogeneous responses to magnet school 
treatment effects, or may be proxies for some unobserved school factors, such as the 
quality of teachers. For example, if less effective teachers tend to be assigned to schools 
(classrooms) with high proportion of low SES students, peer effects are likely to signal 
teacher quality. 
Due to all the complications, even the lottery-induced randomization can not ensure 
the exogeneity of the peer compositions. Therefore, instead of simply comparing the 
outcomes of winners and losers with different peers, this study exploits the randomized 
admission lotteries to form an instrument variable for the regressor of interest --- the 
actual peers, and estimates the causal relationship between individual outcomes and the 
peer groups from the instrumented (exogenous) peer variables. The model controls for a 
large number of individual and school characteristics to improve the precision of the 
regression models and eliminate the biases from attrition. In order to test if peer effects 
are just signals for teacher impacts, I will also include teacher fixed effects in the 
analyses. In addition, the models will control for the interaction between treatment 
indicators with observable individual characteristics to examine if peer effects are 
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confounded with heterogeneous responses to treatment effects. Like many other 
empirical studies in peer effects, this study will circumvent the simultaneity problem by 
using pre-determined peer characteristics (such as race, gender, and social economic 
status in peer composition) and lagged measures of peer outcomes. 
This dissertation examines the impacts of peer groups on both student academic 
achievement (measured by math and reading test scores) and student behavioral 
outcomes (measured by student absence rate and disciplinary infractions). The 
investigation of peer effects is conducted at both school and classroom levels. 
Specifically, the dissertation will answer the following research questions: 
1. What is the impact from average peer characteristics on individual student 
outcomes at both school and classroom levels?  
2. What is the impact from the dispersion of peer characteristics on student 
outcomes at both levels?  
3. To whom do peer effects matter the most --- which subgroup of student 
population are more significantly impact by the peer characteristics? 
The rest of the dissertation will be organized in the following manners: Chapter II 
provides a review of relevant literature. The theoretical research review presents the 
canonical model for peer effect estimation and explains the three major methodological 
challenges in identifying peer effects; and the empirical research review examines the 
existing evidences from some selective studies in peer effects, with a focus on the 
strengths and weaknesses of the methodologies used in these studies. Chapter III 
describes the district under study and its magnet programs, presents the data sources, and 
most importantly, explains the analytical strategies. The discussion of the methodology 
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includes peer effect identification strategies at both school and classroom levels. It will 
start with the basic models under the strict assumption of a pure randomization, followed 
by the 2-stage least square (2SLS) IV models with the relaxation of that assumption. 
Chapter IV presents the results of school level peer group effects on student academic 
achievement. The findings will include the average peer effects, the impacts from 
dispersion of peer characteristics, and the heterogeneous peer effects on students in 
different subgroups. Chapter V reports the findings of classroom peer effects on student 
academic achievement, and compares the results with those from school level analyses. 
Chapter VI provides the findings of peer influences on student behavioral outcomes at 
both school and classroom levels. Finally, chapter VII summarizes the findings, discusses 
the methodological contributions and political implications of this study.  
 
 
 
 
 
 8
CHAPTER II 
 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
This study exploits randomization through admission lotteries to examine the 
relationship between peer composition and student outcomes. As such, the review of 
literature focuses on previous estimates of peer group effects. The first part of this 
chapter reviews theoretical studies on social interaction and peer effects in schools. It 
begins by defining peer group effects, describing the multiple channels through which 
peers affect student outcomes and presenting the methodological challenges in 
identifying peer effects. The second part of this chapter provides an overview of the 
existing evidences on the nature and quantitative importance of the association between 
peer group composition and student outcomes in academic and behavior. The review of 
empirical studies will focus on the methodological strengths and weaknesses. 
 
Conceptual Framework 
Peer effects, neighborhood effects, and other non-market social influences are 
generally termed as ‘social interactions’--- the impact on one individual of the attributes 
or actions of other group members (Moffit, 2001). Peer effects in education usually 
include the impact of social interactions between individual student and other students in 
the same school or classroom, rather than the interactions between the student and 
families or teachers.  
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The mechanisms through which peer groups affect individual’s academic 
achievement are complex. Peers not only influence individuals directly through student 
teaching, role modeling, or classroom disruption; they also impact individual students 
indirectly through the perceptions of teachers and administrators on the peer groups. For 
example, if a teacher thinks one particular socioeconomic group is academically weak, 
she may lower her expectation and slow down her curriculum in a classroom with a high 
proportion of students from that group, which therefore may negatively affect an 
individual student’s performance, regardless of that student’s own SES status.   
In an influential article on the topic of social interaction effects, Manski (1993) 
proposes that the relationship between one individual’s behavior and other group 
member’s behavior comes from three distinct effects. Here, let’s apply the concepts to 
peer effects in education: 
a. Endogenous effects (or simultaneous effects)—a person’s behavior varies 
with the mean behavior of the peer group. For example, the propensity of a 
student graduating from high school will be impacted by the proportion of 
students graduating from high school in the same school. 
b. Exogenous effects (or contextual effects)—a person’s action varies with 
the exogenous characteristics (pre-determined characteristics) of the peer group. 
For example, the propensity of a student graduating from high school will be 
affected by the average level of mother’s education of other students in the 
school.   
c. Correlated effects—persons in same group tend to behave similarly 
because they are subject to a common institutional environment or they share the 
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similar characteristics. Literature often terms the shared institutional settings as 
‘common shocks’---for example, that all students in the same classroom do well 
academically may reflect nothing but the high quality of the teacher. The other 
part of the correlated effects, ‘the shared characteristics’, draws a lot of interest 
from empirical studies. It is called ‘selection problems’, which arises when 
individuals tend to self select into a group with members sharing similar 
attributes. For example, families that are very supportive of children’s education 
are more likely to sort themselves across schools in order to seek for better peers.  
Accordingly, research studying peer effects typically models the behavior (or 
outcomes) of an individual (e.g., educational outcomes, criminal behavior, or teen 
childbearing), as a function of the average behavior of his/her social group, the 
individual’s own characteristics, and also the characteristics of the group: 
ijjijijijij ZXXyy       (2.1) 
where ijy  represents individual behavior, like test scores, for individual i in school j; ijy  
is the average test scores for peers of student i in school j; ijX   are a vector of mean pre-
existing peer characteristics of student i in school j; ijX are a vector of individual or 
family characteristics of student i in school j, including gender, race, and social economic 
status; jZ are school level characteristics, such as teacher quality and school policies etc.; 
ij is an individual error term. In the language of Manski (1993), the coefficients 
 reflects the endogenous effects, the coefficient  reflects the exogenous or contextual 
effects, and the coefficient of   then reflects the correlated effects.   
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However, Manski (1993, 1999, and 2000) demonstrates that without severe 
restrictions, the standard single equation approach like model (2.1) is unable to separately 
identify the causal peer group effects from other influences. The key issue, according to 
Moffit (2001), is that peer effects are endogenous. The endogeneity, as Moffit further 
explains, arises from three problems:  
 Simultaneity problem: simultaneity bias is also called reflection problem 
by Manski (1993, 1999, 2000), which arises from the endogenous effects wherein 
one person’s actions affect other group members’ actions and vice versa.  As a 
simple illustration, in the linear-in-mean model discussed in above, while we 
assume that the average achievement of peers affects individual achievement 
through the coefficient , individual i also influences the average achievement of 
the peers if a symmetric equation holds for every students in the group. As a 
result, the individual error term ( ij ) is mechanically correlated with the peer 
effect variable ijy , which leads to an inconsistent estimation of peer parameters. 
Due to this simultaneous nature, it is extraordinary difficult to identify the causal 
effects of peer interactions using contemporaneous peer behavior or outcome 
measures without severe restrictions. 
 Omitted unobserved factors or measurement error: Omitted variables 
problem or measurement error occurs when a determinant of the student’s 
outcome is omitted or measured poorly in the model. Omitted variables bias is a 
common misspecification to all types of regression models---it is virtually never 
possible to include all relevant factors in a model. However, due to the correlation 
effects, omitted variable bias is particularly damaging to the inferences of peer 
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effects (Hanushek et al., 2003). For example, students in a same school are 
subject to similar environment and experiences. Therefore both individual’s and 
peers’ achievement will tend to be affected by the common omitted factors, which 
may induce a correlation between the peer variables and the random error terms 
for all students. It will lead the false attribution of common behavior among 
students in the same school to peer influences, whereas, in truth, the students have 
similar behavior just because they are subject to a common (unobserved) 
environment, such as high-quality teachers.  
 Endogenous membership problems: it is usually called selection bias or 
group endogeneity in the literature; and it is the most pervasive methodological 
issue discussed in empirical studies. The peer group itself is often the matter of 
individual choice---families and children usually choose being in a neighborhood 
or school where they share similar attributes with other members. Within a 
school, student placement across classes is also influenced by school policies as 
well as parental involvement. Under this circumstance, measures of peer 
characteristics may proxy for other unobservable factors that also affect the 
outcomes, such as student willingness to work, or parental ambition and 
resources. However, those family factors are usually unobservable to researchers. 
A standard approach that ignores the endogenous parental choices might 
erroneously attribute the entire increment in students’ performance to the superior 
peer group.    
Given the multiple mechanisms through which peer group impacts student outcomes, 
one would predict a strong relationship between peer qualities and student achievement. 
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However, these sources of endogeneity biases make it difficult to identify peer effects. As 
Rivkin (2001) argues, regardless of the number of included covariates, single equation 
methods almost certainly do not identify true peer group effects. Therefore, in order to 
overcome the endogeneity problems, empirical studies on peer effects have attempted to 
search for alternative techniques.  
 
Previous Research 
Coleman Report (Coleman et al. 1966) is one of the earliest studies on peer group 
effects in education. In particular, Coleman and colleagues indicate that black students 
performed better academically if they were in schools with higher fraction of white 
students. Winkler’s study (1975) finds that both white and black student’s scholastic 
achievement is positively related to peer social economic composition; and especially, 
transferring from a predominantly black school to a school with lower black population 
adversely affects the achievement of black students. Two studies in the 70s by Summers 
and Wolf (1977), and Henderson, Mieszkowski and Sauvageau (1978), have shown that 
students achieve higher if they are placed with high performing peers. However, the early 
studies take few steps toward addressing the endogeneity problems.  
In the past two decades, a growing literature has adopted a variety of innovative 
techniques to circumvent the methodological challenges in estimating peer effects. 
Despite the differences among all the methods used in recent studies, the key to 
overcoming the endogeneity problem is to find exogenous sources of variation in peer 
composition. The following review will focus on the strengths and weaknesses of 
identification strategies in some selected studies.  
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Because this study examines peer group effects on both student academic 
achievement and behavioral outcomes, the literature review also includes previous peer 
effect studies on both outcomes. 
  
Peer effect on student academic achievement 
Relying on longitudinal panel data from Texas, Hoxby (2001) estimates substantial 
peer effects on student achievement by comparing the idiosyncratic variations in adjacent 
cohorts’ race and gender composition within a grade within a school. The author argues 
that the identification strategies are credibly free of selection biases because the between-
cohort peer variations are beyond the easy management of parents and schools. However, 
Hanushek et al (2009) examined the same data set and pointed out that the between-
cohort peer composition changes actually come from frequent student transfers rather 
than birth or biological rate differences. Student transfers, however, are related to some 
unobserved family factors that also impact student achievement. If it is the transfers that 
cause the variations in peer characteristics, Hoxby’s method can not eliminate the 
endogeneity of family selection.  Another study by Lavy and Schlosser (2007) uses very 
similar strategies to Hoxby’s to examine classroom level peer impacts, and find that a 
high proportion of female classmates improve both boys’ and girls’ academic 
performance. Both studies avoid simultaneity bias by only examining predetermined peer 
characteristics, such as peer race and gender. 
Hanushek and colleagues (2003) also investigate school level peer effects using the 
same set of Texas data as Hoxby; but they implement different techniques to address the 
endogeneity problem.  Their study eliminates the across-school sorting problems by using 
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fixed effect (FE) methods, and circumvents the reflection problems using lagged peer 
achievement measures. As argued by the authors, fixed student effects account for all 
systematic and unobservable time-invariant individual and family factors that may 
influence the residential choice as well as student achievement, such as individual ability 
and parental motivations; fixed school effects are correlated with peer composition 
through school and neighborhood choices. The paper finds moderate effects of average 
peer achievement on student learning, but no impacts from average peer economic status 
or the dispersion of peer achievement. Fixed effects are also used in other school level 
peer effect studies by Hanushek et al. (2009), McEwan (2003) and Ammermueller and 
Pischke (2006).  
Fixed effects are widely used in studies investigating classroom peer effects to 
overcome the self-sorting problems. For example, Burk and Sass (2004) measure the peer 
influences on mathematic achievement within specific math classrooms for middle school 
students in Florida. Both student and teacher fixed effects, as well as school/grade and 
year fixed effects are included in the regression. Based on the findings that adding 
teacher fixed effects purges away the peer influences, the authors argue that the apparent 
peer impacts found in other studies may just reflect the endogenous matching between 
teachers and students within a school. Other classroom peer studies using fixed effect 
method include Betts and Zau (2004), Vigdor and Nechyba (2004), Stiefel, Schwartz, and 
Zabel(2004),  and Sund(2009).  Using fixed effects is expected to remove the spurious 
correlations between the time–invariant unobservables and the peer measures. However, 
despite its popularity, fixed effect models are not able to overcome the endogeneity that 
results from time varying factors, such as the year-to-year shocks. 
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Some studies examine how student performance is impacted by externally induced 
changes in peer composition. For example, Angrist and Lang (2002) find that classroom 
composition changes brought by Boston METCO program only moderately impacted 
minority students’ achievement in reading and language. The METCO program 
transferred and randomly placed inner city students to some suburban schools and 
therefore introduced plausible exogenous sources of variation in peer composition. 
Similarly, Imberman and Kuglar (2008) estimate how the influx of hurricane Katrina 
evacuee students impact the performance and behavior of non-evacuee (native) students. 
Another conventional approach to deal with selection bias problem is by the 
implementation of instrumental variables (IV). For example, in order to address the non-
random classroom assignment problem, Lefgren (2004) instruments the covariates of 
peers with the interaction between student’s initial ability with school tracking policy. 
The author also uses lagged peer achievement measures to overcome simultaneity bias. 
This study suggests modest peer effects--- moving from a 10th percentile classroom to a 
90th percentile classroom would only increase the achievement gains by between 0.03 and 
0.05 grade equivalents.  
Several other empirical studies on school peer effects have also used IV method to 
address the endogeneity problems caused by simultaneity and self selection. For example, 
Case and Katz (1992), and Gaviria and Raphael (1999) instrument the average peer 
behaviors using the average background characteristics of the peers to solve the 
simultaneity problems; Boozer and Cacciola (2001) use the fraction of students 
previously randomly exposed to small class treatment as the IV for the contemporaneous 
peer group measures; Kang (2007) examines the classroom peer effects in South Korea 
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by implementing an IV model that uses the mean and standard deviation of peer science 
scores as the instruments for the variable of interest---average classmate math test scores. 
The study by Evans et al. (1992) is one of the early studies using IV method to address 
group endogeneity (self-selection) problems, wherein a set of metropolitan area social 
economic indexes are used as instruments for the peer variable ‘proportion of 
economically disadvantaged students at a school’. The study finds significant peer effects 
from the simple OLS model, but no impacts from the IV model. However, Rivkin (2001) 
questions the validity of instruments used in Evans et al. He examines the same research 
question using similar set of instruments but different data set. His findings suggest that 
using aggregated metropolitan area characteristics as instruments actually increases the 
magnitude of group selection biases. Another peer effect study by Fertig’s (2003) tackles 
the potential endogeneity arising from both selectivity and simultaneity by utilizing two 
sets of instrumental variables: the first set of IVs indicating school policy in selecting 
students upon entry and whether it is a private school; the second set of IVs including 
measures of parental caring behavior. Fertig’s study finds that individual student reading 
achievement is negatively impacted by the achievement heterogeneity in school peer 
composition. 
A new stream of empirical literature focuses on special cases where individuals are 
randomly assigned across groups. Among all the methods intending to reduce selection 
bias, randomization is the most credible one--- it ensures that peer group formation is 
totally exogenous. Two frequently cited studies are conducted by Sacerdote (2001) and 
Zimmerman (2003), who find significant association between roommate academic 
attainment and individual achievement using randomly assigned roommate data at 
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Dartmouth University and Williams College respectively. However, due to the limited 
experimental data in social sciences, randomization methods are only applicable to a few 
special cases, such as college freshman roommates, or government assisted housing 
programs (e.g., in Katz, Kling, and Liebman, 2001), where a central authority conducts 
the group assignment.  
The random assignment (RA) approach is rarely seen in research on pre-collegial peer 
effects. One exception is the study by Boozer and Cacciola (2001) relying on the random 
assigned classroom data in Tennessee STAR program to investigate the impact of 
average classmate achievement on student own performance. Unlike most other empirical 
studies, this study examines the endogenous peer effects --- effects from average 
contemporaneous classmate achievement. Since randomization eliminates selection bias, 
the authors use instrument variable methods to tackle the simultaneity problems: the 
fraction of classmates previously exposed to small-class treatment is formed as 
instrument. A possible flaw of this study is that the authors did not address issues that 
may affect the purity of the randomization, such as selective attrition and student mobility 
between class types. Two other studies using random assignment approach to examine 
peer effects on student outcomes focus on classrooms in other countries. (e.g., the South 
Korea study by Kang, 2007; and the Kenya by  Duflo, Dupas, and Kremer, 2008) 
Vigdor and Nechyba (2008) recently present a new method attempting to disentangle 
the true peer effects and the effects from selection. Based on the observed peer 
characteristics, they predict the probability of random assignment of students across 
classrooms, which then enter the model as a predictor of selection effects by interacting 
with the peer variables. Similar to many other studies, reflection problems are eliminated 
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by using previous peer achievement measures. Their results suggest that a great portion 
of peer effects from OLS estimation actually reflect selection. 
 
Peer effect on behavioral outcomes 
Researchers in education have been interested in how peer composition impacts both 
individual’s scholastic and non-scholastic outcomes. Due to the limitation in data access 
to individual behavioral outcomes, many empirical studies have to rely on survey data to 
examine peer influences on student conducts. For example, Evans, Oats and Schwab 
(1992) use National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) data and find no significant 
correlation between percentage of economically disadvantaged school population and 
student behaviors such as teenager pregnancy and high school drop out. Argys (2008) 
uses the same data set and finds that female students are more likely to use substances if 
they are accompanied by older peers. Two other studies by Gaviria and Raphael (2001, 
using National Educational Longitudinal Study (NELS) data)  and by Bifulco and 
Fletcher (2008, using National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (NLSAH) data ) 
also investigate peer effects on issues like high school drop out, church attendance, 
college attendance, and substance uses. Behavioral outcomes (such as alcohol use, 
participation in fraternities, and major choices etc) are also widely examined in peer 
effect studies at college level (e.g., Lyle, 2007; Kremer & Levy, 2001; and Sacerdote , 
2000), wherein the outcome variables are usually derived from individual responses to 
research surveys.  
Existing literature provides little knowledge on peer impacts on student conducts at 
elementary and middle school levels. The major explanation for lack of research on this 
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issue is data limitation. Many popular approaches used in identifying peer effects, 
including fixed effect models (used in studies by Hanushek et.al., 2003, 2009; Betts and 
Zau, 2004) and idiosyncratic between-cohort peer variations (used by Hoxby, 2000; and 
Lavy and Schlosser, 2007), require the use of longitudinal panel data; so studies using 
these methods have had to rely on state or local administrative data sets, which usually 
just provide a small set of student outcomes, mostly limited to test scores. Therefore, 
most studies on school peer effects have only focused on academic outcomes. One 
exception is the study by David Figlio (2005), which investigates how disruptive 
classmates impact student achievement and behavior. The behavioral outcome in Figlio’s 
study is represented by whether a student is suspended at least once for more than 5 days. 
However, the validity of the instrumental variable (proportion of male students with 
female names) used in this paper is questionable. 
Like most empirical studies, this paper also concentrates on identifying contextual 
effects measured by pre-determined peer characteristics and lagged peer outcomes, which 
avoids the simultaneity biases arising from endogenous peer effects. The identifying 
strategies then focus on tackling the selection bias problems. Specifically, this study will 
combine two approaches used in previous studies --- instrumental variables (IV) and 
Randomization (RA). As mentioned before, two sets of dependent variables will be 
examined: student academic achievement in both math and reading, and student 
behavioral outcomes in discipline and attendance. Next chapter provides detailed 
discussion on these two methods and their implementations in this study.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND, DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
The identification of peer group effects in this dissertation relies on the randomization 
through magnet school admission lotteries. This chapter starts with the introduction of the 
background of the district under study and its operation of magnet programs. It then lists 
all the data sources. Finally, this chapter introduces the analytical strategies and specifies 
the regression models to estimate peer effects at both school and classroom levels.  
 
Institutional Background 
This study focuses on peer group effects on middle school students in a mid-size 
Southern urban district. In the school year 2003-2004, the district serves approximately 
80,000 students from kindergarten to 12th grade in 129 schools, with half of the student 
population eligible for the federal free or reduced price lunch program. Similar to other 
urban school systems in the nation, the district is racially mixed, serving 41% White 
students, 47% Black students, and 9% Hispanic students. About 6% students are 
categorized as English Language Learners (ELL). Middle schools in this district are 
structured from grade 5 to 8, which is one grade earlier than many other districts in the 
nation. During 2003-2004 school year, there are approximately 24,500 students in 52 
middle schools. The demographic characteristics of middle school students are almost 
identical to the whole district population.  
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The district operates magnet schools at all three levels—elementary, middle, and high 
schools. There are two types of magnet programs: selective academic magnet (applicants 
must meet the grade/test score requirement), and non-academic magnet. At the middle 
school level, there is one academic magnet serving grades 5 to 8. While there is another 
academic magnet serving grades 7 to 12, it is not considered a middle school magnet in 
this study because the lottery to this school happens 2 years later than the other magnet 
programs starting from 5th grade. The complications caused by the second academic 
magnet school will be addressed later in this chapter.  
Students are admitted to a magnet school through four channels:  (1) lottery; (2) 
sibling preference; (3) geographic priority zones; (4) promotion from a feeder magnet.  In 
practice, all students eligible for the latter 3 categories are admitted to the magnet school 
without going through the lottery. Since the identification strategy relies on lottery 
outcomes, the investigation of peer effects in this study will limit to the sample of 
students who participated in the admission lotteries to the magnet middle schools. 
Students who did not participate in magnet school lotteries are included in the 
calculations of peer variables, but are dropped from the regression analysis. 
Middle school lotteries are held in the spring of the fourth grade for the following 
academic year. The district conducts separate lotteries for each magnet school.  Students 
can enter multiple lotteries.  Students who are accepted outright on lottery day must 
decide whether to accept any of the positions offered them --- if they accept a position in 
one school, they go to the bottom of the wait list for any other magnets.  Those who lost 
the lottery on the lottery day are placed on wait lists and will be accepted off the list as 
positions become open.   
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The district offers lottery data starting from the spring of 1997, but the achievement 
data are available from school year 1998-99 through 2006-07. Because student prior 
achievement (measured by 4th grade test scores) is an essential covariate in the analyses, 
this study includes the 5 cohorts of students entering 5th grade between fall of 1999 and 
fall of 2003.  
Table 3.1 lists the middle school level magnet programs for all 5 cohorts. During the 
years of the investigation, the number of magnet programs at middle school level has 
increased from 3 in year 1999 to 6 in year 2003. The fifth non-academic magnet, Central, 
was added in 2003, and filled most of its places in that year through geographic priorities; 
therefore, it is not treated as a magnet school since few observations from this school 
contribute to either control group or treatment group.  
 
Table 3.1 Number of Magnet Programs at Middle School Level1 
Lottery Year  Magnet Schools2        Grades Observed 
1999    Academic, North, East        5,6,7,8 
2000    Academic, North, East, South      5,6,7,8 
2001    Academic, North, East, South      5,6,7,8 
2002    Academic, North, East, South, West    5,6,7,8 
2003    Academic, North, East, South, West, Central  5,6,7,8 
                       
1. The second academic magnet school is not listed in this table, but it operates since the first lottery year 
in the sample. 
2. All school names are pseudonyms.             
 
 
Because our student level data include year 1999/2000 through year 2006/07, all 5 
cohorts will be followed through all middle school grades as long as they stay in the 
district. As shown in Table 3.2, for all five cohorts, there are total 85872 student 
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observations in all middle schools in the district.1 The observations of lottery participants 
count for 14-15% of all middle school observations for each cohort; the total number of 
participant observations is 12314, which makes up the analysis sample in this study. 
 
Table 3.2 Number of Student Observations in Middle Schools by Cohorts 
      Cohot1  Cohort2  Cohort3  Cohot4  Cohort5 
Enrollment               
All Schools      14844  17504  17991  17406  18127 
               
Magnet School             
Academic      516  524  571  621  596 
North      425  514  408  312  282 
South        555  586  589  532 
East      302  225  290  326  371 
West            250  353 
Total      1243  1818  1855  2098  2134 
Lottery Participation             
Total Participants    2087  2449  2820  2499  2459 
               
Academic      1261  1272  1657  1318  1608 
North      860  970  997  927  528 
South        1226  1292  1155  903 
East      793  707  1021  922  705 
West            520  461 
Composite Non‐Academic  1246  1821  2020  1831  1530 
Note: Counts only middle school students (5th to 8th graders) who were also enrolled 
in the district as 4th graders and had non‐missing math test scores in 4th grade. 
 
 
From lottery year 1999 to lottery year 2003, there were approximately 5000 
applications to all middle school magnet programs, among which nearly half applied for 
the academic magnet. Table 3.3 describes the lottery outcomes and 5th grade enrollment 
patterns for each magnet school. There are two types of lottery winners defined: those 
                                                 
1 Because prior achievement is desirable to be included in the calculation of peer characteristics and in the 
regression, the counts of student observations are limited to students who were also enrolled in the same 
district as 4th graders and had non-missing math scores. The actual numbers of student observations are 
larger for all cohorts. 
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admitted outright on the lottery day and those whose place on the wait list was reached by 
the start of the school year23.   
As shown in Table 3.3, for the 2306 lottery participants for the academic magnet, the 
probability of admission is less than 50 percent. Of the 1201 students not admitted by the 
academic school at the beginning of 5th grade, 727 (60%) either did not apply or failed to 
win any other magnet programs. Although 40% of the students who lost the academic 
magnet lottery were admitted to other non-academic magnet programs, many of them did 
not comply with the lottery assignment: only 285 of them chose to attend a non-academic 
magnet in 5th grade, compared with 826 enrolled in regular schools. About 19% (437) of 
lottery participants did not have test records in grade 5, of whom the majority no longer 
attended a school in the district.4  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Delayed winner is defined based on student original position in the wait list. If a student lost the lottery 
outright on the lottery day, but his number in the wait list is reached by the start of the school year, the 
student is defined as a delayed winner. The definition of delayed winner is based on the original wait list 
because the number on the list is solely determined by the lottery and not by subsequent decisions of 
students and parents.  
3 Accordingly, there are two lottery outcome indicators are defined: outright_winMj=1 if a student is an 
outright winner of magnet school j, 0 otherwise; delayed_winMj=1 if a student is a delayed winner of 
magnet school j, 0 otherwise. 
4 337 academic magnet lottery participants never enrolled in the district as 5th graders. Another 100 students 
enrolled in district schools but were not present for testing --- the majority of these students had probably 
left the system prior to the test date, as 65% of them were never enrolled in 6th grade.  
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Table 3.3 Magnet School Lotteries and Enrollment 
                                             Non‐Academic 
    Academic  North  South  East  West 
Composite  
Non‐Academic 
Lottery Participants1  2306  1307  1384  1260  289  2564 
Winners             
  Outright  884  709  492  511  50  1430 4 
  Delayed2  221  308  374  326  46  890 
Losers             
  This Lottery  1201  290  518  423  193  397 
  All Lotteries  727  54  111  73  18  225 
               
Grade 5 Enrollment3             
  This Magnet  758  391  384  243  30  1048 
  Other Magnets  285  325  413  430  143  337 
  Non‐Magnets  826  410  408  406  90  824 
Left System/Untested             
  5th Grade  437  178  172  180  26  347 
  6th Grade5  149  122  99  93  19  196 
                       
1. Lottery participants count only the students who were enrolled in the district as 4th graders 
 and had non‐missing 4th grade test scores when lottery was conducted.   
2. Delayed winners in this table count only the non‐outright winners who received notice before   
the 12th day of school year in 5th grade.         
3. Counts only students tested in mathematics as 5th graders as well as 4th graders. 
4. Win at least one non‐academic magnet lottery       
5. Students who were in the district as 5th graders but left the system (or untested) in 6th grade 
 
 
There were more than 2500 entrants in one or more non-academic magnet lotteries. 
Numbers for the West magnet school are very low because this school did not become a 
magnet school until the school year 2002/03 and most of its places were actually taken by 
students promoted from a feeder school. As we can tell from the table, many students 
applied for more than one magnet programs, so the majority of the participants won the 
admission opportunity in at least one non-academic magnet, either outright or through 
delayed notices. 397 (16%) students did not win a place among all non-academic 
programs; but because many of the students also applied for the academic magnet, there 
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are only 225 students who were not admitted by any magnet program, representing 8% of 
all non-magnet lottery participants. Regardless of the high admission rate, less than 50% 
of participants attended a treatment group school as 5th graders, while 846 were enrolled 
in non-magnet schools. About 13% students left the system or were not tested in 5th 
grade.  
As Table 3.3 shows, there are many complications in this district’s lottery based 
admission process: non-compliance, multiple choices, and attrition. All these 
complications will threaten the purity of randomization; and therefore, Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) method is not able to obtain unbiased estimates of peer effects. Later 
discussion in this chapter will present the solutions to address the problems caused by 
these complications. 
 
Data Source 
Data for this study are collected from the district’s administrative data system. All the 
datasets are student level data, including a rich set of information on individual students, 
such as academic achievement, demographic background, course enrollment, lottery 
participation, disciplinary infractions, and absence records etc.  
 (1) Achievement Data. Student academic achievement information comes from the 
state annual testing program that includes virtually all students beginning in 3rd grade and 
continuing through 8th grade. The tests cover five subjects: reading, mathematics, 
language arts, social studies, and science. The assessments adopt the Terra Nova series of 
achievement tests constructed and calibrated annually by CTB/McGraw-Hill, with 
additional items reflecting special content of the state K-12 curriculum. Achievement 
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data from 4th grade will serve as the prior achievement benchmark for individual students 
and will be aggregated at classroom and school levels to calculate academic ability 
measures for peers. Student test scores in grades 5 to 8 are used to form the dependent 
variables reflecting student academic outcomes.5 Similar to many other empirical studies, 
this project focuses on achievement in math and reading. 
(2) Course Data. Every year, the district provides a detailed course file, including 
information of course code, course id, course title, course period, and instructor name, 
etc. The course file reveals the specific class placement for each student in every subject, 
thereby identifying the classroom peers. In addition, the course file also enables me to 
match a student with his instructor for a specific class, which will be used to estimate 
teacher fixed effects to test if peer effects actually represent the impacts of teachers.  
(3) Lottery Data. The district provides lottery records of all admission lotteries 
conducted for the magnet schools that have oversubscribed applications. The data include 
information such as lottery application, lottery results, and wait list number etc, which are 
going to be used to create variables indicating lottery participation and lottery outcomes.  
Although the data are available from lottery year 19976 through 2003, only lottery 
participants from lottery year 1999 to 2003 are included in the sample.   
(4) Student Background Data. Another student level data file contains student 
background characteristics, such as student gender, race, whether a student is in special 
education program, whether a student is an English Language Learner, whether the 
                                                 
5 The achievement data provide scale scores in all subjects. However, we received two sets of achievement 
data separately: one for school year 1999 to 2004 (received in 2005), and the other for school year 2005-
2007 (received in early 2009). The scores in early year data and late year data are differently scaled --- the 
average scores in later years are lower by 130-150 points for both math and reading.  In order to address the 
inconsistence in test scores, I transformed student test scores (from 4th grade to 8th grades) to standardized 
scores with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 in each grade and each year.  
6 In our sample, it means the lotteries conducted in the spring of 1997 for magnet schools starting from 5th 
grade in the fall of 1997. 
 29
student is eligible for federal free or reduced price lunch program, and student prior 
achievement. All the background variables will be included in the regression as 
explanatory variables to improve the model precision and deal with the possible biases 
arising from sample attrition; they are also going to be aggregated at classroom and 
school levels to construct peer characteristics.  
(5) Discipline and Attendance Data. The district administrative data also provide 
student attendance and mobility records, as well as disciplinary consequences reflecting 
the frequency and severity of student misconduct incidents. Two variables are derived 
from the attendance and disciplinary records: annual attendance rate, and annual number 
of suspensions. The contemporary values (values in grades 5 to 8) of these two variables 
are used to form the dependent variables representing student behavioral outcomes. The 
lagged values (4th grade) of these two behavioral variables will be introduced as 
explanatory variables and will be used to construct peer variables at both classroom and 
school levels.  
All of the datasets are linked by a unique student identification number and variables 
are created to estimate peer group impacts on individual students in middle schools of 
this Southern city district. Middle schools are chosen for two major reasons. First, the 
achievement data from the state standard test are only available for students in grades 3-
8. Because most elementary schools in the district are structured from Kindergarten to 4th 
grade, the elementary sample is much smaller than the middle school sample. Moreover, 
focusing on students from 5th to 8th grade, I can use student’s elementary school (4th 
grade) records to establish the achievement benchmark. Second, this project is going to 
investigate the peer effects at both school and classroom level. In this district, the 
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majority of middle school students (especially when students reach 7th and 8th grade) 
typically rotate through classrooms for different subjects. The classroom level 
investigation then will estimate subject-specific peer effects, which is different from most 
previous studies that examine general class peer effects using data from elementary 
schools.  
 
Analytical Strategy 
In this study, the identification strategy combines both the instrumental variable 
method and the method of randomization. In particular, the lottery outcomes will be 
exploited to construct the counterfactual peer variables and the instrumental variables. 
This part will first presents a review of the two econometrical methods --- instrumental 
variables (IV) and randomization (RA). It will then discuss the analytical models to 
answer the three research questions.  
 
Overview of the methods 
1. Instrumental Variables 
Instrumental variables (IV) method is a frequently used estimation technique in 
empirical economic studies (probably second only to Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
according to Wooldridge (2001)). It was originally proposed by Reiersol (1941), and 
further developed by Durbin (1954) and Sargan (1958).  
The motivation of using instrumental variables method comes from the fact that OLS 
yields consistent estimates only when the error terms are asymptotically orthogonal to the 
regressors. For example, in a simple linear regression model: 
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y  0  x1 u             (3.1) 
If 1ˆ  is to be consistent for 1 , the condition 0),( uxCOV  must hold7. In other words, 
OLS obtains consistent estimates only if all regressors are exogenous. However, in 
applied econometrics, endogeneity that causes 0),( uxCOV  arises from many sources, 
such as omitted variables, self-selection, measurement errors, and simultaneity etc. For 
example, in peer effect estimation, one regression equation can often have multiple 
sources of endogeneity.   
The method of instrumental variables provides a general solution to the problems of 
endogenous regressors. Valid instrumental variables must satisfy two basic conditions. 
First, the instruments must be mean-independent of the error terms. For example, if we 
find an observable variable z to be used as instrumental variable for the endogenous 
variable x  in equation (3.1), it must be uncorrelated withu : 0),( uzCOV . In other 
words, the instrumental variable should not be correlated with any unobserved factors 
that influence the outcome. The second condition requires that the regressor x  depends 
on z . In the simple case like equation (3.1), this means 0),( xzCOV --- the instrumental 
variable and the regressor of interest must be correlated. In summary, an instrumental 
variable is a variable that does not belong in the model in its own right; it must be 
correlated with the regressor of interest x  and only contributes to the outcome y  
through x . When variable z satisfies the two conditions, the parameter  1 can be 
identified from the following: 
1 ),(/),( xzCOVyzCOV                     (3.2a) 
                                                 
7 Another condition is E( u ) = 0, but with the existence of the intercept  0, this assumption is for free. 
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Given a sample of data on yx, and ,z  it is simple to obtain the IV estimation of  18: 
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            (3.2b) 
IV methods have been used in a number of educational studies to solve the 
endogeneity problems. For example, Evans and Schwab (1995) use student’s affiliation 
with Catholic Church as IVs to investigate the effectiveness of attending Catholic 
schools; Neal (1997) examines the same question using geographic proximity to a 
Catholic school as IVs; Hoxby(2000) uses the natural boundaries created by rivers as IVs 
for the concentration of public schools within a school district to estimate the impact of 
public school competition on student achievement.  
Empirical studies using IV approach all face the challenges to justify the validity of 
the chosen instruments. A valid instrument must satisfy the aforementioned two 
conditions. In general, it is likely that the instruments can meet the second requirement of 
being correlated with the regressor of interest 0),( xzCOV ; it is often hard to prove if 
the instruments meet the first condition of not being correlated with the error term 
0),( uzCOV .  For example, in Evans and Shwab’s influential Catholic school paper, 
the authors argue for the credibility of using Catholic church affiliation as instrumental 
variables from two perspectives: first, being a Catholic strongly affects Catholic school 
attendance; second, Catholic families are very close to the national average on a variety 
of social-economic indicators --- therefore, the students from Catholic families do not 
differ from other students in any way impacting outcomes than attending Catholic 
                                                 
8 In practice, instrument variable estimator is usually estimated from the two-stage least square (2SLS) 
models: (1) at the first stage: obtain the fitted values xˆ  (the endogenous regressor ) from the regression of 
x  on the instrument variable z and other exogenous regressors in the model; (2) at the second stage, run 
the OLS regression of y on xˆ  and other exogenous regressors.  
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schools. However, as Tyler(1994), Neal (1997) and Altonji et al. (2005) note, being 
Catholic may still be well correlated with some less easily measurable neighborhood or 
family characteristics that also influence individual outcomes.9  
A valid instrument can be found in the context of program evaluation, such as job 
training program, or school choice program, wherein a social experiment is usually 
conducted to randomly assign individuals to be a control group or a treatment group. 
Randomization determined eligibility meets the two requirements of a convincing 
instrument: first, individuals are randomly selected to treatment or control groups, so the 
eligibility is exogenous; second, in many experiments, being treated is solely determined 
by the randomized assignment, therefore the eligibility is strongly correlated with the 
regressor of interest --- the treatment.   
2. Randomization 
In program evaluation or peer effect studies, the counterfactual question asked is what 
would have happened to individual’s outcomes if he/she had been placed in another 
situation. For example, what would the student math performance be if he attends a 
choice school instead of a neighborhood school, or if he stays with a group of high math 
performing students instead of with low math performing students? Clearly, the sample 
counterparts for the missing counterfactuals are not observable in ordinary data --- the 
same person can not be placed in both states in the same time. Therefore, the best way to 
identify the causal relationship would be comparing the outcomes of individuals with 
nearly identical characteristics (both observed and unobserved) being assigned to 
                                                 
9 In Neal’s Catholic school study, the author uses the geographic proximity to Catholic schools as the 
instruments for Catholic school attendance. Altonji, Elder, and Taber(2005) examines the validity of three 
sets instruments used to address the self-selection problems in attending Catholic schools: religious 
affiliation, geographic proximity, and the  interaction between religion and proximity. However, their 
findings suggest that none of the three instruments are valid in identifying the Catholic school effects. 
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different situations. Randomization makes this realistic. Individuals are randomly 
assigned to a treatment group (for example, a choice school) or to a control group (a 
neighborhood school); therefore, the control group can be used to estimate the average 
outcomes corresponding to the counterfactual state that would happen to the individuals 
in the treatment group had they not received the treatment. 
For example, suppose there is a school choice program with one choice school 
(treatment group) and one regular public school (control group). Let’s assume that a 
lottery is the only way through which a student will be enrolled in the choice school. Let 
ip be an indicator variable for lottery participation. For all the lottery participants 
( 1ip ), let id  denote the treatment: 1id indicates that student i is enrolled in the 
choice school; 0id , otherwise. Let ir  denote the eligibility of the treatment: 1ir  
indicates that student i won the lottery and was offered the opportunity to the choice 
school; 0ir  indicates that student i lost the lottery.   
In theory, selection bias does not arise in a randomization-induced lottery program 
because winners and losers are identical on average in both observable and unobservable 
characteristics. Therefore, for all the lottery participants )1( ip , the causal effect of 
being offered the opportunity of treatment (in this case, being accepted into the choice 
school) can be directly estimated from a simple OLS model: 
iii ry                      (3.3) 
In equation (3.3), ir  is determined by the randomized lottery and is orthogonal to the 
residual i . The parameter  measures the average difference between the outcome of 
lottery winners and lottery losers, also known as Intention to Treat effect (ITT). Although 
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equation (3.3) yields unbiased estimation of ITT effect, many empirical studies still add a 
set of additional individual characteristics (denoted by iX , including demographic 
characteristics and family background etc; for examples, see Cullen et al., (2006, 2007), 
Katz et al (2002)) into the equation to improve the model precision:    
iiii Xry               (3.4) 
Because these individual characteristics also impact the outcome variable y i, the 
inclusion of iX  means that the influence from these variables does not enter the error 
term i . Therefore, including the individual characteristics improves the precision of the 
estimates on ITT effect by reducing the residual variation. 
The intention-to-treat (ITT) estimate measures the impact of being offered treatment. 
It is argued that ITT is of the direct interest of policy makers because it is the only policy 
variable under control by public officials. For example, policy makers can offer vouchers 
for students to attend private schools, but they can not force families who received the 
vouchers to actually use them. However, from the perspective of program evaluation, it is 
still desirable to estimate the actual impact of treatment (such as choice schools, training 
programs) itself, rather than just being offered the chance to get treatment. The average 
effect of treatment on the treated (ETT) can be measured from the equation: 
iiii Xdy               (3.5) 
Wherein 1id  means that student i actually enrolled in the choice school, and 
parameter estimates ETT. In an ideal situation where student enrollment is solely 
determined by lottery and all participants comply with the lottery assignments, id equals 
ir in equation (3.4) --- ITT and ETT coincide.  
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However, in many social experiments, participants usually do not fully comply with 
the lottery assignments: winners may choose not enrolling in the choice school, and 
losers may seek for other choices rather than the neighborhood school. In some school 
choice programs that offer multiple opportunities (such as the Milwaukee voucher 
program and the magnet programs in this study), students may participate in several 
lotteries at the same time. Families that win multiple lotteries have to make one choice 
among all the choice schools that accept their child; and lottery loser families may also 
choose to relocate to another neighborhood or seek for other choices such as private 
schools. Under all these circumstances, the differences between the winners and losers 
are no longer purely determined by the lottery. Rather, they may be correlated with other 
unobserved factors influencing student outcomes. Therefore, in equation (3.5), id  is no 
longer exogenous and OLS approach can not yield an unbiased estimate of parameter .  
This problem can be solved by using lottery assignments )( ir as instruments for the 
actual school where the student finally enrolled in )( id . Lottery assignments meet the two 
required conditions of valid instrumental variables: because the assignments are 
randomly decided, they are orthogonal to the error term; because lottery is the only way 
through which the participants can enroll in the choice school, the assignments are highly 
correlated with the enrollment variable id . Therefore, ETT can be estimated from a two 
stage-least-square (2SLS) model using IV approach: 
First, obtain the fitted values idˆ  from the regression: 
iiii Xrd   i            (1st stage model, 3.6a) 
Second, obtain the IV estimate of parameter  (ETT) from the regression: 
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iiii Xdy   ˆ             (2nd stage model, 3.6b) 
Randomization has been exploited by a number of studies to examine the impact of 
educational policy/reform on student achievement. For example, Cullen and colleagues 
(Cullen, Jacob, and Leavitt, 2003; Cullen and Jacob, 2007) estimate the ITT effects of 
Chicago public school choice program. Rouse (1998) and Howell and Peterson (2002) 
examine the impact of private school voucher plans using lottery assignments as 
instrument. Kruger (1999) also exploits randomized assignment as an instrumental 
variable to evaluate the class size reduction program in Tennessee STAR experiment.  
 
Identification strategies in this study 
As many other social experiments, the lottery-induced randomization in the 
understudy district also has lots of complications: first, the lottery school enrollment 
process is voluntary and participants do not fully comply with the lottery assignment; 
second, in many school choice programs, students can apply for multiple schools; third, 
in the years of our investigation, there are significant student attritions in both lottery 
winner and loser population; forth, student’s responses to peer impact are hetergenous; 
finally, peer effect may signal some unobserved school factors, such as teacher qualities. 
Therefore, instead of simply comparing the outcomes of winners and losers with different 
peers, this study exploits the randomization through admission lotteries to form an 
instrument variable for the regressor of interest --- the actual peers, and estimates the 
causal relationship between individual outcomes and the peer groups from the 
instrumented (exogenous) peer variables.  The model also controls for a large number of 
individual and school characteristics to improve the precision of the regression models 
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and eliminate the biases from attrition. In addition, fixed teacher effect will be included to 
test if the peer variables signal for teacher quality.  
The following sections will discuss the analytical models identifying peer group 
effects on student outcomes. The discussion will start with school level average peer 
effect estimation, followed by classroom average peer effect analysis, the estimates of 
effects from dispersion of peer characteristics, and the heterogeneity in peer group 
impacts. 
1. School level analysis 
I. Basic models and variables 
a. Basic models 
The basic idea of the identification strategy is to estimate peer effects from the 
differences between the actual peers of a magnet school student and his counterfactual 
peers in a neighborhood school he would have attended had he not been enrolled in the 
magnet school. Since one student can not attend both magnet school and neighborhood 
school simultaneously, the counterfactual peers are not observable. However, we can 
exploit the randomized admission lottery for the magnet school to construct the 
counterfactual peer values. In this district, the admission lotteries randomly assign 
participants to magnet schools and neighborhood schools; conditional on the attendance 
zone, the lottery also randomly assign participants to peers they will encounter. If all 
lottery participants fully comply with the lottery assignments, the peers for the lottery 
losers who enrolled in neighborhood schools can serve as the counterfactual peers for the 
magnet school students. Peer effects then can be estimated from the average differences 
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in outcomes associated with the treatment group (magnet school) peers and control group 
(neighborhood school) peers.  
To facilitate the explanation, let’s make some assumptions first: (1) All participants 
are randomly assigned to treatment group (magnet school) and control group 
(neighborhood school), and fully comply with the lottery assignment; (2) The treatment 
group only includes one magnet school; (3) The indicator for lottery outcomes is binary: 
win or lose. The outcomes of individual student i in school j can be estimated from the 
model: 
                      ijjiij uPXY   )(              (3.7) 
where iX  is a vector of observed student characteristics; jP represents the peer 
characteristics in school j; iju is the error term for student i in school j
10.  
Under the assumptions, student i would attend a neighborhood school (N) if he does 
not enroll in a magnet school (M). Therefore, the outcomes are ),( iNiM YY , which can be 
obtained from: 
iMMiiM uPXY   )(              (3.8a) 
or 
iNNiiN uPXY   )(              (3.8b) 
Determined by the lottery, a student is assigned to either MP (peers in the magnet school) 
or NP (peers in the counterfactual neighborhood school where student i would attend if he 
had not been in the magnet school). Let 1id  if student i enrolls in magnet school M (in 
                                                 
10 There are two components included in the error term iju : the school effect on all students enrolled in 
school j, and the idiosyncratic error for student i.  
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treatment group); 0id if in neighborhood school N (in control group). Then we can 
combine equation (3.8a) and (3.8b) together: 
iNiNiMiiNiMiij udPdPduuXY  )]1([)()(   (3.9) 
where iiNiM duu )(  represents the magnet school treatment effects 
and )]1([ iNiM dPdP   represents the peer impacts on student outcomes.  
Because N varies across students, the treatment indicator id is heterogeneous. Let’s 
rearrange the model by defying )1|(  iiNiM duuE as the mean expectation of 
treatment effects over the students who received treatment and 
)1|()(  iiNiMiNiMi duuEuu  as the heterogeneous responses to treatment:  
iNiiiNiMiiij uddPdPdXY   )]1([)(    (3.10) 
Now there are two components in the error term iid  and iNu . 
Although the lottery randomly assign student i to either MP  or NP , NP itself is a 
matter of parental choices, especially residential location decision. Thus, it may be 
related to other unobservable factors that also affect student outcome, such as family 
resources, and bias the estimation of the peer effect . If we can control for the 
correlation of NP and the error term iNu , this source of endogenous bias can be 
eliminated. So let )|( NiNN PuEP   denote the correlation between NP and iNu , including 
NP into the equation: 
           iNiiNiNiMiiij vdPdPdPdXY   )]1([)(    (3.11) 
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where )|( NiNiNiN PuEuv  .  With NP  controlled in the model, the new error term iNv is 
no longer correlated with the peer measures --- the coefficient   now does not pick up 
the endogenous bias from NP .  
Equation (3.11) includes two peer variables: the first term )]1([ iNiM dPdP   
representing lottery-based variation in peers, and the second term NP representing 
residence-based variation in peers. The coefficient on the former term   measures the 
causal relationship between peers and student outcomes. Note from equation (3.11) that 
the estimation of peer effect  depends on the treatment variable id . Under the 
assumptions, the value of id is randomly determined by the magnet school admission 
lottery; conditional on NP , the lottery also randomly assigns students either to MP or NP . 
Therefore, given that NP is included in the model, both the treatment term id and the peer 
term )]1([ iNiM dPdP   are exogenous --- OLS estimation of model (3.11) can yield 
unbiased estimation of peer effects11.  
However, also note that peer variable NP  represents the counterfactual non-magnet 
school peers with whom a student would stay if not enrolled in a magnet school. 
Therefore, NP  is not observable for students who attended the magnet school. The next 
step then is to predict the counterfactual peers NP  for magnet school students. The 
prediction is based on the sample of students who lost the lottery and attended regular 
public schools, using their information in vector X as well as their elementary schools. 
So a student in the magnet school get assigned an predicted value of NPˆ , which is close to 
                                                 
11 Equation (3.11) is considered as the basic model estimating school level peer effects. Other regressors 
included in the final regression model (not shown in the equation due to text limit) include the lottery 
participation indicators (including lottery year and lottery school combination), year and grade indicators. 
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the actual NP  of a counterpart student (a lottery loser attending a neighborhood school) 
who share similar background (such as demographic characteristics and elementary 
school) with this magnet school student12.  
b. Variables 
The dependent variable ijY includes both student academic achievement as well as 
behavioral outcomes. Individual academic achievement as dependent variable is 
measured by the standardized test scores based on the distribution of original scale scores 
in each grade and each school year. The behavioral outcomes are measured by student’s 
total numbers of suspension and the absence rate in each school year. 
The vector X includes student demographic variables as well as previous test scores 
and behavioral measures: black, female, low income (measured by eligibility for the free 
and reduced-price lunch program), special education, ELL, 4th grade reading and 
mathematics test scores, and 4th grade disciplinary incidences and absence rate.     
The regressors of interest cover a rich set of attributes of the peer groups. The 
specifications not only include the most commonly expressed peer characteristics such as 
race, gender, social economic status (SES)compositions and peer academic abilities, but 
also include less commonly examined characteristics such as percent special education 
student, percent ELL students, peer disciplinary infractions and attendance behaviors.  
The contextual (exogenous) peer characteristics, such as race, gender or SES 
compositions, are constructed by averaging over all individual students at each grade in 
every school. The endogenous peer characteristics, including both peer achievement and 
                                                 
12 Detailed discussion on the prediction of NP is provided in Appendix A, which includes the regression 
model that predicts NP , and the descriptive statistics comparing the predicted value and the actual value of 
NP for some lottery losers.  
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behavioral outcomes, are constructed as the aggregate mean of lagged values of the 
outcome variables (both academic achievement and behavioral records in 4th grade).  As 
noted before, the main reason of using lagged peer outcomes is to avoid the mechanical 
peer correlation arising from reflection problems. Another reason of relying on peer 
outcomes in 4th grade is because these values are determined before the admission 
lotteries that assign participants to treatment and control groups. Therefore, it not only 
circumvents the simultaneity bias, but also reduces the possible biases from omitted 
variables that are correlated with both individual outcomes and the peer variables since 
these peer outcomes are predetermined before students enter middle schools. However, 
although lagged values of peer outcomes are expected to capture most of the relevant 
variation in current peer achievement and behavior, they are still not perfect proxies for 
the current values. As Hanushek et al. (2003) suggested, the estimated effects from the 
lagged peer behavioral variables are most likely to be downward biased given the fact 
that the current innovations to behavior form an important avenue through which peers 
affect outcomes; therefore, the estimated effect of lagged peer behaviors may just provide 
a lower bound estimate of current peer behaviors.  
The regression models require multiple versions of peer variables for each student: 
MP and NP for school level peers. MP will be calculated straightforwardly using students 
actually enrolled at M, but NP  is an estimated variable for magnet school students. In 
order to avoid introducing a difference between students whose NP  is observed (lottery 
losers) and those whose NP  is a counterfactual (lottery winners), the predicted NPˆ ’s will 
be used in the final models for all students.   
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The main treatment indicators id  are dummy variables for enrollment in a magnet 
school.  Students are regarded as enrolled in a magnet school if they finished the school 
year at the magnet.  The relatively small number of students who started the year at a 
magnet before transferred out are treated as non-magnet students.   
All models include a full set of grade by year interactions in order to control for 
differences in test forms across grades and year. In addition, a set of lottery participation 
indicators are also controlled in all models because there are separate lotteries for each 
magnet school, and randomization only happens to the participants in a given lottery.  
II. Relax the assumptions 
From now on, let’s relax the provisional assumptions. First, there are some non-
compliers among the lottery participants.  The self selection of non-compliers means that 
the treatment variable id is no longer exogenous and neither is the peer term. Therefore, 
OLS methods will not yield unbiased estimates of model (3.11). The solution for this 
problem is to implement an instrument variable model, in which the lottery outcomes are 
used to construct the instrument variables. The following is the first stage models to 
predict the endogenous covariates (both treatment indicator and the peer variable) using 
the instrumental variables: 
(a) Estimate magnet school treatment variable d i from model  
                                iiii Xrd                     (1st stage IV model1) 
where the lottery result indicator r i serves as the external instrument variable ( ir =1 
if student i won the lottery; 0 otherwise).  
(b) Estimate the peer variable )1( iNiM dPdP  from model:   
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iiiMNiMMiNiM XdPdPdPdP   )]ˆ1(ˆˆ[)1(        (1st stage IV model2) 
Where the external IV for the endogenous peer variable is )]ˆ1(ˆˆ[ iMNiMM dPdP  . 
The instrument variable includes three parts: iMdˆ is an prediction of the probability 
that student i attend the magnet school, which is estimated based on students’ 
lottery outcome indicators and demographic variables13; MP is the mean value of 
school level peer variables in the magnet school; and NPˆ is the estimated school 
level peer variable in the neighborhood school. 
If we replace the endogenous regressors with their IV estimates, the instrumented model 
(second stage model) can now be expressed as: 
iNiiNiNiMiiij vdPdPdPdXY  ˆˆ)]ˆ1(ˆˆ[ˆ)(   (2nd stage model, 3.12) 
Given the use of lottery outcomes as instruments and the inclusion of NPˆ in the 
regression, we obtain unbiased estimates of peer effects free of self-selection bias even 
with the lottery non-compliance.    
Let’s now relax the second assumption. Instead of having one magnet program and a 
single lottery, the school district operates multiple magnet schools, including one 
academic magnet program and several non-academic magnet programs. Separate lotteries 
are conducted for each school. Although a student can only attend one magnet school, 
lots of students apply for multiple lotteries, which causes three problems: (1) Because of 
multiple lottery applications, the chances for a student failing to obtain a place in at least 
one of the non-academic magnet schools are small; therefore, the counterfactual sample 
                                                 
13 Appendix B provides the prediction models for iMdˆ , the detailed procedures of calculating iMdˆ , and the 
descriptive statistics.     
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is small and thus the power of detecting the treatment effects and peer effects in each of 
the non-academic magnet school is limited. (2) When the groups are small, the individual 
characteristics among treatment and control groups are likely to be unbalanced even with 
random assignment. (3) Lottery outcomes are multivalued for students who apply for 
several lotteries, which challenges the validity of lottery outcomes as instruments for id . 
The first two problems do not bias the estimations on and , but they increase the 
sampling error. Combining several non-academic magnet programs into one single 
treatment provides the solution14: it increases the sample sizes of both treatment and 
control groups. In addition, including individual variables )( iX in the regression also 
corrects the imbalances on these characteristics between treatment and control groups.  
The third issue is most problematic. For lottery outcomes to be a valid instrument for 
the treatment variable id , it is required that ],1|)1|([ iiMiMiMiM RddEE     
]1|)1|([  iMiMiMiM ddEE  0 . That is, the lottery outcome variable iR should not 
carry any information about the heterogeneous response term iid . However, there are 
two treatment groups now: one is the academic magnet, and the other is a composite non-
academic magnet. Suppose that a student applied for both magnet programs, then the 
lottery outcome indicator is an ordered pair ),( 21 iii rrR  , with 1ir indicating the lottery 
results for the first magnet school, and 2ir for the second magnet school. This pair of 
lottery outcomes now may no longer be valid instruments because the combination of 
                                                 
14 The numbers of non academic magnet programs vary across years. For each lottery year, a student is 
defined as a composite lottery participant if he/she applied for at least one non-academic magnet program; 
a student is defined as a composite magnet enrollee if he/she is enrolled in one of the non-academic 
programs. The peer characteristics in the composite magnet program is a weighted mean of peer 
characteristics in the non-academic magnet schools, and the construction of the composite magnet peer 
variables is explained in second part of Appendix B. 
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two indicators may convey some information about the heterogeneous response 
term iid . For example, let 1i denote response heterogeneity to magnet school 1.  
Compare now 
)]0,1(,1|)1|([ 1111  iiiii RddEE  with )]1,1(,1|)1|([ 1111  iiiii RddEE  .  
When )0,1(iR  student i is not offered the opportunity to attend school 2, but when 
)1,1(iR  he is.  If the choice of school is based on private information about 1i , the 
conditional expectation will be greater when student i have two options (school1 and 
school 2) than when school 2 is not an option.  Then 
)]0,1(,1|)1|([ 1111  iiiii RddEE   )]1,1(,1|)1|([ 1111  iiiii RddEE  and 
neither equals zero; therefore iR violates the requirements of a valid instrument.  
There are two circumstances under which the third problem would not exist. First, 
parents and students do not have any private information about 1i when they make the 
enrollment decisions. In fact, this situation is very plausible.  For example, it could 
happen when every family shares the same perception of the differences in school quality 
among the choice schools.  It also could happen when parental/student’s preferences for 
one magnet school over another are based on factors unrelated to achievement (e.g., 
distance from home).  In these scenarios, because ij  does not impact the enrollment 
decisions, iR is uninformative about ij . Therefore, the IV approach of using lottery 
outcomes as instrument works. Second, all lottery applicant families have same 
preferences over magnet schools: everyone prefers A to B, and no one with a choice of 
both selects the latter.  Then 
)]0,1(,1|)1|([ 1111  iiiii RddEE  = )]1,1(,1|)1|([ 1111  iiiii RddEE  — school 
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2 as a second option is simply irrelevant and contains no information about response 
heterogeneity 1i .  Note that the two treatment groups in current data are defined as the 
academic magnet and a composite of the non-academic magnets. Very few students 
admitted to the former choose to attend the latter --- the required condition for the second 
solution is very nearly met15.   
The same argument on the validity of instrument arises when we relax the third 
assumption of one binary indicator for lottery outcomes. Instead of a binary indicator for 
lottery results, there are multiple possible indicators for the outcomes of a single lottery. 
Let ),( 21 iii RRR  denote lottery outcomes for students i: 11 iR if student i is an outright 
winner (offered a place in magnet school M on the lottery day); 12 iR if student i is a 
delayed winner (district reaches student i’s position on the wait list at some point during 
the school year). Many students on the wait list make other plans and do not take up the 
position in the magnet school when notice arrives late.  Students who do accept the 
delayed offers may expect unusual benefits from attending. If we compare 
)]0,1(,1|)1|([ 1111  iiiii RddEE  with )]1,0(,1|)1|([ 1111  iiiii RddEE   now, 
it is arguable that the latter conditional expectation is larger than the former one, and 
neither equals zero. When the lottery outcome indicator is not binary, both indicators 
‘outright win’ and ‘delayed win’ are included to construct the instruments --- the validity 
of the instrumental variables needs to be tested using over-identification test after each 
regression model.   
 
                                                 
15 For all 220 students who won both the academic magnet and the non-academic composite lotteries, 
71.4% (157) enrolled in the academic magnet in 5th grade, 7.7% (17) enrolled in the non-academic 
composite, 15% enrolled in regular public schools in the same district, and 5.9% (13) left the system after 
4th grade. 
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III. Complications caused by the presence of a second selective magnet school  
The school district operates another academic magnet school structured from grade 7 
to grade 12, which attracts a lot of 5th grade (middle school) lottery participants 
(especially lottery losers). The admission lottery for this new selective school is 
conducted in the spring of the 6th grade for the following academic year. In each cohort 
of middle school (5th-8th grade magnet schools) lottery participants, about 10% students 
applied for the second academic magnet schools when they were in 6th grade; the number 
ranges from 12% to 19% across cohorts for the first academic magnet middle school 
applicants. Lottery losers for the first selective magnet middle school are more likely to 
apply to this second academic magnet high school: among all 5 cohorts of lottery 
participants in 6th grade, almost a quarter of lottery losers (in total 232 lottery losers) in 
6th grade applied for the second selective school; when students reached 7th grade, 180 
lottery losers switched to the new magnet school, which counts for 20% of lottery losers 
in 7th grade.  In comparison, many fewer winners were interested in the second school: in 
6th grade, only 63 winners (6% of all winners in 6th grade) applied for the second 
academic school lottery; and only 38 (4% of the winners in 7th grade) switched to the new 
school in 7th grade.  
The presence of the second selective magnet school causes some methodological 
challenges. To simplify the discussion, let’s make two assumptions: (1) there is only one 
magnet school at the middle school level (from grade 5 to grade 8)--- the academic 
magnet middle school (M1); (2) all students comply with the 5th grade lottery 
assignments. The problems therefore arise when students reach later grades and have 
another selective magnet school (M2) as a second option. 
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Problem1:  For the first academic magnet middle school (M1), there are a large 
number of lottery losers who applied for and then enrolled in this second academic school 
(M2) in later grades, which changes the composition of the control group in higher 
grades: 80% of lottery losers remained in the regular neighborhood schools while the 
other 20% enrolled in the new academic magnet school.  
This change to the control group challenges the original analytical strategy which 
identifies peer effects relying on the randomization through 5th grade lotteries. Let’s 
recall the model in equation (3.5) 
iNiiNiNiMiiij vdPdPdPdXY   )]1([)(  
Following the original strategy, the treatment variable id equals 1 for all 5
th grade lottery 
winners (treatment group) and equals 0 for all 5th grade lottery losers (control group) 
even if they moved to the new school in later grades. To simplify the discussion, let’s 
drop the peer term )]1([ iNiM dPdP   and only estimate the magnet school effect d i for 
now. The model then changes to: 
                 iNiiiiij uddXY   )(                                   (3.13) 
where the coefficient  measures the treatment effects, and iNii ud  represents the error 
term. For the 20% lottery losers who switched to the new school, the outcome variable 
iNY is expected to be better than the iNY if they had remained in neighborhood schools, 
which improves the average iNY and in the meanwhile reduces the difference between iMY  
and iNY at 7
th and 8th grades. When we estimate model (3.8), the smaller gap between iMY  
and iNY then yields a smaller coefficient on id . 
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For the full model with peer variables controlled, the estimation of peer effects β 
could be biased toward either direction. Note that the causal effect of peer groups is 
estimated from the difference between MP and NP . With more lottery losers enrolled in the 
second academic magnet school, NP is improved for the whole control group, which 
decreases the gap between MP and NP . If the change in peer gap is smaller than the change 
in outcome gap, the estimate of β is biased downward; otherwise, the estimate is biased 
upward.  
Problem 2: The challenge to IV validity emerges if the second selective school M2 is 
treated as an additional magnet option in 7th and 8th grades. Let’s also use the simple 
model with no peer variables for discussion now. Instead of having a single treatment 
variable id , the model now includes two treatment variables: 1d =1 if a student enrolled in 
the first academic middle school M1; 2d =1 if a student enrolled in the second academic 
middle school M2. 
iNiiiiiiiij uddddXY  22112211)(           (3.14) 
As noted in previous discussion, self-selectivity problem arises when there are 
multiple choices, which challenges the validity of using lottery outcomes as instruments 
for the treatment variables. However, because there are few lottery winners applied for 
the second school, the group of students with multiple choices (students with 
11 ir and 12 ir ) is very small --- the multiple-choice challenge does not pose a severe 
problem at this point.  
However, the fact that the two options do not happen simultaneously causes more 
complications.  The choice to participate in the second lottery (and therefore, the lottery 
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outcomes of the second lottery) is conditional on the outcomes of the first lottery, which 
results in 6 different combinations of lottery outcomes in later grades:  
 
Table 3.4 Lottery outcome combinations with the second academic school as an option 
Combinations    Descriptions         
(r1=0, (r2=0|p2=0))    1st school lottery losers who did not apply for the second school 
(r1=0, (r2=0|p2=1))    1st school lottery losers who also lost the 2nd school lottery 
(r1=0, (r2=1|p2=1))    1st school lottery losers who won the 2nd school lottery   
(r1=1, (r2=0|p2=0))    1st school lottery winners who did not apply for the second school 
(r1=1, (r2=0|p2=1))    1st school lottery winners who lost the 2nd school lottery 
(r1=1, (r2=1|p2=1))    1st school lottery winners who won the 2nd school lottery 
 
 
When the participation variable 2p is omitted from the regression model (3.14), the 
estimation of 2 will be biased upward if 2p carries some unobservable individual 
information that is positively related to the outcome variables16. For example, if all 5th 
grade lottery losers (the first three groups in the table) who then applied for the second 
school (the 2nd and 3rd groups)  have more motivated parents, dropping 2p from the model 
will compare students in the third group to both groups in the first two rows and thus 
enlarge the estimation of 2 . However, with 2p  controlled in the model, the make-up of 
the control group for lottery M1 is changed: instead of having two randomly-assigned 
groups with 01 r  or 11 r , there are four groups of )0,0( 21  pr , )1,0( 21  pr , 
)0,1( 21  pr , and )1,1( 21  pr .  The two pairs )0,0( 21  pr  and )0,1( 21  pr are 
not randomly determined; neither are the groups of )1,0( 21  pr and )1,1( 21  pr .  
                                                 
16 As mentioned before, although not expressed in model (3.11), all regression models include lottery 
participation indicators and year/grade indicators.  
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The strategy to solve the problems caused by the second selective school is to pre-
control the treatment effects from the second selective school --- that is, to make the 
coefficient 2  in equation (3.14) equal to 0. If there are no special impacts (including 
peer effects s and impacts from other school factors) from the second academic magnet 
school, it can be treated as a regular neighborhood school which students would have 
attended if they lose the middle school lottery; therefore, the original models can yield 
unbiased treatment effects (equation (3.13)) and peer effects (equation (3.11)) for the 
magnet middle school. Specifically, there are three steps included in this strategy:  
First, estimate the treatment effect of the second academic school ( 2 ) from the 
following model: 
iNiiiiiiiiij udpdddXY  222112211)(      (3.15) 
where the peer variables are excluded in the regression. Therefore, coefficient 2  
measures the total treatment effects from this new selective school, including both peer 
effects and effects from other school factors. With 2ip  controlled in the model and lottery 
outcomes serving as instruments for the treatment variables, model (3.15) estimates the 
treatment effect 2  free of bias. 
Second, subtract the coefficient 2  from ijY for each student who is enrolled in school 
M2. By subtracting 2 , students in the second selective school are assigned new values 
(lower values when 2  is positive) for the outcome variables, which represent the 
outcomes they would have had if they had not been in M2 but instead attended their 
neighborhood schools. Therefore, these students can now be treated no differently from 
the situation in which they remained in their 6th grade schools --- the schools that are 
 54
assigned by the middle school (5th grade) lotteries. If the peer effect is not the regressor of 
interest, the treatment effect for the first selective school 1 can then be estimated from 
the model (3.13): 
iNiiiiij uddXY   )('  
where ijY ' is the new outcome variable ( ijY ' equals to the original ijY for students in 
schools other than  M2 ). The treatment indicator id is determined by the 5
th grade lottery: 
1id for students who won the lottery and enrolled in the first academic school M1; 
0id  for students who lost the middle school lottery and enrolled in other schools 
(including the second selective magnet school which now is treated as a regular school).  
Finally, add peer terms back into the model (3.13). Since the students in school M2 
are now assigned new outcome values that are comparable to the values they would have 
in regular neighborhood schools, the peer values for this school should be changed in the 
same way too. Students in M2 are assigned new peer variables that are predicted from a 
model based on their 6th grade peers, with all demographic characteristics, and 6th grade 
academic/behavioral variables included as covariates. After all three steps, the peer 
effects can be estimated from the original model (3.11): 
iNiiNiNiMiiij vdPdPdPdXY   )]1([)(  
where the variables id , MP , and NP  are determined by the first school (M1) lottery. 
In addition, I’ll also implement another strategy to address the problems caused by 
the new academic magnet school. The second strategy avoids the existence of the new 
school by limiting the peer effect investigation only to the lottery participants in the first 
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two grades (Grades 5 and 6), for whom the 5th grade lottery ensures the exogeneity in 
both treatment variable id  and peer variable )]1([ iNiM dPdP  .   
IV. Other Complications  
There is another potential source of bias in estimating peer effects. Note that in 
equation (3.11), the model identifies peer effect through the interaction of )ˆ( NM PP  and 
id , which means that it might be confounded with unobserved response heterogeneity 
( i ) which is also interacted with id .  For example, suppose that magnet schools have 
higher academic expectations and more rigorous curricula. It is possible that students 
from a neighborhood with high proportion of low SES families (indicated by NPˆ ) are less 
ready to take advantage of the magnet program (they have a lower value of i ) than those 
from more affluent neighborhoods. If so, iNM dPP )ˆ(  then serves as a proxy for iid , 
which biases the estimate of  . In order to test this possibility, I will include more 
controls for observable heterogeneity in treatment responses in the basic model (3.11), 
such as the interactions between observable individual characteristics ( iX ) and the 
treatment variable id , to see if this reduces the correlation between iNM dPP )ˆ(  and the 
unobservable heterogeneity response iid . 
Second, as discussed before, peer effects may also proxy for the omitted school 
factors that influence student achievement, such as the quality of teachers. For example, 
if the district tends to assign less qualified teachers to schools with a high proportion of 
poor students, peer effects then may signal teacher quality if it is omitted from the model. 
Since many studies on teacher quality finds that the conventional measures on teacher 
quality (such as experience and certification) explain very little about student 
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achievement, teacher fixed effect will be added to the basic model (3.11) to check for the 
omitted variable bias problem.  
Finally, studies exploiting social experiments are facing a common problem --- 
attrition. In current data, it is very plausible that lottery losers are more likely to seek 
other out-of-district options. The model removes the source of greatest potential bias by 
including student covariates of prior achievement and behavioral measures in the 
regression. Whether the estimation of peer group effects is impacted by attrition will be 
examined in later analyses.  
2. Classroom Level Analysis 
In addition to measure the peer effects at school level, this study is also going to 
estimate the classroom level peer effects. Estimating peer effects at classroom level poses 
more econometric challenges. First, students in the same classroom are subject to some 
common shocks, such as the quality of the instructor, or additional resources allocated to 
a particular classroom. Omitting or mismeasuring these factors in the model may bias the 
estimation of peer effects if they are correlated with peer characteristics. Second, across 
classroom placement is often not random. A large amount of education literature has 
shown that on the whole U.S. schools, students are assigned to classrooms at least 
partially based on their previous achievement (Oaks, 1990; Argys, Rees & Brewer, 1996; 
Betts & Shkolnik, 2000). Some parents may even exert influence over the placement of 
their child to a particular classroom if they believe certain teacher is highly qualified. 
Principals may choose class composition based on various considerations, such as racial 
diversity, gender balance, or maximizing the school wide accountability measures of 
student achievement etc.  
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In this study, the identification of classroom level peer effects follows the same 
strategy used in estimating school level peer effects --- exploiting randomization through 
admission lotteries. Note the facts that randomization only happens at school level --- 
lotteries randomly assign students into a magnet school and a regular school. The 
classroom placement within each school, however, it is not random as we found in the 
data. Then, how does the identification strategy overcome the endogenous sorting 
problem at the classroom level?  
Here is the basic model estimating classroom level peer variables:   
cijcijicij uPXY   )(                         (3.16) 
where the subscript c means classroom c in school j. cijP  is calculated from the math or 
reading classes that student i attends; if a student has multiple classes in the same subject, 
the peer variable is a weighted average of the class peer attributes (class size used as 
weight). A student’s own value is excluded in the calculation of classroom peer variables. 
Same as the strategies for school level analyses, the identification of classroom peer 
effects also relies on the sample of magnet school lottery participants; therefore, the 
model needs to control for both the treatment indicator id and the neighborhood school 
peer variables NP : 
cijiiNcijiicij vdPPdXY   )(                               (3.17) 
where the coefficient   measures the causal effect from classroom peers.  
Model (3.17) includes two endogenous regressors --- the treatment variable id and the 
peer variable cijP . The endogenous treatment indicator id  is instrumented by lottery 
outcomes following the IV models used for school level analyses. The biggest challenge 
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then is to find exogenous sources of variation in classroom peer characteristics as the 
external IV for the endogenous class room peer variable cijP . The following is the first 
stage IV model for the classroom peer variable cijP :  
          iiiMcNiMcMcij XdPdPP   )]ˆ1(ˆˆˆ[         (1st stage IV model, 3.18) 
where the external instrument variable )ˆ1(ˆˆˆ iMcNiMcM dPdP   includes three components: 
iMdˆ is an prediction of the probability that student i attend the magnet school, which is 
estimated based on students’ lottery outcome indicators and demographic variables; cMPˆ  
is the predicted classroom peer variable in magnet schools, which serves as the 
counterfactual class peers that lottery losers would encounter in classes if they had won 
the magnet school lottery; cNPˆ  is the predicted classroom peer variable in neighborhood 
schools, which serves as the counterfactual class peers that lottery winners would 
encounter in classes if they had lost the magnet school lottery and enrolled in a 
neighborhood school. Every lottery applicant is assigned both values of cMPˆ  and cNPˆ , as 
well as the predicted enrollment probability --- all three predicted variables are used to 
construct the external instrumental variable )ˆ1(ˆˆˆ iMcNiMcM dPdP  . As the literature suggests, 
within each school, students are likely to be grouped based on their academic abilities as 
well as behavior problems. Therefore, the predictions of counterfactual class peers (both 
cMPˆ  and cNPˆ ) utilize all individual information of the counterpart students, including prior 
test scores, prior behavioral outcome measures, and demographic characteristics. Also, 
the prediction of class peers in non-magnet schools ( cNPˆ ) is conducted within each 
elementary school, so that there are more heterogeneous class assignments for students 
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from the same elementary school. The prediction of cMPˆ  is not conducted within each 
elementary school; instead, the elementary school indicator is included as an independent 
variable as other individual covariates in order to capture some unobservable factors that 
may influence student outcomes as well as their class placement17. 
There are two crucial questions querying the credibility of using the same school-
level analysis strategy to estimate classroom peer effects. The first one asks whether the 
instrument for the classroom peer variables is valid. As introduced in previous part, for 
the instrumental variable )ˆ1(ˆˆˆ iMcNiMcM dPdP   to be valid, it has to meet two requirements: it 
must not be correlated with the error term and it should be correlated with the 
endogenous peer variable. First, because the prediction of the three components ( cMPˆ , cNPˆ , 
and iMdˆ ) in the instrumental variables is based on the lottery outcomes and controls for 
all observable individual covariates (including prior test scores and behavioral outcomes), 
the instruments are exogenous. Second, because the instrumental variable is constructed 
as an interaction between the predicted class peer value in either treatment or control 
group with the enrollment probabilities, it is highly correlated with the endogenous 
variable cijP .  
Table 3.5 provides some descriptive results of the classroom peer characteristics by 
different categories for the three enrollment groups: the academic magnet middle school, 
the composite non-academic middle schools, and non-magnet middle schools.   
 
 
                                                 
17 The procedures of constructing cMPˆ , cNPˆ , and classroom level instruments are included in Appendix C. 
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Table 3.5 Classroom Peer Characteristics (Math Class) 
  Black   Low SES    G4 Math  G4 Read 
 G4 
Suspension 
 G4 
Absence 
  G5  G8  G5  G8  G5  G8  G5  G8  G5  G8  G5  G8 
Math Class Peers for Academic Magnet Enrollees    
Actual                  
.204 
(.063) 
.194 
(.116) 
.119 
(.062) 
.104 
(.074) 
1.16 1 
(0.147) 
1.150 
(0.294) 
1.235 
(0.153) 
1.257 
(0.211) 
.026 
(.036) 
.011 
(.022) 
.028 
(.006) 
0.028 
(.007) 
Academic          
.205 
(.065) 
.172 
(.116) 
.111 
(.056) 
.093 
(.097) 
1.160  
(0.114) 
1.152  
(0.220) 
1.234  
(0.112) 
1.257  
(0.156) 
.026 
(.025) 
.011 
(.015) 
.028 
(.004) 
.028 
(.007) 
Non‐academic 
.610 
(.107) 
.512 
(.177) 
.392 
(.094) 
.342 
(.111) 
0.500   
(0.360) 
0.619   
(0.497) 
0.534   
(0.301) 
0.619   
(0.482) 
.041 
(.103) 
.083 
(.103) 
.030 
(.006) 
.029 
(.006) 
Counterfactual 
.387 
(.193) 
.305 
(.254) 
.381 
(.195) 
.305 
(.213) 
0.321    
(0.359) 
0.674    
(0.414) 
0.335    
(0.372) 
0.641    
(0.442) 
.094 
(.142) 
.060 
(.027) 
.035 
(.007) 
.034 
(.008) 
Instrument 
.244 
(.067) 
.214 
(.123) 
.167 
(.072) 
.153 
(.110) 
0.995   
(0.146) 
1.01   
(0.228) 
1.060   
(0.179) 
1.086   
(0.220) 
.040 
(.036) 
.027 
(.049) 
.029 
(.004) 
.029 
(.004) 
Math Class Peers for Non‐ Academic Magnet Enrollees    
Actual                  
.621 
(.159) 
.578 
(.272) 
.378 
(.168) 
.336 
(.205) 
0.389   
(0.426) 
0.528   
(0.546) 
0.423  
(0.398) 
0.563   
(0.536) 
.090 
(.115) 
.079 
(.096) 
.029 
(.009) 
.027 
(.008) 
Academic          
.212 
(.073) 
.198 
(.175) 
.115 
(.073) 
.117 
(.123) 
1.150   
(0.130) 
1.150   
(0.230) 
1.227   
(0.122) 
1.278   
(0.171) 
.032 
(.032) 
.009 
(.021) 
.028 
(.005) 
.028 
(.005) 
Non‐academic 
.610 
(.100) 
.613 
(.170) 
.394 
(.115) 
.397 
(.124) 
0.387   
(0.302) 
0.376   
(0.422) 
0.438   
(0.260) 
0.404   
(0.427) 
.069 
(.087) 
.095 
(.089) 
.030 
(.006) 
.027 
(.006) 
Counterfactual 
.519 
(.214) 
.507 
(.278) 
.500 
(.215) 
.488 
(.233) 
0.103   
(0.387) 
0.291  
(0.458) 
0.102   
(0.425) 
0.243  
(0.449) 
.139 
(.166) 
.128 
(.180) 
.036 
(.008) 
.035 
(.008) 
Instrument 
.564 
(.119) 
.549 
(.195) 
.431 
(.122) 
.436 
(.160) 
0.285   
(0.290) 
0.348  
(0.404) 
0.314   
(0.281) 
0.338  
(0.401) 
.096 
(.094) 
.109 
(.118) 
.032 
(.005) 
.031 
(.006) 
Math Class Peers for Non Magnet Enrollees    
Actual                  
.433 
(.225) 
.431 
(.274) 
.435 
(.228) 
.451 
(.245 ) 
0.193  
(0.457) 
0.421  
(0.565) 
0.209  
(0.462) 
0.384  
(0.550) 
.126 
(.191) 
.112 
(.225) 
.036 
(.010) 
.035 
(.011) 
Academic          
.215 
(.071) 
.228 
(.186) 
.121 
(.079) 
.125 
(.172) 
1.154  
(0.133) 
1.127  
(0.246) 
1.233  
(0.127) 
1.267  
(0.207) 
.028 
(.028) 
.011 
(.017) 
.028 
(.005) 
.028 
(.007) 
Non‐academic 
.607 
(.098) 
.626 
(.172) 
.406 
(.116) 
.422 
(.134) 
0.385  
(0.401) 
0.334  
(0.455) 
0.428  
(0.313) 
0.358  
(0.464) 
.063 
(.096) 
.099 
(.092) 
.030 
(.007) 
.027 
(.013) 
Non‐Magnet 
.430 
(.214) 
.438 
(.278) 
.433 
(.218) 
.471 
(.245) 
0.207  
(0.401) 
0.377  
(0.528) 
0.209  
(0.441) 
0.350  
(0.523) 
.119 
(.155) 
.121 
(.194) 
.035 
(.014) 
.035 
(.014) 
Instrument 
.450 
(.186) 
.464 
(.240) 
.395 
(.179) 
.416 
(.203) 
0.346  
(0.390) 
0.459  
(0.488) 
0.362  
(0.402) 
0.461  
(0.492) 
.094 
(.114) 
.103 
(.137) 
.034 
(.007) 
.032 
(.009) 
 
 
As we see from this table, for all three groups, the instrumental variable values are 
very close to the values of the actual peer variables, which suggests that the instrumental 
variables meet the validity requirement of being correlated with the endogenous 
regressors. Table 3.5 also reveals another significant patterns if we compare the standard 
deviations between 5th grade class peer variables with 8th grade class peer variables: the 
between-class variance in peer composition is bigger in later grades, which provides 
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some evidences that there is more tracking based on ability when students reach higher 
grades.   
The second question asks whether there is enough within-school variance in 
classroom peer variables. If students in the same school have very similar class peers, 
there is no need to examine the peer group effects at classroom level, as they will be 
virtually the same as the school level analysis.  In order to answer this question, I 
examine the variance of 11classroom level peer variables. As Table 3.6 suggests, there is 
significant within-school variance in all variables. For some variables like peer prior 
math scores or reading scores, there is greater within-school variance than between-
school variance. 
 
Table 3.6 Variance in Class Peer Variables 
 
             
Black 
           
Low 
SES   Female 
G4 
Math 
G4 
Read 
  G4 
Suspension 
G4 
Absence 
  G4 
Math 
(St.d) 
G4 
Read 
(St.d) 
  G4 
Suspension 
(St.d) 
G4 
Absence 
(St.d) 
Math Class                       
Between‐school  0.05  0.05  0.01  0.09  0.12  0.03  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.10  0.00 
Within‐School  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.15  0.13  0.02  0.00  0.03  0.03  0.09  0.00 
Fraction due to 
Within‐school  0.27  0.26  0.50  0.61  0.53  0.34  0.50  0.70  0.83  0.47  0.77 
Reading Class                       
Between‐school  0.05  0.05  0.01  0.09  0.12  0.03  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.10  0.00 
Within‐School  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.10  0.11  0.01  0.00  0.03  0.03  0.08  0.00 
Fraction due to 
Within‐school  0.24  0.23  0.47  0.52  0.49  0.30  0.43  0.66  0.78  0.44  0.74 
 
 
After predicting the endogenous treatment variable and peer variable from the first 
stage instrumental models, the next step is to estimate the causal effects of classroom 
peers form the instrumented model (2nd stage model):  
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cijiiNcijiicij vdPPdXY  ˆˆˆˆ)(                          (3.18) 
where idˆ  and cijPˆ are instrumented treatment indicator and peer variables, and NPˆ is an 
predicted neighborhood school peer variable that is included to remove residential 
location selectivity.  Model (3.18) eliminates the endogeneity in classroom peer 
composition by exploiting randomly determined lottery outcomes to construct 
instruments.  
The estimation of classroom level peer effects deals with all other complications 
following the steps in the school level investigation. One thing should be emphasized is 
that classroom level peer effect estimation faces more severe omitted variable biases. For 
example, if the majority of students in a classroom are above the average academic level 
(measured by prior achievement) and all high quality students are assigned to the best 
teachers, then failure to account for teacher characteristics will falsely attribute the 
teacher’s contribution to peer influences, which will bias the peer effect estimation 
upwardly. Fortunately, I can use the course data to match each student to the class 
instructor for both math and reading courses, and therefore to control for teacher fixed 
effect cT in the model: 
cijciiNcijiicij vTdPPdXY   )(                     (3.18) 
With cT included in the model, teacher’s influence on student achievement no longer 
enters through the error term, which reduces the omitted variable bias. 
3. Peer Effects on Non-Academic Outcomes 
In this study, the district administrative data sets provide student attendance records 
and discipline records, which enables me to derive two non-academic outcome variables: 
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the first one is attendance, measured by student absence rate (absent days/ total 
enrollment days) in each school year; the second one is disciplinary infraction, presented 
by the year-total times of suspension that a student was given as consequences to his/her 
misconduct at school.  
The two behavioral outcome variables, attendance and disciplinary infractions, are 
important indicators for student participation and engagement in schools (Rowley, 2005). 
They are also significant factors associated with student educational attainment. Research 
has found that students with higher attendance rate are more likely to have better 
academic achievement (Anderson, Christenson, Sinclair, and Lehr, 2004; and Lamdin, 
1995) and less likely to drop out from school (Alexander, Entwisle, & Horsey, 1997; 
Rumberger, 1995). Similarly, students with frequent misconduct have been found 
significantly associated with low academic achievement (Finn & Rock, 1997; Wentzel, 
Weinberger, Ford, & Feldman, 1990; Wentzel, 1993) and high drop-out rate (Rumberger, 
1995).  
The estimation of peer effects on behavioral outcomes at both school and classroom 
levels will follow the same strategies described in above sections; but the dependent 
variable in the two models (3.13) and (3.17) are now replaced by the attendance or 
delinquency outcomes for student i.   
4. The Impact of Peer Composition Heterogeneity 
In addition to examining the influences from average peer group qualities on student 
outcomes, this study also intends to investigate the impacts from the dispersion of peer 
characteristics. For example, do students benefit more from an ability-tracking class or 
from a homogeneous class? 
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Previous studies have mixed conclusions on the influences of heterogeneity in peer 
composition. In the Texas study, Hanushek and colleagues (2003) find no impacts from 
the dispersion in school level peer achievement. Fertig (2003), however, provides some 
evidences that heterogeneous peer academic ability composition at school level detriment 
individual student reading achievement. Kang’s study (2007) on Korean schools reveals 
that weak students are negatively impacted by the dispersion of peer qualities within 
classroom, while strong students are positively impacted by the dispersion. 
This project will examine the relationship between the dispersion of peer composition 
and student outcomes at both school and classroom level. The dispersion of peer 
composition is measured by the standard deviation in four major peer variables: prior 
math scores, prior reading scores, prior absence rate, and prior disciplinary infractions. 
The analytical strategies are very similar to those used for estimating average peer effects 
except that the regression model includes both the mean peer variable and the standard 
deviation of the peer variable: 
iNiiNiNiMiNMiiij vdPdPdstdPdstdPPdXY   )()]1)((.)(.[][)(
(3.19) 
iNiiNcijcijiicij vdPPdstPdXY   )(.)(                               (3.20) 
5. Heterogeneous Peer Effects 
Although the existence and magnitude of peer effects would be significant findings, 
another important objective of this project is to examine whether peer qualities impact a 
particular student group more significantly than other groups depending on student’s own 
characteristics such as gender, race, or initial position in achievement distribution. That is 
to answer the second research question “to whom do peer effects matter the most?”. 
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Previous studies have revealed some evidences of nonlinearity in the correlations 
between peer group compositions and student achievement. For example, Hoxby (2000) 
and Hanushek et al (2009) find stronger intra racial group effects for certain minority 
groups; Zimmerman (2000) suggests that students at top academic ability level are less 
likely to be impacted by peer abilities; and Kang (2007) shows that while weak students 
are negatively influenced by the dispersion of classroom peer qualities, strong students 
benefit from the heterogeneity.  
As these studies suggest, students are not always impacted by the peer qualities 
uniformly: the magnitude of peer effects are associated with some of student own 
characteristics. To examine this possibility, I’ll implement new models by interacting 
peer variables with individual student characteristics for both school and classroom level 
peer variables: 
iNiiNiiNiMiNMiiij vdPXdPdPdPPdXY   )(*)]1([][)( (3.21) 
iNiiNicijcijiicij vdPXPPdXY   *)(   (3.22) 
Given the example of equation (3.21) with the dependent variables ijY  representing a 
student’s mathematic  achievement, a positive coefficient on the interaction of average 
peer academic achievement with low SES ( iX ) indicates that being placed in a school 
with better performing peers, students from low social economic families gain more in 
math test scores than other students. Or if ijY indicates a student’s behavioral problem, a 
positive interaction of percent Black peers with Black ( iX ) suggests that black students 
are more likely to have disciplinary problems if they go to a school with a high 
proportion of black students.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
PEER EFFECTS ON ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT  
---RESULTS FROM SCHOOL LEVEL ANALYSIS 
 
This study is part of a big project investigating magnet school impacts and peer 
effects on student achievement. While the first part study on magnet school effect aims to 
answer the question whether students in magnet schools perform better than their 
counterparties in neighborhood schools, this dissertation intends to find out if peer effects 
play a significant role influencing student outcomes.  
This chapter reports the findings of school level peer group impacts on student 
academic achievement. The first section presents descriptive statistics, including lottery 
participant characteristics, school level peer characteristics, and student achievement in 
math and reading. The second section reports the regression results on magnet school 
treatment effects, wherein the regressor of interest is only the treatment indicator id  and 
no peer variables are included. The purpose of presenting the findings from the treatment 
effect models is to provide a baseline for further peer effect investigation, which 
examines to what extent the magnet effects are attributable to its peer composition. The 
subsequent sections report and discuss the findings as they are related to the following 
questions: 
 How do average school level peer characteristics impact student academic 
achievement in math and reading? 
 How does the variance of school peer characteristics influence student 
achievement? 
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 Which group of students is more significantly impacted by school peer 
composition? 
 
Descriptive Results 
Table 4.1 presents descriptive statistics of the demographic characteristics and prior 
outcomes of lottery participants in 5th grade. There are ten variables reported in this table, 
all of which are used to construct peer variables at both school and classroom levels and 
are also included in final regression models to control for individual background. As 
shown in this table, compared to the academic magnet, non-academic magnet schools 
drew more applicants who are blacks and from low income families.18 There are very few 
special education or ELL students applying for the magnet programs. Moreover, students 
who applied for the non-academic magnet schools also have lower test scores and higher 
disciplinary incidences in 4th grade. There is no significant difference on prior absence 
rate between the two participant groups.   
Enrollees in the academic magnet school are similar to the applicant population in 
most background measures. However, all non-academic magnet schools have a higher 
percentage of black students among enrollees than among participants, which may signal 
the perceptions of the quality of neighborhood schools, leading fewer blacks to turn down 
places in a magnet school. Among the non-academic magnet applicants, black and low-
income students are more likely to lose all lotteries they entered. Given that the 
possibility of losing all lotteries are strongly related to the number of lotteries entered, the 
                                                 
18 A student is identified as low income or low social economic status (SES) based on the eligibility to 
Federal Free and Reduced Lunch program. 
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higher percentage of black/low-income students losing all lotteries reflects more about 
the application behavior than the fairness of the lotteries.19 
Table 4.2 presents school peer characteristics for lottery participants in 5th grade. 
School/grade level peer variables are calculated by averaging over all students in each 
grade in the schools attended. For students who switched schools during the school year, 
the peer variables are weighted averages reflecting the proportion of school days spent in 
each school. A student is defined as a magnet school enrollee if his/her end-of-year 
(EOY) school is recorded as a magnet school.20 
For all lottery participants, the peer characteristics for the enrollees are of differences 
from the general applicants. Students who attend the academic magnet school have more 
favorable peers than the applicants over almost all dimensions. However, Compared to 
the general participants in non-academic magnets, enrollees in these schools are more 
likely to have black and low SES peers and peers with lower prior test scores. All magnet 
school enrollees have lower percentage of peers identified as special education or ELL 
students. Because the enrollees for each magnet program attend the same school, the 
standard deviations of all peer variables are much lower. Since the sample included in 
Table 4.2 is pooled across all five cohorts of 5th graders, the non-zero standard deviation 
reflects the variation from one cohort to the next. The big difference between peer 
characteristics for enrollees and lottery losers suggests that the qualities of one student’s 
peers are very much affected by the lottery outcomes.  
                                                 
19 Among all the entrants to the non-academic magnet lotteries, 59% Blacks applied for at least 2 schools, 
while 75% non-black students applied for 2 schools or more. Similarly, 59% low income students and 71 
non low income students applied for multiple lotteries.   
20 A student may attend a non magnet school at the beginning of the school year, but receive the notice 
during the school year and switched to the magnet school then.  
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          Table 4.1 Lottery Participant Characteristics 
  Black 
Low 
Income 
Special 
Education  ELL  Female  Hispanic     G4 Math  G4 Reading  G4 Suspension  G4 Absence 
  Pct  Pct  Pct  Pct  Pct  Pct  Mean  SD  Mean  SD  Mean  SD  Mean  SD 
Academic                             
Academic                             
Participants1  20.6  14.8  1.1  0.9  53.1  1.1  1.13  0.68  1.22  0.68  0.03  0.20  0.03  0.03 
Losing Participants2  22.1  15.5  1.0  1.0  49.9  1.1  1.11  0.68  1.20  0.68  0.02  0.19  0.03  0.03 
Losing Participants3  17.7  13.6  1.2  1  49.9  1.2  1.13  0.68  1.20  0.70  0.02  0.19  0.03  0.03 
Enrolling Participants4  20.6  12.0  0.1  0.1  53.8  1.3  1.15  0.67  1.23  0.66  0.03  0.22  0.03  0.03 
Non‐Academic                             
North                             
Participants1  51.3  34  4.3  0.4  60.2  1.5  0.43  0.83  0.53  0.85  0.08  0.39  0.03  0.03 
Losing Participants2  54.5  35.2  1.4  0  63.8  1.4  0.53  0.83  0.59  0.81  0.08  0.37  0.03  0.03 
Losing Participants3  72.2  53.7  3.7  0  62.9  0  0.09  0.90  0.21  0.72  0.19  0.62  0.04  0.04 
Enrolling Participants4  65.2  36.1  4.3  0.3  62.4  1.8  0.23  0.76  0.37  0.80  0.09  0.47  0.03  0.03 
South                             
Participants1  42.6  24.9  2.5  1.7  46.4  1  0.75  0.83  0.76  0.82  0.07  0.38  0.03  0.03 
Losing Participants2  42.1  26.3  3.1  1.4  47.7  1.2  0.77  0.84  0.78  0.80  0.06  0.33  0.03  0.03 
Losing Participants3  47.7  27  4.5  2.7  40.5  1.8  0.73  0.79  0.76  0.71  0.07  0.37  0.03  0.03 
Enrolling Participants4  49.2  21.4  1.6  3.1  44.8  1  0.69  0.79  0.66  0.75  0.05  0.35  0.02  0.03 
East                             
Participants1  43.6  30.7  2.6  1  54.7  1.1  0.63  0.83  0.74  0.85  0.05  0.32  0.03  0.03 
Losing Participants2  43.5  27.2  3.3  1.2  53.4  1.4  0.65  0.85  0.79  0.81  0.06  0.34  0.03  0.03 
Losing Participants3  52.1  32.9  1.4  1.4  52.1  1.4  0.54  0.95  0.77  0.83  0.04  0.26  0.02  0.02 
Enrolling Participants4  50.6  32.1  2.1  0.8  53.5  0.4  0.62  0.73  0.72  0.78  0.02  0.13  0.03  0.03 
West                             
Participants1  63  36  5.9  1  51.9  1.4  0.36  0.80  0.49  0.86  0.07  0.33  0.03  0.03 
Losing Participants2  59.6  36.3  5.2  1.6  48.2  1.5  0.44  0.80  0.54  0.91  0.10  0.39  0.03  0.03 
Losing Participants3  77.8  61.1  0  0  44.4  0  0.35  0.55  0.39  0.63  0.22  0.55  0.03  0.03 
Enrolling Participants4  93.3  40  6.6  0  60  0  ‐0.08  0.69  0.05  0.64  0.00  0.00  0.03  0.02 
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Table 4.1 Continued                           
Composite Non‐Academic                           
Participants1  45.4  29.4  3.2  1.2  52.5  1.2  0.60  0.84  0.67  0.84  0.06  0.37  0.03  0.03 
Losing Participants2  40.8  27.2  2.5  2  47.6  0.5  0.79  0.89  0.88  0.78  0.07  0.34  0.03  0.03 
Losing Participants3  56.4  36.4  2.7  1.8  45.8  0.9  0.48  0.87  0.62  0.77  0.10  0.43  0.03  0.03 
Enrolling Participants4  56.8  29.9  2.9  1.4  53.8  1.1  0.48  0.79  0.55  0.79  0.06  0.36  0.03  0.03 
1.Counted as 4th graders who participated the magnet school lottery and had non‐missing test scores in 4th grade.  
2. Students who lost this lottery (neither outright winner nor delayed winner by the start of 5th grade).      
3. Students who lost all lotteries they entered (neither an outright winner nor a delayed winner by the start of 5th grade). 
4.Counted only 5th graders who enrolled in the magnet school and have non‐missing test scores in 4th and 5th grades. 
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Table 4.2 School Peer Characteristics in Grade 5 1 
 
        Black   Low Income 
Special 
Education      ELL      Female      Hispanic   G4 Math  G4 Reading   G4Suspension  G4 Absence 
    Mean  SD  Mean  SD  Mean  SD  Mean  SD  Mean  SD  Mean  SD  Mean  SD  Mean  SD  Mean  SD  Mean  SD 
Academic  pct    pct    pct    pct    pct    pct                   
Academic                                         
  Participants  35.8  18.5  30.1  19.3  6.7  6.8  2.1  3.3  51.3  4.7  2.7  3.9  0.56  0.54  0.61  0.56  0.09  0.10  0.03  0.01 
  Enrollees  20.5  3.7  12.0  2.9  0.5  0.6  0.1  0.2  54.2  2.0  1.3  0.7  1.16  0.08  1.23  0.06  0.03  0.01  0.03  0.00 
  Losers2  41.5  16.2  43.1  17.8  13.1  4.8  4.2  4.2  48.4  4.5  4.7  5.3  0.08  0.26  0.11  0.31  0.14  0.13  0.04  0.01 
Non‐Academic                                         
North                                         
  Participants  56.3  21  44.3  17.4  8.7  5.9  1.9  3  52.8  5.5  2.5  3.7  0.20  0.42  0.45  0.43  0.14  0.10  0.03  0.01 
  Enrollees  73.1  5.4  51.2  7.4  8.9  4.5  0.3  0.2  57.7  4  1.3  1  ‐0.02  0.11  0.08  0.11  0.18  0.04  0.04  0.00 
  Losers2  59.8  20.9  50.3  19.1  10.7  4.6  3.7  4.9  49.8  4  3.5  4.8  0.05  0.36  0.08  0.40  0.15  0.10  0.04  0.01 
South                                         
  Participants  49.9  20.6  39.1  17.3  7.2  5.9  2.3  2.9  50.6  4.5  2.3  2.9  0.37  0.45  0.40  0.47  0.12  0.10  0.03  0.01 
  Enrollees  61.4  1.6  44  7.3  6.2  4.1  2.8  1.5  48.6  2.3  1.2  0.4  0.32  0.16  0.29  0.18  0.13  0.08  0.03  0.00 
  Losers2  51.4  21.9  43.3  17.9  11.7  5.5  3.7  3.7  48.8  3.5  3.4  4.6  0.10  0.32  0.12  0.36  0.15  0.09  0.04  0.01 
East                                         
  Participants  50.4  20.2  40.1  18.8  7.2  6.5  2  2.9  51.6  4.8  2.3  3.5  0.36  0.46  0.40  0.48  0.11  0.11  0.03  0.01 
  Enrollees  52.9  6.4  33.3  5  1.7  1.6  0.9  1  53.2  3.6  0.7  0.6  0.57  0.10  0.65  0.09  0.04  0.01  0.03  0.01 
  Losers2  59.2  21.5  53.2  20.2  12.9  5.9  2.4  2.7  50.2  4.3  2.8  2.8  ‐0.00  0.31  0.01  0.33  0.18  0.14  0.04  0.01 
West                                         
  Participants  59.4  22.5  45.6  16.6  7.8  5.5  1.8  3  51.1  5.1  2.7  3.9  0.27  0.41  0.30  0.45  0.10  0.08  0.03  0.01 
  Enrollees  95.2  0  54.2  0  9.5  0  0  0  55  0  1.7  0  ‐0.05  0.00  ‐0.05  0.00  0.11  0.00  0.03  0.00 
  Losers2  61.3  20.7  61.3  18.6  12.3  4.6  3.4  4  50.4  3.7  3.4  4.7  ‐0.03  0.41  ‐0.02  0.44  0.19  0.12  0.04  0.00 
Composite Non‐Academic                                       
  Participants  52.2  21.5  41.2  18.2  7.8  6.2  2  2.9  51.6  5  2.4  3.5  0.30  0.45  0.34  0.47  0.12  0.10  0.03  0.01 
  Enrollees  64.7  10.5  44.4  9.7  6.3  4.7  1.4  1.5  53.2  5.1  1.13  0.8  0.24  0.27  0.29  0.26  0.13  0.08  0.03  0.01 
   Losers2  55.7  21.5  49.2  19.7  12.4  5.4  3.3  3.8  49.4  3.9  3.4  4.3  0.03  0.31  0.05  0.34  0.17  0.11  0.04  0.01 
1.Counted as 5th graders with non‐missing test scores in both grades 4 and 5.                      
2. Students who lost all lotteries (neither as outright winner nor delayed winner by the start of 5th grade).              
Sample limited to 4th graders with non‐missing test scores.                                        
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There are some discrepancies between Table 4.1 and 4.2, notably for the non-
academic magnet schools. Overall, the percentage of black peers or low SES peers is 
higher than the percentage of black or low SES lottery participants enrolling in the non-
academic magnet schools. As noted before, many non-academic magnet schools have 
places filled by students from other channels such as geographic priority zones, sibling 
preference, or a feeder school, which causes school peer characteristics to differ from the 
characteristics of lottery participants.  
Table 4.3 presents the descriptive statistics on the two dependent variables --- student 
test scores in math and reading. As I mentioned in Chapter III, I standardized student test 
scores by grade and year: for every grade (from grade 4 to grade 8) in each school year 
from 1999 to 2007, the district mean score is 0 with a standard deviation of 1. As shown 
in Table 4.3, overall, lottery participants score higher in both math and reading than other 
middle school students in the district. Academic magnet school enrollees appear to 
perform better in both subjects than the lottery losers who enrolled in other schools. Also, 
the standardized scores for the academic magnet enrollees are less dispersed than the 
scores for lottery losers enrolled in neighborhood schools.  The non-academic composite 
enrollees, however, only significantly outperform their counterpart students in 
neighborhood schools in 6th grade; the achievement differences between the enrollees and 
lottery losers are not notable in other grades. 
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Table 4.3 Descriptive Statistics on Academic Achievement 
 
        Grade 5         Grade 6         Grade 7         Grade 8 
Math Scores  Mean  SD    Mean  SD    Mean  SD    Mean  SD 
Lottery Participants                       
All    0.82  0.86    0.86  0.85    0.86  0.84    0.86  0.85 
Academic                         
Participants  1.22  0.70    1.21  0.75    1.23  0.72    1.22  0.71 
Enrollees  1.33  0.65    1.28  0.73    1.32  0.69    1.36  0.65 
Enrollees in Other Magnet Schools  1.09  0.70    1.23  0.74    1.19  0.70    1.19  0.76 
Enrollees in Non‐Magnet Schools  1.17  0.73    1.15  0.75    1.16  0.75    1.12  0.73 
Composite Non‐Academic                       
Participants  0.62  0.85    0.69  0.85    0.69  0.84    0.70  0.87 
Enrollees  0.49  0.81    0.66  0.82    0.60  0.81    0.63  0.86 
Enrollees in Other Magnet Schools  1.33  0.71    1.23  0.74    1.33  0.69    1.37  0.69 
Enrollees in Non‐Magnet Schools  0.50  0.81     0.50  0.83     0.57  0.83     0.55  0.83 
Reading Scores  Mean  SD    Mean  SD    Mean  SD    Mean  SD 
Lottery Participants                       
All    0.89  0.81    0.89  0.84    0.90  0.84    0.87  0.82 
Academic                         
Participants  1.26  0.67    1.26  0.72    1.28  0.71    1.22  0.69 
Enrollees  1.35  0.63    1.33  0.69    1.45  0.67    1.38  0.63 
Enrollees in Other Magnet Schools  1.15  0.68    1.22  0.74    1.13  0.68    1.07  0.67 
Enrollees in Non‐Magnet Schools  1.21  0.70    1.21  0.73    1.18  0.71    1.14  0.72 
Composite Non‐Academic                       
Participants  0.71  0.81    0.73  0.84    0.73  0.86    0.70  0.81 
Enrollees  0.60  0.76    0.65  0.78    0.59  0.74    0.58  0.72 
Enrollees in Other Magnet Schools  1.35  0.74    1.33  0.68    1.52  0.74    1.37  0.62 
Enrollees in Non‐Magnet Schools  0.58  0.80     0.57  0.86     0.60  0.85     0.58  0.82 
*Count only students who have non‐missing 4th grade test scores.         
 
 
Magnet School Treatment Effects 
The estimation of magnet school treatment effects follows the same strategy as the 
peer effect estimation except that the peer term is dropped from the model. Because there 
are two treatment groups (the academic magnet, and the composite non-academic 
magnet) in the data, the regressors of interest include two treatment indicators: 1id equals 
1 if student i enrolled in the academic magnet; 2id equals 1 if student i enrolled in the 
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non-academic composite. The regression model estimating magnet school treatment 
effects is expressed as  
           iNiiiiiiiij uddddXY  22112211)(                   (4.1) 
In order to eliminate the possible selection bias arising from non-compliances, lottery 
outcomes are exploited to form the instruments for both treatment indicators 1id and 2id . 
Table 4.4 reports the estimates of magnet treatment effect models on student achievement 
in math and reading. For both subjects, I ran the regression models on two different 
samples separately21: students in the first two grades (Grades 5 and 6), and students in all 
four grades (Grades 5 to 8).  The point estimates of treatment indicators suggest that the 
academic magnet school improves student standard score by almost 0.1 point of 
standardized scores in both math and reading. This implies that students enrolling in the 
academic magnet school achieve 0.1 point higher in standardized score than the test 
scores they would achieve if they had lost the academic magnet lottery and enrolled in 
the neighborhood schools. The estimates of treatment effects for the non-academic 
magnet composite are not statistically significant in either subject. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 As mentioned in Chapter III, the purpose of limiting the investigation to 5th and 6th graders is to avoid the 
complications arising from the presence of the second academic magnet school in later grades. I also ran a 
set of grade-specific models, wherein the treatment indicator is interacted with grade indicators (for grades 
6 to 8) to examine whether the treatment effect varies across grades. Since the treatment effects in grades 6 
to 8 are not found different from 5th grade, I’m not going to report the results from the grade specific 
models in the text.  
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Table 4.4 Magnet School Treatment Effects on Academic Achievement 
                 Math                 Reading 
Independent Variables 
First 2 
grades 
All 4 
grades   
First 2 
grades 
All 4 
grades 
Academic Magnet Treatment     
Academic   0.09*  0.08*    0.07*  0.09** 
  (0.04)  (0.03)    (0.03)  (0.03) 
Non‐Academic Magnet Treatment     
Composite  0.11  0.07    0.02  ‐0.01 
  (0.08)  (0.08)    (0.08)  (0.07) 
Student Characteristics       
Black  ‐0.19***  ‐0.20***    ‐0.17***  ‐0.17*** 
  (0.02)  (0.02)    (0.02)  (0.01) 
Hispanic  ‐0.24***  ‐0.12*    0.01  0.02 
  (0.07)  (0.05)    (0.06)  (0.05) 
Special Education  ‐0.20***  ‐0.17***    ‐0.12**  ‐0.11*** 
  (0.05)  (0.03)    (0.04)  (0.03) 
Low SES  ‐0.09***  ‐0.12***    ‐0.12***  ‐0.14*** 
  (0.02)  (0.01)    (0.02)  (0.01) 
ELL  0.17  0.16*    ‐0.10  ‐0.11 
  (0.09)  (0.07)    (0.08)  (0.07) 
Female  ‐0.03  ‐0.03**    0.01  0.04*** 
  (0.01)  (0.01)    (0.01)  (0.01) 
Grade 4 Reading  0.18***  0.18***    0.53***  0.50*** 
  (0.01)  (0.01)    (0.01)  (0.01) 
Grade 4   Math  0.44***  0.43***    0.11***  0.12*** 
  (0.01)  (0.01)    (0.01)  (0.01) 
Grade 4 Absence  ‐0.86**  ‐1.19***    ‐0.31  ‐0.44* 
  (0.29)  (0.21)    (0.26)  (0.20) 
Grade 4 Suspension  0.00  0.00    0.01  ‐0.01 
   (0.02)  (0.02)     (0.02)  (0.02) 
Over‐Identification Test  0.61  0.57    0.75  0.82 
N  6267  11869     6270  11885 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001         
  
 
The other coefficients reported in Table 4.4 pertain to student characteristics. Black 
students and students from low SES families score significantly below other lottery 
participants in both mathematics and reading. This is also true of special education 
students in both subjects. Although Hispanic students score significantly lower in math, 
their reading achievement does not differ from other students. ELL students in our 
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sample outperform other students by 0.16 standard scores in mathematics22, but not in 
reading. As one would expect, prior achievement is significantly associated with later 
performance, with a more substantial intra-subject correlation. For example, a 0.5 point 
increase in 4th grade standardized math score is related to 0.2 point of standardized score 
increase in middle school math test. Moreover, students with a high absence rate in 4th 
grade have lower achievement in middle school grades, while prior disciplinary 
infractions are not found significantly related to middle school performance.  
The P-values of the omnibus over-identification tests are reported in the second panel 
of the table.23  The results indicate that the instruments used in all four models are 
exogenous.  
 
Impacts of Average School Peer Characteristics 
This section investigates the average school level peer effects on middle student 
achievement in both math and reading. All ten specifications of peer characteristics 
(including 6 predetermined peer characteristics, and 4 lagged values of peer outcome 
measures) are examined. First, I run a set of single variable models with only one peer 
variable included in the regression; I then include all specifications of peer characteristics 
in one regression. Coefficients from all 11 models are reported in this part. Similar to the 
treatment effect investigation, all models are run twice using both the small sample 
comprising grades 5 and 6 and the big sample of all four grades. Overall, the findings 
from both samples are close, but the estimates from the models using the big sample have 
                                                 
22 In the regression sample, 164 (1.25%) observations are Hispanic and 79 (0.6%) observations are ELL 
students, but only 9 Hispanic observations are identified as ELL students.  
23 Recall that the lottery outcomes are not binary, and there are two excluded instruments (outright-win and 
delayed-win) for each treatment variable. Therefore, the validity of the external instruments is tested for all 
regression models using the over-identification tests.  
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smaller standard errors and higher P-values from the omnibus over-identification tests. 
Therefore, I’m only going to report and discuss the results from the full sample analysis. 
 
Math Achievement 
Estimates of average school level peer effects on math achievement are presented in 
Table 4.5. As introduced in Chapter III, there are two types of peer variables included in 
the model: the exogenous, lottery-based variation in peer characteristics 
)]1([ iNiM dPdP  ; and the endogenous, residence-based variation in peer 
characteristics NP . The causal relationship between peer group composition and student 
outcomes are obtained from the estimates on the first exogenous peer term; and the 
second peer term is included to control for residence choice (or neighborhood school 
choice). The estimated effects of both peer terms are reported in Table 4.5 along with the 
magnet school treatment effects. Individual characteristics are also controlled in the 
regression models, but are not reported in the table since the estimates are quite similar to 
those in previous treatment effect models.  
Several estimates from Table 4.5 are noteworthy. The first result to draw is from 
model 1, which suggests that students tend to perform worse in mathematics if they are in 
a school with a high proportion of black students. The estimate of this racial composition 
effect is quite large. For instance, increasing the share of black schoolmates from 25% to 
75% would reduce student math scores by 0.25 points of standardized score. Although 
the estimate of percent low SES student effect is not statistically significant (Model 2), 
the coefficient on this variable is negative. Also note that in model 1 and model 2, 
including the peer variables --- percent Black and percent low income students --- 
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completely overturns the positive treatment effect from the academic magnet school 
reported in Table 4.4. This implies that if the academic magnet school lottery losers 
attend a neighborhood school where peer racial or Social Economic Status composition is 
very similar to the academic magnet school, they would do as well in mathematics as 
those students enrolled in the academic magnet. 
The second significant estimate is on school gender composition effect (Model 3), 
which shows that having more girls in a school decreases average math scores for the 
lottery participants. While some previous studies find female peers help to improve 
student achievement (e.g., Hoxby, 2000; Lavy & Scholosser, 2007), results in Table 4.5 
do not support that conclusion. The coefficient is strikingly large --- for 50 percent point 
increase of female students in the school, the average math score falls by almost 0.8 
standard deviations. However, a 50% change in percent school female population far 
exceeds anything observed in our data. 
Model 5 and Model 6 find significant and positive coefficients on school percent 
special education students and school percent ELL students. For example, the estimate 
from Model 5 suggests that double the special education population in the academic 
magnet school (from 0.5% to 1%) would increase the average math scores by 0.02 points 
of standardized scores. However, although the school level estimates suggests positive 
peer effect from percent special education or ELL students, the impact of having special 
education peers or ELL peers is more likely to work through the classroom. For instance, 
a teacher may spend disproportional time on a leaning disabled student, which would 
have a great impact on the children in the same classroom but not on other children in the 
school. Therefore, it would be more meaningful to draw the conclusion on the effect of 
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these two peer variables after comparing the results at both school and classroom levels, 
which will be done in next chapter.  
 
Table 4.5: Average School Peer Effects on Math Achievement 
              Math Scores                
Independent 
Variables  Model1  Model2  Model3  Model4  Model5  Model6  Model7  Model8  Model9  Model10  Model11 
Magnet School Effect                   
Academic  ‐0.05  ‐0.03  0.19**  0.12**  0.46***  0.18**  0.08  0.00  0.09  0.11  ‐0.38 
  (0.04)  (0.08)  (0.06)  (0.04)  (0.13)  (0.06)  (0.19)  (0.19)  (0.04)  (0.07)  (0.30) 
Non‐Academic 
Composite  0.05  0.04  0.14  0.10  0.25*  0.11  0.08  0.06  0.09  0.09  0.12 
  (0.08)  (0.09)  (0.10)  (0.09)  (0.12)  (0.09)  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.08)  (0.10)  (0.16) 
Peer Effect (Lottery Based)                   
Black (proportion)  ‐0.49**                  0.75 
  (0.15)                  (0.40) 
Low SES (proportion)  ‐0.33                  0.10 
    (0.18)                  (0.43) 
Female (proportion)    ‐1.52**              ‐0.83 
      (0.57)                (0.65) 
Hispanic (proportion)      0.83              3.14 
        (0.63)              (2.54) 
Special ED (proportion)        3.45**            8.33*** 
          (1.08)            (2.33) 
ELL (proportion)          2.43*          2.69 
            (1.18)          (3.83) 
Grade 4 Math (Mean)          0.04        0.80* 
              (0.17)        (0.33) 
Grade 4 Reading (Mean)            0.10      0.80* 
                (0.15)      (0.39) 
Grade 4 Suspension (Mean)              ‐0.08    ‐0.17 
                  (0.20)    (0.32) 
Grade 4 Absence (Mean)                2.10  ‐1.96 
                   (4.68)  (7.76) 
Peer Effects (Residence Based)                   
Black (proportion)  ‐0.02                    0.01 
  (0.04)                    (0.06) 
Low SES (proportion)  ‐0.15***                ‐0.20* 
    (0.04)                  (0.10) 
Female (proportion)    0.18                0.09 
      (0.13)                (0.16) 
Hispanic (proportion)      ‐0.35***            ‐0.20 
        (0.07)              (0.11) 
Special ED (proportion)      ‐0.23**          ‐0.21* 
          (0.07)            (0.10) 
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Table 4.5 (Continued) 
ELL (proportion)       ‐0.24***        ‐0.04 
       (0.06)          (0.08) 
Grade 4 Math (Mean)       0.04*        ‐0.26* 
         (0.02)        (0.10) 
Grade 4 Reading (Mean)         0.05*      0.18 
           (0.02)      (0.10) 
Grade 4 Suspension (Mean)           ‐0.08    0.11 
             (0.06)    (0.08) 
Grade 4 Absence (Mean)             ‐2.53*  0.94 
              (1.00)  (1.52) 
Student Characteristics                   
   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Over‐
identification Test  0.6  0.53  0.71  0.8  0.45  0.34  0.58  0.58  0.81  0.57  0.96  
Sample Size24  11780  11780  11780  11780  11780  11780  11778  11778  11778  11778  11778 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001                   
  
 
School level models do not find significant estimates of average peer achievement 
variables (Models 7 and 8), average peer disciplinary infractions (Model 9)25, or average 
peer absence rate (Model10). Because middle school students (especially students in later 
grades) are often grouped for instruction based on their academic abilities26 --- students 
with lower prior achievement (or behavioral problems) are often placed in a class with 
other disadvantaged students, it is possible that average school level peer academic 
ability or behavioral measures may only have a moderate or no impact on these variables. 
                                                 
24 The regression sample is limited to lottery participants to all magnet middle schools. The sample size in 
the peer effect models is 11780, which is smaller than the sample size in the treatment effect models (11885) 
in Table 4.4. The difference is caused by the creation of peer variables --- there are about 100 observations 
whose End-of-Year school can not be identified. 
25 In order to circumvent the reflection problems, I use student 4th grade test scores and behavioral records 
to construct these peer variables. Given that students in elementary schools are less likely get suspension, I 
also constructed another peer disciplinary variable representing average 4th grade punishment numbers 
including severe punishments such as suspension and other less severe punishments. However, the 
conclusion from the average punishment peer variable is very similar to that from the suspension variable 
except that the coefficient is smaller. Since suspension is more often used in other studies measuring 
student disciplinary infractions (e.g., Figlio, 2005; Rowley, 2005), I follow the literature and keep only the 
suspension variable in the result table. 
26 It is also possible that some schools keep students with behavioral problems in one class just because the 
teacher is more experienced with disruptive students.  
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Note that although there is no significant peer effect from these four peer variables, the 
positive treatment effect of the academic magnet program vanishes in all four models 
while the peer variables are controlled.  Because of the tracking police in middle school, 
the influence of peer achievement or misconduct is more likely to work through a 
classroom rather than through the school/grade level; therefore, I expect significant 
estimates of peer ability effects at the classroom level. This of course will be examined in 
next chapter.  
Model 11 incorporates all peer variables in one regression. Among the four peer 
variables that are found significantly influencing student math achievement in the single 
variable models, only the estimate of percent special education peers remains significant 
and positive. With all specifications of peer characteristics controlled in one model, the 
estimates of prior peer math and reading scores become weakly significant (P<0.05) and 
show positive impact on student math achievement. Due to the correlations among the 
peer variables, the estimates of most peer characteristics are insignificant in the full 
model. Moreover, with all peer variables controlled in the same equation, the coefficient 
on the academic magnet school treatment effect turns to -0.38. This result suggests that if 
school peer compositions are held constant, lottery winners enrolling in the magnet 
schools do not perform better than their counterpart students enrolling in neighborhood 
schools, at least not in math test.  
The lower part of Table 4.6 presents the estimates on the residence based peer 
variables. Four residence-based pre-determined (contextual) peer characteristics, percent 
low SES students, percent Hispanic students, percent special education students, and 
percent ELL students, have shown negative impacts on student math achievement in 
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middle school; the estimates on the two residence-based peer ability variables (Model 7 
and Model 8) suggest that students tend to score slightly higher in math if their 
neighborhood schools have more high performing students. The residence-based peer 
absence rate is also found reducing student achievement. However, compared to the 
estimated effects from the exogenous, lottery-based peer variables, the estimates of 
residence based peer characteristic effects are smaller in magnitude.  
The findings from the residence-based peer variables suggest that although the 
admission lotteries randomly assign students between a magnet school and a 
neighborhood school, family residential choice (indicated by neighborhood school 
characteristics) is still correlated with some factors influencing student achievement --- 
although the correlation is smaller than the peer effects identified from the exogenous 
peer characteristics.  
 
Reading Achievement 
Estimates of peer effect models on reading achievement are presented in Table 4.6. 
Compared to the estimates from the math achievement models, there are fewer significant 
peer variable coefficients on reading achievement. The first significant estimate is percent 
ELL students, which shows positive impact on student reading achievement in middle 
school. Surprisingly, Model 6 suggests that school level average peer reading 
achievement reducing student reading scores in middle school: if average school peer 4th 
grade reading scores increase by 1 point of standardized scores, student reading 
achievement in middle school falls by almost 0.3 points of standardized scores. The last 
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significant coefficient is from model 10, which finds a positive association between 
individual reading achievement and prior peer absence rate.  
 
Table 4.6: Average School Peer Effects on Reading Achievement  
 
              Reading Scores                
Independent 
Variables  Model1  Model2  Model3  Model4  Model5  Model6  Model7  Model8  Model9  Model10  Model11 
Magnet School Effect                   
Academic  0.04  0.12  0.15**  0.13***  0.28*  0.21***  0.41*  0.44*  0.06  0.21***  0.53 
  (0.04)  (0.07)  (0.06)  (0.04)  (0.12)  (0.05)  (0.18)  (0.18)  (0.04)  (0.06)  (0.27) 
Non‐Academic 
Composite  ‐0.02  0.01  0.03  0.03  0.09  0.05  0.07  0.09  ‐0.03  0.10  0.25 
  (0.07)  (0.08)  (0.09)  (0.08)  (0.11)  (0.08)  (0.10)  (0.11)  (0.08)  (0.10)  (0.14) 
Peer Effect (Lottery Based)                   
Black 
(proportion)  ‐0.20                    0.21 
  (0.14)                    (0.37) 
Low SES (proportion)  0.05                  ‐0.54 
    (0.17)                  (0.38) 
Female (proportion)    ‐0.88                ‐1.23* 
      (0.54)                (0.57) 
Hispanic (proportion)      0.90              ‐1.70 
        (0.59)              (2.25) 
Special ED (proportion)      1.72            1.69 
          (1.01)            (2.14) 
ELL (proportion)          3.18**          5.70 
            (1.13)          (3.45) 
Grade 4 Math (Mean)          ‐0.29        ‐0.04 
              (0.16)        (0.30) 
Grade 4 Reading (Mean)            ‐0.29*    ‐0.02 
                (0.14)      (0.36) 
Grade 4 Suspension (Mean)              ‐0.27    ‐0.64* 
                  (0.18)    (0.29) 
Grade 4 Absence (Mean)                12.20**  14.38* 
                   (4.45)  (7.03) 
Peer Effects (Residence Based)                   
Black 
(proportion)  ‐0.06                    ‐0.04 
  (0.04)                    (0.06) 
Low SES (proportion)  ‐0.18***                ‐0.08 
    (0.04)                  (0.09) 
Female (proportion)    ‐0.03                ‐0.09 
      (0.12)                (0.14) 
Hispanic (proportion)      ‐0.32***            ‐0.25** 
        (0.07)              (0.10) 
Special ED (proportion)        ‐0.16*          ‐0.03 
          (0.07)            (0.09) 
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Table 4.6 (Continued)                  
ELL (proportion)          ‐0.21***        ‐0.06 
            (0.05)          (0.07) 
Grade 4 Math (Mean)          0.06**        ‐0.19* 
              (0.02)        (0.09) 
Grade 4 Reading (Mean)            0.07***    0.18* 
                (0.02)      (0.09) 
Grade 4 Suspension (Mean)              ‐0.06    0.11 
                  (0.06)    (0.07) 
Grade 4 Absence (Mean)                ‐3.35***  ‐0.82 
                   (0.95)  (1.35) 
Student Characteristics                   
   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Over‐
identification 
Test  0.72  0.84  0.73  0.79  0.86  0.91  0.84  0.98  0.89  0.84  0.85 
Sample Size27  11796  11796  11796  11796  11796  11796  11794  11794  11794  11794  11794 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001                   
 
 
In the full variable model (column 11), the estimated effect of average peer absence 
rate remains big and significant; and the estimate of average peer suspension records 
becomes negative and weakly significant at 5% statistical level. The variable of percent 
ELL students is no longer significant; but having more female peers seems to reduce 
individual reading scores in middle school while all other peer variables are controlled. 
Since most models do not find advantaged peers improving student reading scores in 
middle school, the positive academic magnet school treatment effect becomes larger in 
some models while peer characteristics are controlled. Two exceptions are model 1 and 
model 9: the former one suggests that lottery losers in neighborhood schools would do 
just as well in reading as the lottery winners in the magnet schools if the school racial 
composition (percent black students) is similar; the later one suggests no evidence of 
magnet school effects on reading achievement if peer behavioral records in the magnet 
school and neighborhood schools are alike. Although the estimate of academic magnet 
                                                 
27 The sample size for reading models is slightly larger than that in the math models because fewer students 
have missing reading scores. 
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school treatment effect is particularly big in model 11 where all peer variables are held 
constant, it is not statistically significant.  
Seven out of ten estimates of residence based peer effects are significant. Although 
the size of the coefficients on the residence based peer variables are smaller, the 
coefficient signs are as expected. This again suggests that residential choice is correlated 
with other factors influencing student achievement, although the impact is in a small 
magnitude.  
All 11 models in both Table 4.6 and Table 4.7 have high P-values from the omnibus 
over-identification tests, which support the exogeneity of the instruments used in the peer 
effect models on both math and reading achievement. 
In conclusion, the estimates of average school peer effects on math and reading 
achievement are not quite similar. Overall, a student’s math score is more likely to 
increase if the individual is in a school with more advantaged peers; this, however, is not 
true on student reading achievement in our sample. Several estimates of peer effects on 
student academic outcomes are noteworthy. First, although percent black students is 
significant only in the math equation, controlling for this school racial composition 
variable totally overturns the positive magnet school treatment effect in both math and 
reading. Second, school SES composition does not show significant impact on student in 
either subject. Third, there is no evidence that average school peer academic abilities or 
average school peer disciplinary records are associated with student math achievement in 
middle school, while average school peer reading achievement is even negatively 
correlated with student reading scores in middle school. However, as I mentioned before, 
the peer group impacts on student academic achievement may mostly come from 
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classroom where the direct peer interaction on learning actually takes place. Therefore, it 
would be more interesting to see how different the estimates of peer effects at the 
classroom level are from the estimates at the school level.  
 
Impacts from Dispersion of Peer Characteristics 
The last section finds some important peer group effects on student academic 
outcomes from average school peer characteristics. In this part, I am going to explore 
whether student academic achievement is influenced by the variance of peer 
characteristics. The heterogeneity of peer composition is measured by the standard 
deviations in four lagged peer outcome variables: peer math achievement, peer reading 
achievement, peer disciplinary infractions, and peer absence Rate. One thing needs to be 
kept in mind is that this chapter focuses on peer effects at the school level. The variance 
specifications are aggregated grade level measures of variance, not variance within 
classes.  
Table 4.7 presents some descriptive statistics on the four school level heterogeneity 
variables in 5th grade. The mean values reported in the table are across-cohort means of 
standard deviations in all four peer outcome variables. As shown in the table, the average 
standard deviation of peer math achievement is about 0.82 for the applicants of the 
academic magnet program, and 0.86 for lottery participants of the non-academic magnet 
composite. There is less variance in peer outcomes (all 4 specifications) for academic 
magnet school enrollees than for lottery losers attending neighborhood schools. However, 
the differences in the dispersion measures are not very significant between the non-
academic magnet enrollees and losers.  
 87
Table 4.7 Heterogeneity of School Peer Characteristics in Grade 51 
   
Standard 
Deviation in G4 
Math 
Standard 
Deviation in 
G4Readng 
Standard 
Deviation in G4 
Suspension 
Standard Deviation 
in G4 Absence 
    Mean  SD  Mean  SD  Mean  SD  Mean  SD 
Academic                 
Academic                 
  Participants  0.82  0.18  0.82  0.17  0.38  0.27  0.03  0.01 
  Enrollees  0.66 0.09 0.66 0.04 0.21 0.06 0.03  0.00 
  Losers2  0.97 0.12 0.96 0.12 0.53 0.31 0.04  0.01 
Non‐Academic           
North           
  Participants  0.88 0.13 0.89 0.13 0.52 0.26 0.03  0.01 
  Enrollees  0.90 0.06 0.93 0.07 0.63 0.12 0.04  0.02 
  Losers2  0.89 0.14 0.92 0.12 0.53 0.28 0.04  0.01 
South           
  Participants  0.88 0.15 0.88 0.14 0.46 0.26 0.03  0.01 
  Enrollees  0.95 0.09 0.93 0.09 0.48 0.21 0.03  0.00 
  Losers2  0.92 0.12 0.92 0.07 0.56 0.22 0.04  0.01 
East           
  Participants  0.83 0.15 0.85 0.14 0.42 0.27 0.03  0.01 
  Enrollees  0.71 0.10 0.78 0.06 0.20 0.04 0.03  0.01 
  Losers2  0.91 0.11 0.92 0.14 0.59 0.34 0.04  0.01 
West           
  Participants  0.81 0.14 0.85 0.12 0.39 0.22 0.03  0.01 
  Enrollees  0.75 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.37 0.00 0.03  0.00 
  Losers2  0.93 0.10 0.92 0.10 0.66 0.29 0.03  0.00 
Composite Non‐Academic               
  Participants  0.86  0.15  0.87  0.14  0.46  0.26  0.03  0.01 
  Enrollees  0.87  0.12  0.89  0.1  0.47  0.22  0.03  0.01 
   Losers2  0.91  0.17  0.92  0.11  0.58  0.28  0.04  0.01 
1. Counted as 5th graders with non‐missing test scores in both grades 4 and 5.      
2. Students who lost all lotteries (neither as outright winner nor delayed winner by the start of 5th grade). 
3. Sample limited to 4th graders with non‐missing test scores.          
 
 
Math Achievement 
The models estimating the dispersion of peer composition effects are reported in 
Table 4.8. The regression model is equation 3.19 in Chapter III, wherein both the average 
peer characteristics and the heterogeneity of peer composition are included in the same 
equation. Since the conclusions on the estimates of the magnet school treatment effects 
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and the residence based peer effects are quite similar to those in average peer effect 
models, Table 4.8 only reports the estimates of the two regressors of interest: the mean 
peer outcome variables, and the variance of peer outcome variables (from the exogenous, 
lottery based peer characteristics). 
 
Table 4.8 Impacts from Dispersion of Peer Characteristics on Math Achievement 
     Math Scores    
Independent Variables  Model1  Model2  Model3  Model4 
Magnet School Effect         
  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Peer Effect ( Mean, Lottery Based)         
Grade 4 Math (Mean)  0.05       
  (0.16)       
Grade 4 Reading (Mean)    0.16     
    (0.14)     
Grade 4 Suspension (Mean)      ‐0.47   
      (0.49)   
Grade 4 Absence (Mean)        0.30 
        (5.71) 
Peer Effect (Dispersion, Lottery Based)         
Grade 4 Math (Standard Deviation)  0.06       
  (0.14)       
Grade 4 Reading (Standard Deviation)    0.60***     
    (0.13)     
Grade 4 Suspension (Standard Deviation)      0.16   
      (0.18)   
Grade 4 Absence (Standard Deviation)        1.76 
        (2.31) 
Peer Effects (Residence Based)         
  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Student Characteristics         
   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
P‐value for Over‐identification Tests  0.58  0.5  0.52  0.59 
Sample Size  11778  11778  11778  11778 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001         
 
 
 Only one dispersion variable is found significantly influencing student math 
achievement. Model 2 suggests that the heterogeneity of school peer reading ability 
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levels is positively associated with student math scores in middle school. For instance, a 
0.5 point increase in the standard deviation of school peer reading achievement (this is 
about 3 standard deviation of this dispersion variable) will improve student math 
achievement by 0.3 point in standardized scores. There is little evidence that changes in 
the heterogeneity of peer math ability or student behaviors (discipline or attendance) 
affect individual math performance in middle school.  
The estimates of average peer math and reading achievement remain almost 
unchanged after controlling for the variance of both variables. However, due to the high 
collinearity between the average term and the dispersion term28, the coefficient on 
average peer suspension times increases substantially, but it is still insignificant. 
Similarly due to the collinearity, the estimated effect of average peer absence rate drops 
while controlling for the variance variable and also remains insignificant. 
 
Reading Achievement 
 Table 4.9 reports the results from the reading achievement models. Column 1 and 2 
suggest that the heterogeneity of peer academic achievement in both subjects tends to 
increase student reading performance in middle school. Although the coefficient on the 
standard deviation of peer disciplinary infractions is negative, the estimate is not 
statistically significant. The estimated effects from most specifications of average peer 
outcomes do not change much with the variance terms included in the regression, except 
that the coefficient on average peer absence rate is no longer significant now in model 4. 
                                                 
28 The average peer suspension times is highly correlated with the standard deviation of peer suspension 
times (0.56 in our sample). Given the fact that 90% students never received a suspension in 4th grade, a 
school with a high value of average peer suspension times is most likely to have a high value in the 
dispersion term.  
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Over-identification tests indicate that the instruments (for both the average peer terms 
and the variance terms) are exogenous in all 4 models on both subjects. 
 
Table 4.9 Impacts from Dispersion of Peer Characteristics on Reading Achievement 
     Reading Scores    
Independent Variables  Model1  Model2  Model3  Model4 
Magnet School Effect         
  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Peer Effect ( Mean, Lottery Based)         
Grade 4 Math (Mean)  ‐0.27       
  (0.15)       
Grade 4 Reading (Mean)    ‐0.24     
    (0.14)     
Grade 4 Suspension (Mean)      ‐0.20   
      (0.46)   
Grade 4 Absence (Mean)        10.33 
        (5.39) 
Peer Effect (Dispersion, Lottery Based)         
Grade 4 Math (Standard Deviation)  0.26*       
  (0.13)       
Grade 4 Reading (Standard Deviation)    0.55***     
    (0.13)     
Grade 4 Suspension (Standard Deviation)      ‐0.03   
      (0.17)   
Grade 4 Absence (Standard Deviation)        1.92 
        (2.19) 
Peer Effects (Residence Based)         
  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Student Characteristics         
   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
P‐value for Over‐identification Tests  0.96  1.00  0.90  0.83 
Sample Size  11794  11794  11794  11794 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001         
 
 
Heterogeneous Peer Effects 
The results in previous part reveal significant effects from some average peer 
characteristics and variation in peer variables. However, peer groups may impact some 
students more than others depending on a student’s own background, such as race, 
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gender, or academic ability. This section answers the third research question “to whom 
do peer effects matter more”. To examine this possibility, I interact all peer group 
variables with individual characteristics, including black, Low SES, female, and 
indicators of student academic ability.29 The student academic ability indicators are 
measured by student initial position in each cohort lottery participants’ achievement 
distribution in 4th grade: if a student’s prior math score is in the bottom quartile (1st) of 
math score distribution among lottery participants, this student is coded as a low math 
achiever; if a student’s prior math score is in the top quartile (4th) of the distribution, 
he/she is coded as a high math achiever. The same procedure is also applied to reading 
achievement. Therefore, there are four academic ability indicators for one student: high 
math achiever, low math achiever, high reading achiever, and low reading achiever. The 
four indicators along with three demographic variables are interacted with all 10 peer 
variables to investigate if there are heterogeneous peer effects.  
As shown in previous part, not every peer characteristic has shown a significant 
impact on student outcomes. Therefore, although all 10 specifications of peer 
characteristics are examined in the investigation of heterogeneous peer effects, I’m only 
going to report the results from two widely expressed contextual peer characteristics 
(percent black students and percent low SES students30 ) and from the other four peer 
                                                 
29  Because there are very few Hispanic, Ell, and Special Education students among the lottery participants 
(especially for the academic magnet program), I only choose three student demographic variables (black, 
female, and SES) to interact with the peer characteristics. Also, due to the fact that most lottery participants 
never received suspension and have very low absence rate, more than 80% students will receive the value 
of 1 as low disciplinary incidences based on the quartiles, and very few will be coded as high misbehaving 
group. Therefore, I only create the academic ability indicators, which are also used in Haneshek et al (2002) 
and Kang (2007) in examining heterogeneous peer effects.     
30 Another widely expressed peer variable is peer gender composition (percent female students), I did not 
include in the tables here because most models (at both levels) find no significant effect from this variable.  
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outcome variables (peer math and reading achievement, peer disciplinary incidence, and 
peer absence rate). 
 
Math Achievement 
The regression model examining the heterogeneous peer effect is expressed in 
equation (3.17) of Chapter III, in which the interaction of the peer variables with 
individual characteristics is added into the model. The two regressors of interest then 
include the average peer characteristics and the interaction term. As usual, since the 
estimates of magnet school treatment effect, residential choice effect, and individual 
characteristics do not change much from previous average peer effect models, Table 4.10 
omits the coefficients on these variables.  
Each column in Table 4.10 represents an individual background variable; each 
horizontal panel represents a peer variable. The coefficients on the average peer term are 
reported in each row of the mean effect; the coefficients on the interaction terms are 
reported in each row of the heterogeneous effect. However, note that the coefficients on 
the average peer term in Table 4.10 can not be interpreted as the overall estimates of 
average peer effects on all students; instead, they should be explained as the average peer 
effects on students of the group not indicated at the top of each column. The coefficients 
on the heterogeneous terms stand for the peer effect differences between the two groups. 
The estimated peer effects on the specific student group in each column are obtained as 
the linear combination of the coefficient on the average term and the coefficient on the 
interaction term31.  
 
                                                 
31 The combination test results will be reported in Appendix E.  
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Table 4.10 Heterogeneous School Level Peer Effects on Math Achievement 
          Math Scores          
    Model1  Model2  Model3  Model4  Model5  Model6  Model7 
    Black  LSES  Female 
Low 
Reading 
Achiever 
High 
Reading 
Achiever 
Low 
Math 
Achiever 
High 
Math 
Achiever 
Peer Effects (Lottery Based)             
Proportion of Black Students        
Mean Effect  ‐0.43**  ‐0.48**  ‐0.66***  ‐0.47**  ‐0.46**  ‐0.39**  ‐0.45** 
   (0.18)  (0.16)  (0.16)  (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.15) 
Heterogeneous Effect  ‐0.11  ‐0.04  0.32***  ‐0.09**  ‐0.16**  ‐0.22***  ‐0.18*** 
   (0.09)  (0.10)  (0.07)  (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.05) 
Proportion of Low SES Students             
Mean Effect  ‐0.33  ‐0.36*  ‐0.48**  ‐0.30  ‐0.30  ‐0.22  ‐0.28 
   (0.18)  (0.18)  (0.18)  (0.18)  (0.18)  (0.18)  (0.18) 
Heterogeneous Effect  ‐0.00  0.14  0.22**  ‐0.11**  ‐0.18**  ‐0.27***  ‐0.20*** 
   (0.10)  (0.13)  (0.08)  (0.04)  (0.06)  (0.04)  (0.05) 
Peer Prior Math Achievement             
Mean Effect  0.04  0.04  0.14  0.05  0.06  0.07  0.03 
   (0.17)  (0.17)  (0.17)  (0.17)  (0.17)  (0.17)  (0.17) 
Heterogeneous Effect  0.06  ‐0.01  ‐0.08*  ‐0.09*  ‐0.09**  ‐0.05  ‐0.13*** 
   (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.03) 
Peer Prior Reading Achievement           
Mean Effect  0.10  0.10  0.18  0.12  0.12  0.13  0.10 
   (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.15) 
Heterogeneous Effect  0.04  ‐0.03  ‐0.07*  ‐0.08*  ‐0.08**  ‐0.06  ‐0.12*** 
   (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
Peer Prior Disciplinary Records             
Mean Effect  ‐0.17  ‐0.14  ‐0.23  ‐0.03  ‐0.04  0.13  0.09 
   (0.23)  (0.21)  (0.23)  (0.20)  (0.20)  (0.20)  (0.21) 
Heterogeneous Effect  0.18  0.17  0.25  ‐0.20  ‐0.28  ‐0.58***  ‐0.71*** 
   (0.20)  (0.23)  (0.19)  (0.12)  (0.18)  (0.12)  (0.16) 
Peer Prior Attendance Records             
Mean Effect  0.97  0.89  0.31  2.48  2.08  3.01  2.35 
   (4.86)  (4.69)  (5.08)  (4.69)  (4.69)  (4.68)  (4.68) 
Heterogeneous Effect  4.86  5.48  2.60  ‐1.83***  ‐2.50***  ‐3.45***  ‐3.51*** 
     (4.05)  (4.55)  (3.44)  (0.51)  (0.63)  (0.50)  (0.61) 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001        
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The first peer variable reported in the table is percent Black students. The results from 
model 1 and model 2 suggest that although individual math score appears to be lower in a 
school with high percentage of black students, there is little evidence showing that Blacks 
or low income students are more severely impacted by school racial composition. This is 
different from previous findings of Hanueshek et al (2002) and Hoxby (2000), who both 
find stronger intra-racial group peer effects for Black students. However, although the 
heterogeneous effect is not statistically significant for black students, the linear 
combination test in Model 1 shows a coefficient of 0.55 (P<0.01) on black students, 
which is still bigger than the coefficient on non-black students (0.43). Female students, 
however, are much less strongly impacted than males by school percent black students. 
For instance, switching from a school with 25% black students to another school with 
75% black students is likely to lower the math scores for boys by 0.33 points of 
standardized scores; but for girls, the achievement reduction is only 0.17, about half the 
size of the impact on boys. Interestingly, models 4 to 7 suggest that the estimated effect 
of school percent black students appears to be stronger on both low achievers and high 
achievers. Recall that the estimate of percent Black student effect on all lottery 
participants is 0.49 in the average peer effect model (model 1 in Table 4.5). The 
heterogeneous peer effect models find the percent black student coefficients (linear 
combination coefficients) are higher on students at both the bottom and the top quartiles 
of achievement distribution: 0.56 for low reading achievers, 0.61 for high reading 
achiever, 0.61 for low math achievers, and 0.63 for high math achievers. All 4 
coefficients are statistically significant at 1% level.  
 95
The second peer variable examined here is percent low SES students. Although there 
is no significant effect of percent low SES students on the whole lottery participant 
sample (as shown in Model 2 of Table 4.5), the heterogeneous models find that school 
percent low income students does have significant impact on some student groups. First, 
the estimate of percent low SES student effect is significant (P<0.05) on students from 
more affluent families (students who are not eligible for free and reduced lunch 
programs). Second, boys are much more likely to score lower if they are in a school with 
high percentage of low SES peers. The coefficient is quite large (-0.48), which suggests 
that a 50 percentage point change in school low SES population will affect the average 
math performance by 0.24 points of standardized score for boys; in contrast, the 
estimated effect is much less sizeable and not significant for girls. Third, students in both 
the bottom and top quartiles of achievement distribution seem to be more impacted by the 
changes in school low SES population. For instance, the linear combination coefficients 
for both low math achievers and high math achievers are -0.49 and are statistically 
significant at 1 percent level.   
The next two peer variables are the lagged measures of peer math and reading 
achievement. The results from all models on these two variables are very similar. First, 
school average peer achievement (in both math and reading) does not have significant 
influence on individual math scores; and there is no heterogeneous effect on black 
students or low SES students. Second, although girls and students in both the bottom and 
top achievement quartiles appear to be more negatively impacted by average peer 
achievement, the linear combination tests do no reveal significant effects on these groups 
of lottery participants. 
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The fifth peer variable is peer average disciplinary infraction, which has shown no 
significant impact on student math scores from the average peer effect model (Model 9 in 
Table 4.5). Heterogeneous effect of this peer discipline variable is only found in two 
models: both high math achievers and low math achievers are much more strongly 
influenced by peer disciplinary behaviors than other students. The linear combination 
coefficient for students in the top quartile of math achievement distribution is -0.62 
(P<0.01), which suggests that if half of the school peers received 1 more suspension in 4th 
grade, high math performing lottery participants are likely to score lower by 0.3 points of 
standardized score in math.  
The last peer variable is average school peer absence rate, which represents peer 
attendance behavior. There is no significant influence from the average attendance 
behavior of peers on student math achievement in middle school. No heterogeneous 
effects are found from the interactions of this peer variable with the three demographic 
characteristics. Although the estimates of peer attendance behavior appear to be different 
on students in both the bottom and top quartile of achievement distribution, the linear 
combination tests do not find the coefficients significant.  
 
Reading Achievement 
The estimates of heterogeneous peer effect models are presented in Table 4.11. The 
first peer variable is percent Black students. Recall that the average peer effect model 
(model 1 in Table 4.7) does not reveal significant peer effect from this variable on student 
reading achievement. Table 4.11, however, finds some significant heterogeneous effects. 
First, boys tend to have worse math performance if they attend a school with high 
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proportion of black peers, while the negative impact is much smaller and insignificant 
(the linear combination coefficient) on girls. Second, the estimates of heterogeneous peer 
racial composition effects are significant on both low and high reading achievers. 
Especially for the students in the top quartile of reading score distribution, the linear 
combination coefficient is -0.54 (P<0.001), which is more than 5 times of the coefficient 
for other students whose prior reading scores are lower. Low math performing students 
also appear to be more negatively impacted by average school percent black students than 
other students, but the linear combination coefficient is not significant. 
 The second peer variable is percent low SES students. Significant heterogeneous 
effects are found for female students, students in both the bottom and top quartiles of 
reading achievement distribution, and low math achievers. However, the estimated effect 
of average school percent low SES students is only significant on the reading 
achievement of high reading achievers --- the linear combination coefficient is -0.34 
(P<0.05), suggesting that increasing the school low SES population from 25% to 75% 
tends to reduce the average reading score by 0.17 points of standardized scores for 
students with high reading skills. 
The third peer variable is peer math achievement. Both high and low reading 
achievers are more negatively impacted by average peer math achievement than other 
students. The linear combination coefficients on both groups are -0.38 and significant at 
5% statistical level, suggesting that lottery participants at both the top and bottom math 
achievement distribution are likely to perform worse in reading if their school peers have 
better prior math achievement. There are no significant findings for other groups of 
students.  
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Table 4.11 Heterogeneous School Level Peer Effects on Reading Achievement 
          Reading Scores          
    Model1  Model2  Model3  Model4  Model5  Model6  Model7 
    Black  LSES  Female 
Low 
Reading 
Achiever 
High 
Reading 
Achiever 
Low 
Math 
Achiever 
High 
Math 
Achiever 
Peer Effects (Lottery Based)           
Proportion of Black Students        
Mean Effect  ‐0.15  ‐0.21  ‐0.30*  ‐0.16  ‐0.10  ‐0.17  ‐0.19 
   (0.16)  (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.14)  (0.14)  (0.14)  (0.14) 
Heterogeneous Effect  ‐0.09  0.06  0.19**  ‐0.18***  ‐0.43***  ‐0.07*  ‐0.05 
   (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.06)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.04) 
Proportion of Low SES Students             
Mean Effect  0.06  0.05  ‐0.05  0.11  0.14  0.09  0.06 
   (0.17)  (0.17)  (0.17)  (0.17)  (0.17)  (0.17)  (0.17) 
Heterogeneous Effect  ‐0.04  0.01  0.15*  ‐0.23***  ‐0.48***  ‐0.10**  ‐0.03 
   (0.09)  (0.12)  (0.08)  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.05) 
Peer Prior Math Achievement             
Mean Effect  ‐0.30  ‐0.30  ‐0.28  ‐0.27  ‐0.27  ‐0.31  ‐0.30 
   (0.16)  (0.16)  (0.16)  (0.16)  (0.16)  (0.16)  (0.16) 
Heterogeneous Effect  0.06  ‐0.01  ‐0.01  ‐0.15***  ‐0.13***  0.03  ‐0.05 
   (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
Peer Prior Reading 
Achievement             
Mean Effect  ‐0.30*  ‐0.30*  ‐0.29*  ‐0.26  ‐0.27  ‐0.31*  ‐0.29* 
   (0.14)  (0.14)  (0.14)  (0.14)  (0.14)  (0.14)  (0.14) 
Heterogeneous Effect  0.05  ‐0.00  ‐0.00  ‐0.14***  ‐0.11***  0.03  ‐0.04 
   (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
Peer Prior Disciplinary Records             
Mean Effect  ‐0.25  ‐0.36  ‐0.11  ‐0.09  ‐0.13  ‐0.24  ‐0.18 
   (0.21)  (0.20)  (0.22)  (0.19)  (0.19)  (0.19)  (0.19) 
Heterogeneous Effect  ‐0.04  0.24  ‐0.26  ‐0.56***  ‐0.82***  ‐0.09  ‐0.37* 
   (0.19)  (0.21)  (0.18)  (0.11)  (0.16)  (0.11)  (0.15) 
Peer Prior Attendance Records             
Mean Effect  12.64**  13.47**  14.02**  13.10**  12.28**  12.51**  12.28** 
   (4.62)  (4.47)  (4.83)  (4.46)  (4.45)  (4.47)  (4.47) 
Heterogeneous Effect  ‐1.96  ‐5.74  ‐2.66  ‐3.65***  ‐4.93***  ‐0.97*  ‐0.69 
     (3.83)  (4.30)  (3.26)  (0.48)  (0.59)  (0.47)  (0.58) 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001       
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Average peer prior reading achievement has been found negatively associated with 
student reading scores in middle school. The estimates of heterogeneous models suggest 
that both high and low reading achievers are 50% more negatively impacted by average 
school peer prior reading achievement --- the linear combination coefficients are about 
0.40 and significant at 1% level.  
Average school peer disciplinary infractions (the fifth peer variables), significantly 
reduces the reading test scores of both high and low reading achievers. The 
heterogeneous effect is particularly large for students who are in the top quartile of 
reading achievement distribution. Linear combination test of Model 5 finds that when 
average school peer disciplinary infractions increase by 0.5, reading scores of high  
reading performing students falls by almost 0.47 in standardized scores (P<0.001) --- the 
estimate if very substantial.  
The last peer variable is peer attendance behavior, measured by average peer absence 
rate. Overall, there is a positive correlation between average peer absence rate and 
student reading achievement. However, three subgroups, the high and low reading 
achievers, and low math achievers, appear to be less strongly impacted by peer 
attendance behavior than other students. Moreover, the linear combination tests suggest 
no significant effects of average peer absence rate on the reading scores of low income 
students or students with high reading abilities. 
The heterogeneous peer effect models on both math and reading achievements reveal 
that peer influences do affect students differently depending on their backgrounds. 
Overall, the academic outcomes (in both math and reading) of female students are less 
impacted by school peer compositions. Both strong and weak ability students (measured 
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by both math and reading skills) seem to be more strongly impacted by school racial and 
SES composition, as well as peer disciplinary infractions; and interestingly, both groups 
of students seem to be more negatively impacted by average school peer academic 
achievement.  
Recall that the regression sample in this study is limited to lottery participants and the 
identification of peer effects relies on the differences between lottery losers in 
neighborhood schools and lottery winners in magnet programs. Overall, lottery 
participants attending neighborhood schools are superior (in terms of social economic 
status, prior achievement, and prior disciplinary records etc.) than other students in the 
same school, and are more likely to be grouped with other advantaged peers for classes. 
Especially for high performing lottery participants, because they are really advanced 
compared to other students in their neighborhood school, they may be placed with the 
best teacher, receive special instructions and more attention. This may less likely happen 
to high performing lottery participants in magnet schools because the overall peer quality 
is high. Similarly, even a student is at the bottom quartile of the prior achievement 
distribution among the lottery participants; he/she may still be a high performer in his 
neighborhood school and be assigned to classes with high quality peers and good 
teachers; while this again may not be true for the low performing lottery participants 
attending magnet programs. These are the possibilities that cause the large negative effect 
of peer achievement on students at both the top and bottom quartiles of prior achievement 
distribution. Given that students are often tracked within schools, high ability students are 
likely to be grouped with more advantaged students (e.g., fewer black students or low 
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SES students, and fewer students with behavioral problems), the conclusions from the 
classroom level may be different, which will be examined in next chapter.  
 
Robustness Checks 
Previous sections have shown that some of the estimated peer effects are quite large, 
which raises the question whether the estimates capture something other than the effect of 
peers. In this section, I am going to check the robustness of the peer effect estimates. In 
specific, there are three major problems as discussed in Chapter III. First, whether the 
estimated peer effects are confounded with some unobserved heterogeneity in treatment 
responses? Second, whether the estimates of peer effects capture some other unobserved 
school factors, especially teacher qualities? Third, whether the estimated peer effects are 
biased by sample attrition?  
This section will address the above three problems in order. Although I did the 
robustness checks for all models related to the three research questions, in order to save 
some space, the following discussion will only focus on the average peer effect models 
on math achievement32.  
 
Heterogeneity in Treatment Response 
Recall that in the average peer effect model (equation 3.11) the causal effect of peer 
group is identified from the interaction between the lottery based peer term )ˆ( NM PP   
and the treatment indicator id . Therefore, the estimate of peer group effect could be 
confounded with unobserved heterogeneity in the treatment response ( i id ). It is hard to 
                                                 
32 The conclusions from other models are similar to the average peer effect model on math achievement; 
and the results are available upon request. 
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directly test this hypothesis. However, controlling for the observable heterogeneity in 
treatment response can help to indirectly check whether the estimated peer effects are 
proxies for the treatment response heterogeneity. In specific, we are going to control for 
the interactions of the treatment indicators33 ( id ) with all individual characteristics in the 
model, including prior achievement and behavioral outcomes. If controlling for all these 
observable treatment response heterogeneity in the regression leads to a diminished 
estimate of peer effect, then it indirectly proves that the estimated peer effect is in fact 
confounded with the way different individual respond to treatment.  
 Table 4.12 presents the estimates of average school peer effect models on math 
achievement, with the observed heterogeneity in treatment response controlled in the 
regression. As shown in the table, including the interaction of treatment indicator with 
individual variables in the model does not produce the expected changes in most of the 
estimates of peer effects, especially not for the widely expressed peer characteristics, 
such as peer race and SES composition, and peer academic achievement. 
Some of the point estimates of peer effects become even larger than before (results in 
Table 4.5), e.g., percent black students and percent low SES students. Especially, the 
estimated effect of percent low SES students turns bigger and significant while 
controlling for the heterogeneous treatment response term. The estimates of peer 
academic ability measures (models 7and 8), and peer attendance behavior are also larger, 
but they are still insignificant.  
The point estimates of variables like percent female students, percent special 
education students, and prior student discipline infractions, are a little smaller, but they 
                                                 
33 There are two treatment indicators, one for the academic magnet, and the other for the non-academic 
composite. 
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still remain significant. Including treatment response heterogeneity only overturns the 
significant impact from one variable --- percent ELL students. The point estimate of 
percent ELL students is about 40% smaller than the estimate from the original model 
(model 6 in Table 4.5), and is not statistically significant.  
 
Table 4.12: Average School Peer Effects on Math Achievement (Treatment Response 
Heterogeneity) 
 
              Math Scores             
Independent 
Variables  Model1  Model2  Model3  Model4  Model5  Model6  Model7  Model8  Model9  Model10 
Magnet School Effect                   
Academic      Treatment indicators are interacted with individual characteristics 
Non‐Academic Composite  Treatment indicators are interacted with individual characteristics 
Peer Effect (Lottery Based)                 
Black 
(proportion)  ‐0.59***                 
  (0.18)                   
Low SES (proportion)  ‐0.41*               
    (0.18)                 
Female (proportion)    ‐1.15*             
      (0.54)               
Hispanic (proportion)      ‐0.11             
        (0.63)             
Special ED (proportion)        2.33*           
          (0.98)           
ELL (proportion)          1.40         
            (1.22)         
Grade 4 Math (Mean)          0.22       
              (0.15)       
Grade 4 Reading (Mean)            0.20     
                (0.14)     
Grade 4 Suspension (Mean)              ‐0.04 
                  (0.20)   
Grade 4 Absence (Mean)                3.85 
                   (4.58) 
Peer Effects (Residence Based)               
 Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Student Characteristics                 
   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sample Size  11780  11780  11780  11780  11780  11780  11778  11778  11778  11778 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001                 
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Overall, the results from Table 4.13 do not support that the estimates of average 
school peer effects are confounded with unobservable heterogeneity in treatment 
response.  
 
Unobserved School Factors 
The second problem is whether the estimates of peer effects pick up some other 
unobserved school characteristics, especially teacher qualities. A lot of research (e.g, 
Ingersoll 1999, 2004; Peske & Haycock, 2006) has shown that low quality teachers are 
more likely to be assigned to schools with high percent poor and minority students. In our 
sample, if the neighborhood schools that lottery losers must attend (those schools usually 
have higher percentage of black and low income students) tend to have less effective 
teachers, then the estimates of peer effects may just be proxies for the school teacher 
qualities.  
To examine this possibility, I re-estimate the average peer effect models with teacher 
fixed effects included in the regression. Introducing teacher fixed effect into the model 
greatly reduces the variation in the data to estimate peer effects because the between-
teacher differences in peer characteristics are absorbed by the estimates of teacher effect. 
Fortunately, we have 5 cohorts of students in the sample, which ensures a great within-
teacher variation in peer characteristics. Also, the district was undergoing a school 
reassignment during the investigation years34, which also contributes to a great variation 
in peer characteristics over the course of a teacher’s career. 
                                                 
34 The district moved from a court-ordered desegregation plan to a neighborhood-based school system 
during these years. 
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Table 4.13 presents the results from the teacher fixed effect models. Overall, the 
estimates of peer effects have larger standard errors, which are expected given that 
estimating teacher fixed effects requires a large amount of data. However, the new 
models do not find any evidence that the estimated peer effects in the original models are 
picking up the effects from school teachers. Instead, while teacher fixed effect is 
controlled in the regression, some estimates of peer effects are even larger than earlier, 
such as percent black students, percent special education peers and percent ELL students. 
 
Table 4.13: Average School Peer Effects on Math Achievement (Teacher Fixed Effect)  
 
              Math Scores             
Independent 
Variables  Model1  Model2  Model3  Model4  Model5  Model6  Model7  Model8  Model9  Model10 
Magnet School Effect                   
Academic      Treatment indicators are interacted with individual characteristics 
Non‐Academic Composite  Treatment indicators are interacted with individual characteristics 
Peer Effect (Lottery Based)          
Black (proportion)  ‐1.47*                   
  (0.63)                   
Low SES (proportion)  ‐0.16                 
    (0.69)                 
Female (proportion)    ‐1.44               
      (1.11)               
Hispanic (proportion)      4.38*             
        (2.13)             
Special ED (proportion)        5.49**           
          (2.17)           
ELL (proportion)            7.22*         
            (3.52)         
Grade 4 Math (Mean)          ‐0.34       
              (0.74)       
Grade 4 Reading (Mean)            ‐0.34     
                (0.74)     
Grade 4 Suspension (Mean)              0.03   
                  (0.51)   
Grade 4 Absence (Mean)                19.13 
                   (11.74) 
Peer Effects (Residence Based)                 
 Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Student Characteristics                 
   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sample Size  11764  11764  11764  11764  11764  11764  11762  11762  11762  11762 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001                 
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 In addition, I also implemented a set of school fixed effect models to check if the 
estimated peer effects are confounded with some unobserved time-invariant school 
factors, such as school policy and principal leadership. The school fixed effect model 
results are very similar to the results from the teacher fixed effect models, and do not 
support that the large estimates of peer effects are proxies for unobserved school factors. 
 
Attrition Problems 
All studies exploiting randomized experiment face a common problem --- attrition. In 
our data, there are two types of attrition: (1) students do not continue to enroll in the 
district schools in a year subsequent to the lottery --- they may switch to a private school, 
or move to another district; (2) students do not have spring test scores. Not all of the 
students in the second group are attritors for that they may still stay in the system --- there 
are other reasons that no test scores may be reported. However, since a student without 
test scores could not contribute to the estimation of peer effects, they pose the same 
problem as the attritors. 
If attrition from the lottery winners is the same as from the lottery losers, it will not 
impact the difference in outcomes between these two groups and will not bias the 
estimates of treatment effect and peer effect. Unfortunately, as shown in table 4.14, the 
attrition rate of lottery winners is quite different from the rate of the lottery losers. The 
discrepancy is particularly pronounced for lottery participants in the academic magnet 
program --- losers are 50 percent more likely to leave the district than winners between 
4th and 5th grade. The attrition rate of lottery losers continues to be larger than lottery 
winners in later grades. For non-academic composite lottery participants, although the 
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attrition gap is smaller, lottery losers still have an attrition rate 40 percent higher than 
lottery winners in the year subsequent to the lottery.  
 
Table 4.14 Attrition Rates, by Lottery Outcomes1,2 
                                Lotteries     
                     Academic     Non‐academic Composite 
      Winners  Losers    Winners  Losers   
Leave the system after grade             
    4  11.50%  17.45%    7.45%  10.58%   
    5  6.05%  12.01%    9.85%  6.57%   
    6  7.79%  9.94%    9.18%  6.23%   
    7  4.61%  8.20%    7.97%  6.02%   
No spring Math scores in grade            
    5  4.00%  6.16%    6.60%  3.14%   
    6  1.73%  2.46%    3.46%  2.37%   
    7  1.61%  2.50%    2.24%  1.51%   
      8  1.08%  1.79%     2.13%  2.49%    
1.Counts only students who were in the system as 4th grade students when the lotteries 
were conducted and do not miss 4th grade math scores.       
2. A student is defined as a lottery winner if he/she won the lottery outright on the lottery day  
or received the delayed offer in 5th grade.                
 
 
The lower part of Table 4.14 shows the percentage of students missing math scores in 
the spring35. There is less significant difference between winners and losers who do not 
have spring test scores. In 5th grade, academic magnet lottery losers are more likely to 
miss math scores than lottery winners, and the pattern is opposite for the non academic 
composite lottery participants. The between group gap is even smaller in later grades. 
                                                 
35 Students who miss spring test scores are different from the first type of attritor (those who left the district 
before a new school year started as indicated in the upper part of the table). They have records in the 
district attendance file and student file, but do not have the record of test scores in the state standardized 
tests. Although there are many reasons that test scores are not reported, many students may have left the 
system during the school year. For example, there are 337 academic magnet lottery participants who never 
enrolled in the system as 5th graders (they are considered as the first type of attritors); there are 100 
participants who enrolled in district schools but were not present for testing (considered as students with 
missing scores). Among these 100 students, the majority of them had probably left the system prior to the 
test date, as 65% of them were never enrolled in 6th grade.  
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Therefore, I’ll only focus on the first type of attritors (those who do not return to the 
system in the fall) in the following analysis. 
Apparently, attrition is not random among lottery winners and lottery losers. Lottery 
outcomes do affect the decision whether to stay or leave the system. The problem is 
whether the correlation between attrition and student outcomes is systematically different 
between lottery winners and lottery losers. For example, if the lottery losers who left the 
system have families that are more concerned than the average about the quality of their 
children’s schools (especially, more concerned about the peers in the school), attrition 
may introduce systematic differences in outcomes between treatment group and control 
group, and then bias the estimates of treatment effect and peer effect. 
In this study, all regression models control for a large set of observed individual 
characteristics, including prior achievement and behavioral records, which greatly 
reduces attrition-induced bias36 . However, if attrition is correlated with some 
unobservable variables, the differences between winners and losers may not be a simple 
linear function of the observed student characteristics, then even these controls are not 
enough to offset the bias caused by attrition. For example, if high achieving lottery losers 
are more likely to leave the system when they have to return to a neighborhood school 
that has a high percentage of disadvantaged peers, then attrition difference may bias the 
estimate of peer effect upwards by removing high achievers from schools that have a 
large population of minority and poor students.  
                                                 
36 To the extent that attrition-related outcome differences are a linear function of student demographic 
characteristics and 4th grade test scores and behavioral records, including these individual variables restore 
the balance between treatment and control groups. 
 109
To examine the attrition problem further, I estimate a model of attrition between 
fourth and fifth grades among the academic magnet participants.37 The dependent 
variable is a dichotomous variable indicating attrition: 1 if the student left the system in 
5th grade; 0 otherwise. The independent variables are mostly limited to the regressors 
already included in the achievement models, including lottery outcome indicator38 and 
individual characteristics. If the results do not find a significant correlation between the 
attrition and the observable characteristics that predict achievement, it is less plausible 
that other unobservables with comparable predictive power could drive the decision of 
attrition. In addition, four variables as functions of peer characteristics are also included 
in the model to explore the possibility whether there is selective attrition among high 
achieving students when they have had to attend a school with disproportional minority 
and low income students. The four variables include: the school peer characteristics 
(percent black and percent low income students) a student will face if he/she loses the 
lottery NP(  in the above notation); the interaction of lottery outcome indicator with NP ; 
the interaction of individual prior math achievement with NP ; and a three way interaction 
of individual prior math scores, lottery outcome indicator, and NP .  Since the 
neighborhood school peer characteristics should not affect a student’s attrition decision if 
he won the lottery, one would expect the estimate on the second term (the interaction of 
winning with NP ) to offset the effect of the stand-alone NP . Moreover, if the previously 
described scenario is true, the coefficient on the interaction of prior math achievement 
with NP should be positive, while the coefficient on the three way interaction are 
                                                 
37 The discrepancy in attrition rate is more pronounced in the year subsequent to the lottery between lottery 
winners and lottery losers in the academic magnet lottery.  
38 Given that students have to make the private school enrollment decision in the spring, while the delayed 
win notice usually comes at the beginning of the fall semester, I only use the outright win indicator. 
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expected to be negative. Only two models are estimated--- one with the peer variable of 
percent black and the other with percent low SES students.39 
Table 4.15 presents the results from the two attrition models. Given the numerous 
interactions included in the model, all coefficients have large standard errors and are very 
imprecise. While the point estimate of percent school black students is positive as 
expected, the estimate of percent low SES students is negative; the coefficient on winning 
the lottery is negative which offsets the impact from the stand-alone peer characteristics. 
However, the coefficients on the interaction of peer characteristics with prior math 
achievement are negative, which works opposite to the hypothesis that high achieving 
students are more likely to leave the system if they had to return to a neighborhood 
school with more disadvantaged students; the coefficients on the three way interaction are 
also unexpectedly positive.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
39 The reasons to choose these two peer variables include: (1) these are two school characteristics that are 
usually released to the public, such as posted on the district website. It is easier for parents to check school 
racial composition and SES composition than to check other school peer characteristics, such as average 
prior achievement, disciplinary records, or special education students. Therefore, they are likely to be the 
major factors influencing parents’ decision on school enrollment. (2) these two peer variables are found 
significantly influencing student math achievement as shown in Table 4.5. Although the overall coefficient 
on average percent low SES peers is not significant in Table 4.5, the heterogeneous effect table (Table 4.10) 
shows that many groups of students are negatively impact by school low income population. (3) these are 
commonly expressed peer characteristics examined in the literature. 
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Table 4.15 Effects of Lottery Outcomes and Peer Characteristics on Attrition 
 
   Attrition 
  Model 1    Model 2 
Independent Variables       
Outright Winner  ‐0.43    ‐0.3 
  (0.48)    (0.47) 
Percent Black  0.32     
  (0.48)     
Percent Black * Winner  ‐0.38     
  (0.91)     
Percent Black * 4th grade math  ‐0.22     
  (0.35)     
Percent Black * 4th grade math*winner  0.02     
  (0.62)     
Percent low SES      ‐0.47 
      (0.51) 
Percent low SES * Winner      ‐0.74 
      (0.96) 
Percent LOW SES * 4th grade math      ‐0.16 
      (0.37) 
Percent LOW SES * 4th grade math*winner      0.49 
      (0.66) 
4th grade math scores  0.06    0.02 
  (0.17)    (0.17) 
4th grade math scores *winner  0.12    ‐0.07 
  (0.29)    (0.29) 
4th grade reading scores  0.05    0.04 
  (0.06)    (0.07) 
4th grade reading scores *winner  0.14    0.15 
  (0.11)    (0.11) 
Black  ‐0.49**    ‐0.44** 
  (0.13)    (0.13) 
Black*winner  0.13    0.08 
  (0.24)    (0.23) 
Low SES  ‐0.09    ‐0.02 
  (0.13)    (0.13) 
Low SES*winner  0.01    0.03 
  (0.26)    (0.26) 
Special Ed  ‐0.57    ‐0.62 
  (0.53)    (0.54) 
Special Ed*winner  0.52    0.58 
  (0.79)    (0.79) 
ESL  ‐0.33    ‐0.31 
  (0.51)    (0.51) 
ESL*winner  0.63    0.60 
  (0.78)    (0.78) 
Female  0.03    0.02 
  (0.08)    (0.08) 
Female*winner  0.10    0.07 
   (0.15)     (0.15) 
No. of Observation  2275      2275  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001       
 112
To make the interpretation of the regression results easier, I calculated the attrition 
probability for high performing students and low performing students40 under different 
situations: lottery losers whose neighborhood schools have high proportion of 
unfavorable peers41; lottery losers with more favorable neighborhood school peers; 
lottery winners with more unfavorable peers; lottery winners with more favorable 
neighborhood peers. 
 
Table 4.16 Attrition Probabilities as Function of Prior Achievement, Peer 
Characteristics and Lottery Outcomes (Outright Win, Academic Magnet)   
 
           Percent Black       Percent Low SES 
Prior 
Achievement  High  Low  Difference    High  Low  Difference 
                 
Lottery Losers               
High    12.1%  13.0%  ‐0.9%    8.2%  16.0%  ‐7.8% 
Low    13.7%  11.3%  2.4%    9.9%  14.8%  ‐4.9% 
Difference    ‐1.6%  1.7%  ‐3.3%    ‐1.7%  1.2%  ‐2.9% 
                 
Lottery Winners               
High    9.1%  9.9%  ‐0.8%    5.5%  11.6%  ‐6.1% 
Low    10.4%  8.5%  1.9%    6.8%  10.6%  ‐3.8% 
Difference    ‐0.7%  1.4%  ‐2.7%    ‐1.3%  1.0%  ‐2.3% 
                 
Difference, Losers ‐ Winners             
High    3.0%  3.1%      2.7%  4.4%   
Low     3.3%  2.6%        3.1%  4.2%    
 
 
The attrition probability results are reported in Table 4.16. Overall, high achievers are 
less likely to leave the system when their neighborhood school peers are unfavorable 
                                                 
40 High performing students are those who scored one standard deviation above the sample mean in 
mathematics; low performing students score one standard deviation below the sample mean in math. 
41 A neighborhood school that has 75 percent black student or low SES students is defined as a school with 
unfavorable peers; a neighborhood school with 25 percent black or low SES students is coded as a school 
with favorable peers. 
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(column 1 and column 4); and low achievers are less likely to exit when the situation is 
reversed --- with more favorable neighborhood school peers (column 2 and column 5). 
This pattern holds for both lottery winners and lottery losers in both peer characteristics; 
and it works against finding large peer effects.  
Under any scenario, lottery losers are more likely to leave the system. However, a 
more important problem is whether the attrition rate gap between high performing lottery 
losers and lottery winners is different from the gap between lottery losers and lottery 
winners who are low performers. Overall, the loser-winner difference is modest as 
reported in the bottom panel. When the neighborhood school peers are unfavorable, the 
attrition gap is larger for low achievers than for high achievers; the reverse is true when 
peers are favorable --- the loser-winner difference is bigger for high achievers than for 
low achievers. These findings again, do not support the hypothesis that differential 
attrition biases the estimates of peer effects upward by removing high performing lottery 
losers from schools serving high proportion minority and poor students.42 
The final step to assess the attrition impact is to re-estimate the achievement model 
(with only two peer characteristics examined, percent Black and percent low SES 
students) using a weight option. Each observation is weighted by the inverse of the 
predicted probability that the student remains in the school system; therefore, the 
weighted sample resembles what the sample would be if no student had left the system. 
The stay-in-system probability (the inverse of the weight) equals 1 minus the attrition 
                                                 
42 However, one thing should be mentioned that the linear combinations of the coefficients reported in 
Table 4.17 have large standard errors and overlapping confidence intervals, so we can not reject the 
hypothesis that high performing students do not differ from low performing students in attrition rate, 
regardless of the peers and lottery outcomes.  
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probability, which is calculated from a more general attrition model than the one shown 
in Table 4.15.43  
The estimates of peer effects are quite similar to those in Model 1 and Model 2 of 
Table 4.6. The coefficient on percent Black from the weighted model is -0.53 (P<0.001), 
virtually identical to the coefficient (-0.49, P<0.001) in Table 4.6. The coefficient on 
percent low SES students from the weighted model is -0.43 (P<0.05), which is even 
larger than the one in original model (-0.33) and is weakly significant (at 5% level) in 
statistical sense.   
To conclude, although there is significant attrition from our data, with more lottery 
losers leaving the system than lottery winners, there are no systematic differences 
between the remaining (or attrited) lottery losers and lottery winners in the correlation 
between all observed characteristics and achievement. Therefore, there is no evidence 
that attrition has biased the estimates of magnet school treatment effects and the peer 
group effects.  
                                                 
43 The attrition model is very similar to the one shown in Table 4.15, but includes lottery participants in 
both the academic magnet and the non-academic composite, and has separate equations for attrition after 
each grade. For instance, the attrition equation after grade 5 includes 5th grade test scores as additional 
controls; the one after grade 6 includes 6th grade achievement; the one after grade 7 includes 7th grade test 
scores. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
PEER EFFECTS ON ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT 
 ---RESULTS FROM CLASSROOM LEVEL ANALYSIS 
 
This chapter explores how the classroom peer composition impacts student academic 
achievement in math and reading. Last chapter finds significant peer effects from some 
school peer characteristics, such as percent Black students, but no evidences that average 
school peer academic abilities or peer disciplinary records influence student achievement 
in middle school. Intuitively, it is expected that peer effects at the classroom level should 
be stronger than the school level peer effects since classroom is the place where 
instruction happens and peer interactions in academics mostly take place.  In this chapter, 
I am going to examine how classroom peers influence student achievement and whether 
the magnitude of classroom peer effects is larger than that of school peer effects. 
As discussed in Chapter III, identifying classroom peer effects poses more 
econometrical challenges, including selection bias arising from the non-random 
classroom placements and omitted variable bias which is likely to be stronger at the 
classroom level. This section overcomes these methodological challenges by exploiting 
the admission lotteries that randomly assign students to a magnet school or a 
neighborhood school. In particular, each student in both the treatment group and the 
control group is assigned a predicted value of counterfactual classroom peers, which is 
close to the class peers that a student would encounter if he had been in the opposite 
situation. The prediction of the counterfactual peer characteristics utilizes a rich set of 
information including lottery outcomes, individual characteristics, prior outcomes, and 4th 
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grade schools. The exogenous estimates of the classroom peer effects on student 
achievement can then be derived from the differences between the actual classroom peer 
characteristics and the counterfactual classroom peer characteristics.  
The descriptive statistics of classroom peer characteristics has already been reported 
in Chapter III; therefore this chapter will skip the section of descriptive results. The first 
three sections in this chapter are organized to answer the three research questions on: (1) 
average classroom peer effects on student achievement; (2) the impact from dispersion of 
classroom peer characteristics; (3) the heterogeneous classroom peer effects. The fourth 
section checks the robustness of the estimates with a focus on whether the estimated 
classroom peer effects are proxies for classroom instructors. The final section discusses 
the differences between school level peer effects and classroom level peer effects.  
 
Impacts from Average Classroom Peer Characteristics 
The model used to estimate average classroom peer effect is equation 3.17. The major 
regressor of interest is cijP , the actual classroom peer characteristics. To deal with he 
endogeneity of the classroom peer variable, I constructed an instrumental variable 
consisting of the enrollment probability and counterfactual class peer characteristics. 
Other important variables included in the equation are the magnet school treatment 
indicators, residence based school peer characteristics44, and individual characteristics 
(including prior outcomes).  
The majority of middle school students usually rotate through classrooms for 
different subjects, so the achievement models in this chapter estimate subject-specific 
                                                 
44 The residence based school peer characteristics are included in the model in order to control for the 
correlation between family residence choice and achievement. 
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peer effects on student academic achievement. The peer variables used in the math 
achievement model are the average peer characteristics of one’s math classes; the 
variables used in the reading achievement model are the average peer values of the 
reading/language classes.45,46 
 
Math Achievement 
Table 5.1 presents the estimates of classroom peer effects on math achievement. Only 
coefficients on the lottery based classroom peer variables and the magnet school 
treatment indicators are reported in the table.47 Model 1 and model 2 suggest that student 
math achievement is negatively impacted by classroom percent Black students and 
percent low income students. The estimates of peer effects from these two classroom peer 
variables are quite large: the average math score decreases by 0.33 points in standardized 
score if the classroom black students increase from 25% to 75%; and a 50 percent point 
change in classroom low income students is related to 0.4 point change in standardized 
math scores. Moreover, the treatment effect of the academic magnet school turns to 
negative (significant at 5% level) when classroom percent low income student is 
controlled. This implies that a student would do even better in his neighborhood school if 
he attends a class in the neighborhood school that has the same percent of low income 
peers as his class in the academic magnet school.  
                                                 
45 If a student took multiple classes in one subject, the peer variable is an average value across all courses in 
this subject.   
46 Schools have different titles for reading and language classes, for example, the same class may be titled 
Reading in some school, but as Language Arts (or English) in other schools. Therefore, we coded the class 
as reading class if the course id starts with ENG (the district course id for reading/language arts classes), 
but excludes some selective classes such as Creative Writing or Theater.   
47 The coefficients on student characteristics are not included in the table because they are quite similar to 
previous results. The coefficients on majority of the residence based school peer characteristics are quite 
small and insignificant; and the conclusions on these estimates are similar to those from the school level 
models. 
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Table 5.1 Average Classroom Peer Effects on Math Achievement (Math Class) 
              Math Scores                
Independent 
Variables  Model1  Model2  Model3  Model4  Model5  Model6  Model7  Model8  Model9  Model10  Model11 
Magnet School Effect                     
Academic  0.00  ‐0.09*  0.12**  0.09*  0.09*  0.21***  ‐0.09  ‐0.19**  0.08*  0.07  ‐0.08 
  (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.07) 
Non‐Academic 
Composite  0.11  0.02  0.13  0.11  0.09  0.18  0.06  0.00  0.11  0.06  0.02 
  (0.08)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.10)  (0.11) 
Peer Effect (Lottery Based)                   
Black (proportion)  ‐0.66***                  ‐0.08 
  (0.09)                    (0.43) 
Low SES (proportion)  ‐0.81***                ‐0.49 
    (0.10)                  (0.33) 
Female (proportion)    ‐0.17                ‐0.00 
      (0.25)                (0.26) 
Hispanic (proportion)      ‐0.88              ‐2.28* 
        (0.70)              (1.07) 
Special ED (proportion)        ‐0.87*          ‐0.43 
          (0.34)            (0.52) 
ELL (proportion)            2.82*          4.47 
            (1.29)          (2.45) 
Grade 4 Math (Mean)            0.32***      0.03 
              (0.05)        (0.22) 
Grade 4 Reading (Mean)            0.40***    0.15 
                (0.05)      (0.14) 
Grade 4 Suspension (Mean)              ‐0.65***  0.24 
                  (0.20)    (0.30) 
Grade 4 Absence (Mean)                ‐6.73  1.99 
                    (4.05)  (6.85) 
Peer Effects (Residence Based)                 
  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Student Characteristics                     
   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Over‐identification 
Test  0.77  0.75  0.68  0.69  0.73  0.62  0.8  0.85  0.54  0.69  0.36 
Sample Size48  10224  10224  10224  10224  10224  10224  10224  10224  10224  10224  10224 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001                   
 
                                                 
48 The sample size for classroom level analysis is smaller than that for school level analysis is due to two 
reasons: (1) Some lottery participants are not included in the course file so we are not able to construct 
classroom peer variables for them. (2) The academic magnet school did not report course information 
during school years 1999-2003. We are able to use homeroom number to calculate class peer variables for 
students in this school. However, due to the tracking policy in later grades, homeroom peer characteristics 
are quite different from the true class peer characteristics in grades 7 and 8. After consulting with the 
school former principle, we decided to include only 5th and 6th graders in school year 2000 to 2003 in the 
regression sample. Therefore, we exclude lottery participant observations from the following cohort: lottery 
year 1999 participants (7th graders in 2002 and 8th graders in 2003) and lottery year 2000 participants (8th 
graders in 2003). 
 119
The third significant finding is on classroom percent special education students 
(Model 5), which is found significantly decreasing student math scores in middle school. 
For instance, a 10 point percentage change in classroom percent special education 
students is associated with a 0.09 point standardized score change in math achievement. 
The estimated effect is quite large. Note that students eligible for special education 
programs are often placed in the same class to meet their needs: in our data, the average 
class percent special education peers is 0.33 for lottery participants who are also 
identified as special education; and it is only 0.03 for non special education lottery 
participants. The problem then is whether the negative impact of classroom percent 
special education peers mainly works on those who are identified as special education 
students. This will be addressed in the third section of heterogeneous peer effects. Also 
note that the estimate of percent special education peers at the classroom level is opposite 
to the estimate at school level which shows positive impact on student achievement. The 
difference between the classroom estimate and school level estimate will also be 
discussed later.  
Model 6 in Table 5.1 finds that student math achievement tends to increase if there 
are more ELL students in their class. The estimated effect is substantial: if the classroom 
percent ELL students increases by 5% (one standard deviation of this peer variable in our 
sample), the average math score improves by 0.14 standardized score. Interestingly, the 
estimate of percent ELL students at the classroom level is very close to the estimate at the 
school level, both indicating a positive correlation between student math scores and 
percent ELL peers, at least in our sample.  
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The two peer academic ability variables, measured by average 4th grade math and 
reading scores, have shown significant and positive impact on individual math 
achievement in middle school. The sizes of the estimated effects from both peer academic 
ability indicators are substantial. For example, a student’s math score in middle school 
improves by 0.32 points in standardized scores if the average class prior math 
achievement increases by 1 point (also in standardized scores); the estimated effect of 
average class reading achievement is even larger. Also note that the treatment effect of 
the academic magnet school is negative when the academic quality of class peers is 
controlled. Model 8 finds a coefficient of -0.19 (P<0.01) on the academic magnet 
treatment indicator, which suggests that lottery losers of the academic magnet school 
would perform 0.19 standardized score higher in mathematics than the winners enrolling 
in the academic program if the average class peer prior reading achievement in the 
neighborhood school is the same as the academic magnet school. This implies that once 
the classroom peer academic ability is controlled, students enrolled in the academic 
magnet program are actually worse off in academics than their counterpart students in 
neighborhood schools. 
The result from Model 9 shows that average classroom peer disciplinary infractions 
greatly decrease student math achievement in middle school. The coefficient on this 
variable is -0.65 (P<0.001), implying that if half of the peers in the same class received 
one more suspension in 4th grade, the average math score will decrease by 0.33 
standardized score --- the effect is very large. 
The classroom level analyses do not find significant impacts from percent Female 
students, percent Hispanic students, and peer attendance behaviors. In column 11, all 
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specifications of peer characteristics are incorporated in one model. Due to the 
collinearity of all these variables49, the estimated effects of most peer variables are no 
longer significant. Only the variable percent Hispanic student shows weakly significant 
and negative effect in the full variable model. Moreover, with all peer characteristics 
included in one equation, neither of the two magnet programs is found influencing 
student achievement --- the coefficient on the treatment indicator is negative for the 
academic magnet. Again, the findings suggest that once we control for the class peer 
composition, the magnet program is no more successful than the regular public schools in 
this district, at least not in improving student math achievement.   
 
Reading Achievement  
Table 5.2 reports the regression results of classroom peer effects on student reading 
achievement. Most estimates of peer effects on reading achievement are similar to the 
estimates from the math achievement models. First, classroom race composition and SES 
composition have strong and negative impact on student reading scores as shown in 
model 1 and model 2. Second, peer academic abilities (model 7 and model 8), measured 
by average peer math and reading scores in 4th grade, significantly improve individual 
reading achievement in middle school. Third, average class peer disciplinary behavior 
has shown strong and negative influence on student reading score. Interestingly, the point 
estimate of the peer behavior effect on reading achievement (0.95) is almost 50% larger 
than the estimated effect on math achievement (0.65): if every peer in the class received 1 
                                                 
49 Given the ability grouping policies in many schools, it is likely that the classroom peer characteristics are 
highly correlated.  
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more suspension in 4th grade, the average class reading score decreases almost 1 point in 
standardized score. 50 
 
Table 5.2 Average Classroom Peer Effects on Reading Achievement (Reading Class) 
              Reading Scores                
Independent 
Variables  Model1  Model2  Model3  Model4  Model5  Model6  Model7  Model8  Model9  Model10  Model11 
Magnet School Effect                     
Academic  0.02  ‐0.07  0.13***  0.11**  0.11**  0.10  ‐0.04  ‐0.11*  0.06  0.12*  ‐0.06 
  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.06)  (0.09) 
Non‐Academic 
Composite  0.05  ‐0.02  0.07  0.06  0.06  0.06  0.01  ‐0.02  0.04  0.06  0.01 
  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.09)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.11)  (0.12) 
Peer Effect (Lottery Based)                   
Black (proportion)  ‐0.49***                  ‐0.18 
  (0.10)                    (0.28) 
Low SES (proportion)  ‐0.71***                ‐0.32 
    (0.10)                  (0.27) 
Female (proportion)    ‐0.32                ‐0.34 
      (0.25)                (0.26) 
Hispanic (proportion)      ‐0.67              0.08 
        (0.85)              (1.48) 
Special ED (proportion)        ‐0.16            ‐0.11 
          (0.48)            (0.67) 
ELL (proportion)            ‐1.13          ‐1.85 
            (1.90)          (3.10) 
Grade 4 Math (Mean)          0.23**        ‐0.24 
              (0.07)        ‐0.21 
Grade 4 Reading (Mean)            0.30***    0.22 
                (0.05)      (0.20) 
Grade 4 Suspension (Mean)              ‐0.93***  ‐0.55* 
                  (0.18)    (0.25) 
Grade 4 Absence (Mean)                ‐0.54  0.90 
                    (6.01)  (8.77) 
Peer Effects (Residence Based)                   
  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Student Characteristics                   
   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Over‐
identification Test  0.7  0.57  0.81  0.79  0.83  0.81  0.72  0.6  0.74  0.81  0.62 
Sample Size  10246  10246  10246  10246  10246  10246  10246  10246  10246  10246  10246 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001                   
                                                 
50 The vast majority students in our sample took multiple reading/language classes, but only one (15% of 
the students took two) math class. The reading class peer characteristics assigned to one student is an 
averaged value across all the reading/language courses, so one point change in the average reading class 
peer disciplinary infraction usually means that the student has encountered more misbehaving peers in 
classes than one point change of average disciplinary infraction in math class. Therefore, it is not surprising 
the estimate of reading class peer behavior problem is larger. 
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Other peer variables, including percent special education students and percent ELL 
classmates (they have shown significant impact on math achievement), are not found 
significantly associated with student reading achievement. When all peer characteristics 
are included in one model (Column 11), only the estimate of average peer disciplinary 
infraction still remains strong and negative. Again, when the classroom peer composition 
is controlled, neither of the magnet programs has shown any positive impact on student 
reading achievement.  
All models from both Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 are over-identified. The omnibus over-
identification tests suggest that the instruments (for both the treatment indicators and the 
peer variables) in both math and reading achievement models are exogenous.  
 
Impacts from Dispersion of Peer Characteristics 
Ability tracking in schools has long been a controversial topic. Supporters of within 
school tracking argue that putting similar students in classes can improve instructional 
efficiency, while opponents argue that ability grouping would essentially harm low-
ability students by isolating them from peers with high ability and high motivations. In 
this section, I am going to use the classroom data to examine how the heterogeneity of 
classroom peer composition influences student academic achievement --- whether 
students benefit from a more homogeneous class setting or they perform better in a class 
with students at various levels in academic qualities.  
Table 5.3 presents some descriptive statistics on the peer composition heterogeneity 
variables, measured by the standard deviations in peer math and reading achievements, 
peer disciplinary infractions, and peer absence rates. Overall, the classroom peer 
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academic qualities (measured by prior math and reading achievement) are more dispersed 
in 5th grade than in 8th grade, which reflects that students in higher grades are more likely 
to be tracked based on their ability. Enrollees in the academic magnet have more 
homogeneous classes than the lottery losers enrolled in neighborhood schools; however, 
the heterogeneity gap is very small in 8th grade. The same pattern is also applied to the 
lottery participants of the non-academic composite, but with a smaller enrollee-loser gap.  
There is a large gap between enrollees and losers in the heterogeneity of peer 
disciplinary infractions in both 5th and 8th grades. However, note that the average value of 
class peer disciplinary records is highly correlated with the dispersion value in our data.51 
Therefore, although many schools may also group students for instruction based on their 
behavioral problems (note that the mean variance is smaller in 8th grade), the 
heterogeneity of peer disciplinary behavior is still much larger in neighborhood school 
classes because the average value is bigger.  
Finally, there is no significant difference in peer attendance behavior (measured by 
prior absence rate) between the enrollees and losers, or across grades.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
51 The correlation between the mean value and the standard deviation in peer disciplinary infractions is 0.90 
for both math and reading classes in our sample.   
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Table 5.3 Heterogeneity of Classroom Peer Characteristics1 
         
   
Standard Deviation in G4 
Math 
Standard Deviation in G4 
Reading 
Standard Deviation in G4 
Suspension 
Standard Deviation in G4 
Absence 
        G5      G8      G5      G8      G5      G8      G5      G8 
    Mean  SD  Mean  SD  Mean  SD  Mean  SD  Mean  SD  Mean  SD  Mean  SD  Mean  SD 
Math Class                               
Academic                               
  Participants  0.72  0.18  0.60  0.14  0.74  0.18  0.65  0.16  0.23  0.32  0.14  0.25  0.03  0.01  0.03  0.01 
  Enrollees  0.66  0.12  0.59  0.12  0.65  0.10  0.64  0.12  0.13  0.17  0.06  0.11  0.03  0.01  0.03  0.01 
  Losers2  0.79  0.20  0.61  0.18  0.82  0.20  0.65  0.15  0.32  0.41  0.18  0.32  0.03  0.01  0.03  0.01 
Non‐Academic Composite                              
  Participants  0.73  0.19  0.60  0.16  0.75  0.20  0.65  0.17  0.30  0.36  0.27  0.36  0.03  0.01  0.03  0.01 
  Enrollees  0.71  0.18  0.59  0.15  0.75  0.20  0.64  0.15  0.29  0.31  0.27  0.31  0.03  0.01  0.03  0.01 
   Losers2  0.78  0.18  0.59  0.17  0.82  0.17  0.64  0.17  0.45  0.44  0.29  0.42  0.03  0.01  0.03  0.01 
Reading Class                               
Academic                               
  Participants  0.72  0.17  0.65  0.14  0.72  0.18  0.65  0.14  0.22  0.31  0.16  0.27  0.03  0.01  0.03  0.01 
  Enrollees  0.66  0.12  0.64  0.14  0.65  0.10  0.66  0.13  0.13  0.17  0.06  0.11  0.03  0.01  0.03  0.01 
  Losers2  0.78  0.18  0.67  0.18  0.78  0.21  0.66  0.17  0.30  0.40  0.23  0.35  0.03  0.01  0.03  0.01 
Non‐Academic Composite                              
  Participants  0.73  0.19  0.65  0.14  0.74  0.19  0.64  0.15  0.29  0.34  0.27  0.33  0.03  0.01  0.03  0.01 
  Enrollees  0.72  0.17  0.63  0.12  0.74  0.19  0.63  0.13  0.28  0.29  0.26  0.28  0.03  0.01  0.03  0.01 
   Losers2  0.78  0.18  0.65  0.15  0.19  0.18  0.65  0.14  0.40  0.40  0.33  0.38  0.03  0.01  0.03  0.01 
1.Counted only lottery participants with non‐missing test scores in 4th grade.              
2. Students who lost all lotteries (neither as outright winner nor delayed winner by the start of 5th grade).    
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Math Achievement 
The model estimating the impacts of the dispersion in classroom peer composition is 
equation 3.16, wherein the regressors of interest include both the average term and the 
dispersion term of peer outcome variables. Regression results are reported in Table 5.4. 
Overall, there is no evidence that the heterogeneity of classroom peer characteristics 
influence student math achievement in middle school. First, results in model 1 and model 
2 suggest that although students tend to have higher math scores when they are in classes 
with high performing peers, the variation in peer academic qualities does not show 
significant impacts on student math achievement. Second, controlling for the 
heterogeneity of peer disciplinary infractions overturns the strong impact from the 
average discipline measures, even though the coefficient on the dispersion term is not 
significant. This is due to the high collinearity between the average term and the 
heterogeneity term, which causes big standard errors. However, the linear combination 
test on both the average term and the standard deviation term still finds a significantly 
negative coefficient, which indicates that students do perform worse in a class with more 
disruptive peers. Third, no evidence shows that either the mean or the variation of class 
peer absence rate has significant impact on student math achievement in middle school.  
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Table 5.4 Impacts from Dispersion of Peer Characteristics on Math Achievement    
(Math Class) 
 
      Math Scores    
  Model1  Model2  Model3  Model4 
Magnet School Effect         
  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Peer Effect ( Mean, Lottery Based)         
Grade 4 Math (Mean)  0.31***       
  (0.05)       
Grade 4 Reading (Mean)    0.41***     
    (0.05)     
Grade 4 Suspension (Mean)      ‐0.61   
      (0.69)   
Grade 4 Absence (Mean)        ‐11.79 
        (9.33) 
Peer Effect (Dispersion, Lottery Based)         
Grade 4 Math (Standard Deviation)  ‐0.22       
  (0.21)       
Grade 4 Reading (Standard Deviation)    0.22     
    (0.37)     
Grade 4 Suspension (Standard Deviation)      ‐0.01   
      (0.31)   
Grade 4 Absence (Standard Deviation)        5.17 
        (6.52) 
Peer Effects (Residence Based)      
  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Student Characteristics      
   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
P‐value for Over‐identification Test  0.78  0.88  0.52  71 
Sample Size  10215  10215  10215  10215 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001      
 
 
Reading Achievement 
Table 5.5 presents the estimated effects of the heterogeneity of classroom peer 
characteristics on reading achievement. The regression results are very similar to those 
from the math achievement models. One exception is from Model 3, wherein the estimate 
of average peer disciplinary infractions increases while controlling for dispersion. This is 
also caused by the high collinearity between the average term and the dispersion term in 
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peer disciplinary records --- when the positive effect of the dispersion value (although it 
is not significant) is controlled, the negative impact of the average term rises.  
 
Table 5.5 Impacts from Dispersion of Peer Characteristics on Reading Achievement 
(Reading Class) 
 
     reading Scores    
  Model1  Model2  Model3  Model4 
Magnet School Effect         
  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Peer Effect ( Mean, Lottery Based)         
Grade 4 Math (Mean)  0.21***       
  (0.06)       
Grade 4 Reading (Mean)    0.30***     
    (0.05)     
Grade 4 Suspension (Mean)      -1.57**  
      (0.58)  
Grade 4 Absence (Mean)       1.08 
       (13.77) 
Peer Effect (Dispersion, Lottery Based)         
Grade 4 Math (Standard Deviation)  ‐0.27       
  (0.20)       
Grade 4 Reading (Standard Deviation)    ‐0.01     
    (0.25)     
Grade 4 Suspension (Standard Deviation)      0.31  
      (0.23)  
Grade 4 Absence (Standard Deviation)        ‐2.03 
        (8.62) 
Peer Effects (Residence Based)      
  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Student Characteristics      
   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
P‐value for Over‐identification Test  0.73  0.58  0.66  0.79 
Sample Size  10243  10243  10243  10243 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001      
 
 
Overall, the results from both the math and reading achievement models reveal little 
evidence that the heterogeneity of class peers (measured by the standard deviation in peer 
achievement levels and behavioral records) affect individual academic outcomes. While 
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this finding implies that ability tracking per se has little effect on average achievement in 
our sample, another question emerges: how are students at different academic levels 
impacted by class grouping? For example, if high ability students benefit but low ability 
students suffer from being in an ability grouping setting, it is likely to get a zero net 
effect. Therefore, it is important to explore the differential effects of classroom peer 
heterogeneity. 
 
Heterogeneous Peer Effects 
This section examines whether students from different background (race or SES 
groups) or at different achievement levels are influenced by classroom peer composition 
uniformly. The model estimating the heterogeneous class peer effects is equation 3.18, 
which includes two sets of regressors of interest --- the average peer characteristics and 
the interaction of peer characteristics with individual variables.  
 
Math Achievement 
Table 5.6 reports the estimates of heterogeneous classroom peer effect models on 
math achievement. Same as Table 4.12 in Chapter IV, Table 5.5 only presents 6 peer 
variables interacted with 7 individual characteristics.  
The first peer variable reported in the table is average percent black students. While 
model 1 and model 2 do not find that Black students or low income students are 
differently impacted by percent black classmates, model 3 suggests that the negative 
impact of having more black peers is stronger on boys: the coefficient is -0.75 (P<0.001) 
for boys and 0.58 for girls (linear combination coefficient, P<0.001). Model 4 to Model 7 
 130
suggest that both high and low performing students (depending on their initial position in 
achievement distribution among lottery participants) appear to be more negatively 
impacted by class Black population; and the negative impact is even stronger on students 
with high prior achievement. For example, model 7 finds that the estimated effect of 
percent black classmates is 30% stronger on students who are in the top quartile of math 
achievement distribution. 
 
Table 5.6 Heterogeneous Class Level Peer Effects on Math Achievement (Math Class) 
          Math Scores       
    Model1  Model2  Model3  Model4  Model5  Model6  Model7 
    Black  LSES  Female 
Low 
Reading 
Achiever 
High 
Reading 
Achiever 
Low 
Math 
Achiever 
High 
Math 
Achiever 
Peer Effects (Lottery Based)             
Percent Black Students        
Mean Effect  ‐0.69***  ‐0.68***  ‐0.75***  ‐0.64***  ‐0.63***  ‐0.61***  ‐0.62*** 
   (0.10)  (0.09)  (0.10)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.09) 
Heterogeneous Effect  0.06  0.10  0.17**  ‐0.08*  ‐0.14*  ‐0.17***  ‐0.22*** 
   (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.06)  (0.03)  (0.06)  (0.03)  (0.06) 
Percent Low SES Students             
Mean Effect  ‐0.81***  ‐0.84***  ‐0.93***  ‐0.78***  ‐0.78***  ‐0.73***  ‐0.78*** 
   (0.11)  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.10) 
Heterogeneous Effect  ‐0.01  0.11  0.23**  ‐0.09*  ‐0.17*  ‐0.20***  ‐0.15* 
   (0.09)  (0.11)  (0.07)  (0.04)  (0.07)  (0.04)  (0.07) 
Peer Prior Math Achievement             
Mean Effect  0.31***  0.32***  0.35***  0.33***  0.34***  0.33***  0.35*** 
   (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.05) 
Heterogeneous Effect  0.06  0.04  ‐0.05  ‐0.03  ‐0.08**  ‐0.04  ‐0.10*** 
   (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
Peer Prior Reading Achievement           
Mean Effect  0.39***  0.40***  0.43***  0.41***  0.41***  0.41***  0.42*** 
   (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05) 
Heterogeneous Effect  0.02  0.00  ‐0.05  ‐0.05*  ‐0.05*  ‐0.05*  ‐0.08*** 
   (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02) 
Peer Prior Disciplinary Records             
Mean Effect  ‐0.86***  ‐0.72**  ‐0.70**  ‐0.58**  ‐0.65**  ‐0.47*  ‐0.62** 
   (0.24)  (0.27)  (0.23)  (0.22)  (0.20)  (0.23)  (0.21) 
Heterogeneous Effect  0.42  0.13  0.10  ‐0.19  ‐0.06  ‐0.46**  ‐0.20 
   (0.25)  (0.27)  (0.23)  (0.17)  (0.37)  (0.17)  (0.31) 
Peer Prior Attendance Records             
Mean Effect  ‐7.25*  ‐8.97*  ‐7.78*  ‐6.34  ‐6.25  ‐5.62  ‐5.48 
   (3.57)  (4.08)  (3.53)  (4.03)  (4.08)  (4.02)  (4.10) 
Heterogeneous Effect  2.06  8.28  2.13  ‐2.32***  ‐2.69***  ‐3.44***  ‐3.21*** 
     (6.13)  (5.78)  (4.68)  (0.61)  (0.76)  (0.59)  (0.73) 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001           
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The second peer variable is percent low income students. Similarly, the first two 
models do not find significant differential effect of this variable on Blacks or low income 
students; but model 3 suggests that female students are less impacted by class low income 
peers than male students. Heterogeneous effect of percent class low income students is 
also found in models 4 to 7 --- both high and low performing students are more 
negatively impact by percent low income classmates. The linear combination of the 
coefficients on the mean term and the interaction term is 0.93 for students with high prior 
math achievement (model 7), which is about 20% larger than the coefficient on other 
students. The estimated effect of percent low income class peers is very substantial for 
boys and high performing students: increasing the class low income peers from 25% to 
75% is associated with a 0.47 point (standardized scores) fall in math achievement.  
The next two peer variables are average class peer math and reading test scores in 4th 
grade. The coefficients on the main effect terms of two peer variables are positive and 
significant for all 7 models. The first two models reveal little evidence of heterogeneous 
effects on black or low income students. Although high performing students (in two 
subjects, as shown in column 5 and column 7) appear to be less strongly influenced by 
average class peer achievement, the linear combinations of both coefficients are still 
positive and statistically significant.  
The fifth class peer variable is peer disciplinary infractions (average class peer 
suspensions in 4th grade). Overall, average class peer disciplinary infractions exert very 
strong and negative impact on student math scores. The differential effect is only 
significant from model 6 --- low math achievers are much more strongly influenced by 
peer disciplinary problems. The linear combination test finds a coefficient of 0.92 
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(P<0.001) on students at the bottom quartile of math achievement distribution, doubling 
the estimate of average peer disciplinary behavior effect on other students (0.47, P<0.05). 
The last peer variable is average class peer absence rate. The estimate of class peer 
attendance behavior is not found significant from the average model (Model 10 in Table 
5.1); however, Table 5.5 suggests that some groups of students tend to score lower if the 
class peers have high absence rate in 4th grade. For example, the negative effects of 
average peer absence rate are significant (P<0.05) on non-black students, non-low-
income students, and male students, with coefficients slightly higher than the overall 
estimate (-6.60, model 10 in Table 5.1). Moreover, both the low achievers and higher 
achievers (in both subjects) appear to be more negatively impacted by peer absence rate 
than other students. The estimated effect of class peer absence rate is about -8.5 (P<0.05) 
for students at the two ends of achievement distributions. This implies that if the class 
peers were absent from schools for 2 more days (with an absence rate of 1.14% in a 
school year of 175 days), the average math achievement of high or low performing 
students falls by 0.1 point of standardized scores.  
Although it is not reported in the table, the heterogeneous effects of two other peer 
variables are worth mention. The first one is percent special education students, which 
significantly decreases average student math scores (-0.88, P<0.05; model 5 in Table 
5.1). The heterogeneous effect model finds that the coefficient on the mean effect term is 
-0.46 (for non-special education students), and the coefficient on the interaction term 
(percent special education * special education indicator) is -0.57. Although neither of the 
coefficients is statistically significant, the linear combination coefficient is -1.03 
(P<0.001), which suggests that the negative effect of percent special education peers 
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mainly works on special education students themselves. The other peer variable is 
percent class ELL students, which has shown a positive impact on student math scores 
(2.83, P<0.05; model 6 in Table 5.1). Interestingly, the positive influence of having more 
ELL classmates, however, mainly woks on non-ELL students: the coefficient on the 
average term is 3.16 (P<0.05); and the coefficient on the interaction of the peer variable 
with ELL indicator is -12.96, but is not statistically significant at 5% level.  
Moreover, I also ran a set of models to check if there are differential effects from the 
heterogeneity of classroom peer characteristics on students from various backgrounds. In 
order to examine this possibility, I add the interaction of the standard deviation of peer 
achievement (in both math and reading) with individual characteristics to equation 3.16. 
Therefore, there are three regressors of interest in the model: average class peer 
achievement, standard deviation of class peer achievement, and the interaction of the 
standard deviation with individual characteristics.   
Table 5.7 presents the differential effects of classroom peer achievement 
heterogeneity on student math achievement. The first peer variable is the variation of 
class peer math achievement. The results suggest that some students are impacted 
differently by the heterogeneity of classroom peer math achievement. First, Black 
students and low income students appear to be more negatively impacted by the 
heterogeneity of class peer achievement. The linear combination of the coefficients on 
the standard deviation term and the interaction term is -0.75 (P<0.05) for low income 
students, which implies that low income students would have better math performance in 
a more homogeneous class. Second, the negative impacts from the variation in class peer 
achievement seem to be stronger on both high and low performing students than on other 
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students in the middle of the achievement distribution. However, the linear combination 
tests from model 4 to model 7 find little evidence that the heterogeneity of peer 
achievement influence the math achievement of students from either the bottom or the 
top achievement quartiles. Finally, the conclusions from the models of classroom peer 
reading achievement are very similar to those from the math achievement models, 
suggesting that the heterogeneity of peer reading achievement has a stronger negative 
impact on black and low income students.  
 
Table 5.7 Differential Effect from Dispersion of Class Peer Achievement on Math 
Achievement (Math Class) 
 
           Math Scores      
    Model1  Model2  Model3  Model4  Model5  Model6  Model7 
Peer Effects (Lottery 
Based)  Black  LSES  Female 
Low 
Reading 
achiever 
High 
Reading 
Achiever 
Low 
Math 
achiever 
High 
Math 
Achiever 
Peer Prior Math Achievement           
Mean  0.32***  0.32***  0.31***  0.32***  0.31***  0.32***  0.31*** 
   (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05) 
Standard deviation  ‐0.02  ‐0.10  ‐0.14  ‐0.20  ‐0.20  ‐0.12  ‐0.18 
   (0.20)  (0.21)  (0.27)  (0.21)  (0.21)  (0.21)  (0.21) 
Standard deviation * 
individual variables  ‐0.54*  ‐0.65*  ‐0.13  ‐0.11***  ‐0.09*  ‐0.19***  ‐0.10* 
   (0.24)  (0.27)  (0.19)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.04) 
Peer Prior Reading Achievement          
Mean  0.44***  0.41***  0.40***  0.41***  0.40***  0.41***  0.40*** 
   (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05) 
Standard deviation  0.61   0.52  0.22  0.25  0.24  0.28  0.22 
   (0.31)  (0.37)  (0.59)  (0.38)  (0.38)  (0.37)  (0.37) 
Standard deviation * 
individual variables  ‐1.18  ‐1.46*  ‐0.00  ‐0.12***  ‐0.06  ‐0.18***  ‐0.10** 
    (0.63)  (0.60)  (0.44)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.03)   (0.03) 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001      
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Reading Achievement 
Estimates of heterogeneous effect of average classroom peer characteristics on 
student reading achievement are reported in Table 5.8. Many of the estimates are quite 
similar to those on math achievement. First, there is no significant differential effect of 
class racial or SES composition on the reading achievement of Blacks or low income 
students (model 1 and model 2); and the negative impacts from both peer variables are 
only 70% as great on female students as compared to males. Second, heterogeneous 
effects of percent black or low SES classmates are significant on both low and high 
reading achievers. Especially for students with high prior reading scores (model 5), the 
magnitude of the estimated effect of percent black peers is double the effect on other 
students.  
Heterogeneous effects of average peer academic qualities (measured by peer 
achievement in math and reading) are only found significant from model 4 and model 5. 
The results suggest that students at both the bottom and the top quartiles of reading 
achievement distribution are less likely to be impacted by average classmate academic 
abilities, although the linear combination coefficients still suggest positive influence from 
average class peer achievement on both groups. 
The fifth peer variable is average peer disciplinary records. Model 1 shows that the 
average reading scores for black students tend to decrease more with the same change in 
peer prior suspension records. Moreover, the negative impacts are much stronger on both 
high and low reading achievers. Especially for students at the top reading achievement 
quartile, the linear combination test suggests that the average reading score for these 
students would drop by 1.6 point of standardized scores if every student in the class 
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received 1 more suspension in 4th grade, which almost doubles the estimated effect on 
other students below the 75th percentile of prior reading achievement. 
 
Table 5.8 Heterogeneous Class Peer Effects on Reading Achievement (Reading Class) 
            Reading Scores       
    Model1  Model2  Model3  Model4  Model5  Model6  Model7 
    Black  LSES  Female 
Low 
Reading 
achiever 
High 
Reading 
Achiever 
Low 
Math 
achiever 
High 
Math 
Achiever 
Peer Effects (Lottery Based)             
Percent Black Students        
Mean Effect  ‐0.48***  ‐0.49***  ‐0.59***  ‐0.43***  ‐0.39***  ‐0.47***  ‐0.49*** 
   (0.11)  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.10) 
Heterogeneous Effect  ‐0.02  0.01  0.19**  ‐0.19***  ‐0.44***  ‐0.07*  ‐0.03 
   (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.06)  (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.05) 
Percent Low SES Students             
Mean Effect  ‐0.68***  ‐0.70***  ‐0.88***  ‐0.62***  ‐0.60***  ‐0.67***  ‐0.72*** 
   (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.10) 
Heterogeneous Effect  ‐0.06  ‐0.01  0.33***  ‐0.23***  ‐0.48***  ‐0.09*  0.09 
   (0.08)  (0.10)  (0.07)  (0.04)  (0.07)  (0.04)  (0.06) 
Peer Prior Math Achievement             
Mean Effect  0.21**  0.23**  0.25***  0.25**  0.24**  0.22**  0.24** 
   (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07) 
Heterogeneous Effect  0.08  0.02  ‐0.05  ‐0.08*  ‐0.14***  0.02  ‐0.04 
   (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
Peer Prior Reading Achievement             
Mean Effect  0.28***  0.30***  0.32***  0.33**  0.31***  0.30***  0.31*** 
   (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05) 
Heterogeneous Effect  0.07*  0.01  ‐0.03  ‐0.09***  ‐0.11***  0.01  ‐0.02 
   (0.03)  (0.40)  (0.03)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Peer Prior Disciplinary Records             
Mean Effect  ‐0.64**  ‐0.91***  ‐1.04***  ‐0.57**  ‐0.82***  ‐0.83***  ‐0.95*** 
   (0.22)  (0.23)  (0.20)  (0.21)  (0.18)  (0.22)  (0.18) 
Heterogeneous Effect  ‐0.55*  ‐0.02  0.25  ‐0.76***  ‐0.76*  ‐0.20  0.11 
   (0.22)  (0.23)  (0.20)  (0.15)  (0.30)  (0.16)  (0.26) 
Peer Prior Attendance Records             
Mean Effect  0.69  1.59  ‐4.54  0.75  0.42  0.05  ‐0.41 
   (4.90)  (6.03)  (4.56)  (5.99)  (6.05)  (6.05)  (6.09) 
Heterogeneous Effect  ‐2.37  ‐7.14  8.03  ‐4.02***  ‐5.17***  ‐1.29*  ‐0.43 
     (7.67)  (8.02)  (6.26)  (0.58)  (0.75)  (0.58)  (0.70) 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001        
 
 137
Finally, heterogeneous effects of average peer absence rate are only found significant 
on students at the top and bottom quartiles of reading achievement distribution. However, 
the linear combination tests do not suggest significant effect of peer absence rate on any 
student group specified in the table. 
Unlike the models on math achievement, there is no evidence that special education 
students themselves are more strongly influenced by class percent special education 
students in reading achievement. Similarly, there is no heterogeneous effect of percent 
class ELL students. 
Table 5.9 reports the estimates of heterogeneous effect from the dispersion of class 
peer achievement on student reading scores. First, differential effects of peer math 
achievement variation are found for female students and students at the two end quartiles 
of reading achievement distribution. The linear combination tests find that if the standard 
deviation of peer math achievement increases by 0.5, the average reading scores for girls, 
or students in either the bottom or top quartile of reading achievement will fall by 0.2 
point of standardized scores (P<0.05). This implies that female students, both high and 
low reading performers, will achieve higher reading scores if the peers in their reading 
classes are more alike in math abilities. Second, the dispersion of peer reading 
achievement shows more negative impact on both high and low reading achievers, but the 
coefficients from the linear combination tests are not significant. 
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Table 5.9 Differential Effect from Dispersion of Class Peer Achievement on Reading 
Achievement (Reading Class) 
 
            Reading Scores     
    Model1  Model2  Model3  Model4  Model5  Model6  Model7 
Peer Effects (Lottery 
Based)  Black  LSES  Female 
Low 
Reading 
achiever 
High 
Reading 
Achiever 
Low Math 
achiever 
High Math 
Achiever 
Peer Prior Math Achievement           
Mean  0.22***  0.21***  0.20***  0.21***  0.20***  0.21***  0.21*** 
   (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06) 
Standard deviation  ‐0.11  ‐0.22  0.03  ‐0.23  ‐0.21  ‐0.25  ‐0.28 
   (0.19)  (0.20)  (0.26)  (0.20)  (0.20)  (0.20)  (0.20) 
Standard deviation * 
individual Variable  ‐0.41  ‐0.2  ‐0.48*  ‐0.19***  ‐0.19***  ‐0.03  0.02 
   (0.25)  (0.27)  (0.20)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.04) 
Peer Prior Reading 
Achievement           
Mean  0.31***  0.30***  0.30***  0.31***  0.28***  0.30***  0.30*** 
   (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05) 
Standard deviation  0.12  ‐0.04  0.21  0.07  0.09  0.02  0.01 
   (0.21)  (0.24)  (0.36)  (0.25)  (0.25)  (0.25)  (0.25) 
Standard deviation * 
individual Variable  ‐0.27  0.29  ‐0.30  ‐0.19***  ‐0.19***  ‐0.03  0.01 
    (0.42)  (0.41)  (0.29)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001       
 
Overall, the heterogeneous peer effect models find some evidences that the academic 
outcomes of students from various backgrounds are differently impacted by class peer 
composition. In general, female students are less likely to be impacted by average class 
peer characteristics. Both high achievers and low achievers appear to be more negatively 
influenced by disadvantaged class peers. The heterogeneous effect is particularly 
significant on the reading achievement of students with high prior reading scores. Finally, 
some groups of students tend to be more negatively impacted by the heterogeneity of 
classroom peer achievement. For example, black and low income students will do better 
in mathematics if the peer math achievement is more homogeneous; females and both 
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high and low reading achievers will score higher in reading if their reading class peers are 
less dispersed in prior math achievement.  
 
Robustness Checks 
Following the procedures in last chapter, I also ran a set of models to check if the 
strong estimates of class peer effects pick up the effects of some other factors than the 
classroom peer characteristics. First, I include the interaction of the treatment indicators 
with individual characteristics in the regression to test if peer effects are confounded with 
the heterogeneity in treatment responses. However, it turns out that the point estimates of 
classroom peer effects become even larger (and remain significant) when the 
heterogeneous interaction term is controlled. The results do not support that the estimated 
classroom peer effects are proxies for treatment response heterogeneity.  
Second and more importantly, I implemented teacher fixed effect model to test if 
classroom peer effects are confounded with teacher impacts. One of the challenges faced 
by peer effect identification at the classroom level is the non-random matching between 
teachers and students within each school. For example, schools may place students with 
disciplinary problems with one teacher who is more experienced with misbehaving 
students; or schools may assign the best teachers to classes with high performing 
students. Therefore, the estimation of classroom peer effects is likely to pick up some 
effects of teacher characteristics.52  
                                                 
52 For example, the Florida study by Burk and Sass (2004) finds that adding teacher fixed effect totally 
overturned the significant estimates of peer influence on student math achievement. They argue that the 
apparent peer impacts found in other studies may just reflect the endogenous matching between teachers 
and students within a school. 
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The estimates of classroom peer effect models (on math achievement) with teacher 
fixed effect are presented in Table 5.1053. Due to the large amount of data required by 
teacher fixed effect models, the standard errors of the peer effect estimates arise. 
However, the point estimates of some major classroom peer characteristics, including 
percent black students, percent low income students, average peer math achievement, 
average peer reading achievement, and average peer disciplinary records become even 
larger and still remain statistically significant. Therefore, there is little evidence that the 
large estimated effects of classroom peers are signals for teacher qualities or the 
endogenous matching between teachers and students.   
 
Table5.10 Average Class Peer Effects on Math Achievement (Teacher Fixed Effect) 
 
               Math Scores             
Independent 
Variables  Model1  Model2  Model3  Model4  Model5  Model6  Model7  Model8  Model9  Model10 
Magnet School Effect                   
Academic  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Non‐Academic 
Composite  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Peer Effect (Lottery Based)                 
Black (proportion)  ‐0.96***                 
  (0.24)                   
Low SES (proportion)  ‐1.39***               
    (0.27)                 
Female (proportion)    0.26               
      (0.36)               
Hispanic (proportion)      ‐3.59             
        (2.49)             
Special ED (proportion)        ‐1.18*           
          (0.54)           
ELL (proportion)            6.45         
            (3.57)         
Grade 4 Math (Mean)            0.42**     
              (0.10)       
Grade 4 Reading (Mean)            0.50***   
                (0.09)     
                                                 
53 The findings from the teacher fixed effect models on reading achievement are quite similar, except that 
the estimate of average peer disciplinary infraction effect is larger and significant. 
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Table 5.10 Continued               
Grade 4 Suspension (Mean)              ‐1.23**   
                  (0.47)   
Grade 4 Absence (Mean)                ‐8.93 
                    (6.18) 
Peer Effects (Residence Based)                 
  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Student Characteristics                   
  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Teacher Fixed Effects                   
   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sample Size  10219  10219  10219  10219  10219  10219  10219  10219  10219  10219 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001             
 
 
Differences between School Level Estimates and Classroom Level Estimates of  
Although both school level analysis and classroom analysis find some important 
influences of peer groups, there are differences in the magnitude and nature of the 
estimated peer group effects between the two levels. In this section, I am going to 
compare the peer effect estimates at both levels and discuss the possibilities that cause the 
differences. The following discussions mainly focus on the estimated average peer 
characteristic effects on math achievement. The estimates can be referred to the models in 
Table 4.5 (school level analysis) and Table 5.1 (classroom analyses). 
First, both the school level and classroom level analyses find that percent Black 
students (Model 1) are negatively associated with student math achievement. However, 
the magnitude of estimate of percent Black effect is about 30% stronger at the classroom 
level (0.66) than at the school level (0.49). The difference in the size of peer racial 
composition effect supports the hypothesis that peer group influence on student academic 
achievement mainly works through classrooms where the direct peer interactions in 
learning actually take place. Peer racial composition at school level, may impact student 
achievement mostly through the indirect channels, such as shaping the culture or 
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environment of the schools (e.g., low expectations and fewer resources in a school with 
disproportional black students). However, peer racial composition at classroom level, in 
addition to the indirect influence such as teacher expectations, may also have direct 
impact on student achievement through the interactions between students. For example, 
black students are more likely to have disciplinary problems (as found in next chapter), 
which can directly impact student learning if the disruptive behavior happens in the 
classroom. 
Second, while there is little evidence that the percentage of low income students 
(model 2) at school level impacts student math achievement, the estimated effect at the 
classroom level is large and significant. The same patterns are also found from model 7 
and model 8 --- school level estimates of average peer academic abilities (in both 
subjects) do not show significant influence on student math achievement, but the 
classroom level estimates are positive and significant. One possibility is due to the 
tracking practice in middle schools. As suggested by many studies (e.g., Gamoran, 1986; 
Oaks, 1990; Argys, Rees & Brewer, 1996; Mickelson, 2001), students are often tracked 
in schools (especially in middle and high schools). Therefore, if disadvantaged students, 
such as low SES students or students with low academic abilities, are grouped with other 
disadvantaged students for classes no matter what school they attend (regardless of the 
school type or the average school peer characteristics), then the school level peer 
composition may only have a moderate or no influence on student outcomes. Moreover, 
the estimated differences between school level and classroom level further suggest that 
the causal relationship between peer groups and student achievement mostly comes from 
classrooms where students directly interact with each other on learning activities. 
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Third, although school level analysis finds that high percent female students decrease 
individual math scores, the significance vanishes at the classroom level (Model 3). 
Although it might be true that schools with more female students have relatively lower 
expectations on math achievement and put more emphasis on reading or language arts 
classes, I would not draw the conclusion from the school level estimate that there is a 
strong and negative causal relationship between percent female students and average 
student math achievement. As I mentioned in the previous chapter, because the analytical 
strategy in this paper identifies peer effect from the average difference in peer 
characteristics between the treatment group and the control group, the small gap in school 
gender composition between the two groups is likely to yield a large coefficient on the 
peer variable percent female students. However, although it may also be true that there 
are low expectations and motivations in a female dominate math class, the negative 
impact can be canceled out because there are fewer classroom disruptions.   
Fourth, the school level models find significant and positive effects from percent 
school special education students and percent ELL students. In our data, many of the 
special education and ELL lottery participants chose to attend neighborhood schools even 
when they won the lottery of the academic magnet school, which may signal the 
perceptions of certain school qualities of some neighborhood schools, such as good 
special education or ELL programs, or teachers more experienced with special need or 
ELL students. However, I still would not conclude that the causal relationship between 
student achievement and school special education students or ELL students is strongly 
positive. In fact, the classroom estimate of percent special education students tells a 
totally different story: having more students with special needs in a class reduces average 
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student math achievement in middle school. For example, when the instructor has to slow 
down her class pace or spend disproportional time teaching students with learning 
disabilities, it will likely have a negative impact on other students in the same classes 
regardless of their own academic abilities. Interestingly, the classroom heterogeneous 
peer effect model finds that in our sample, the negative influence of percent special 
education students mainly works on the lottery participants who are also special 
education students. This is not surprising because the special education lottery 
participants perform much better in both subjects than other special education students in 
the same district.54 Therefore, if special education lottery participant are put in a special 
education class where most of other students are at extremely low academic levels55, it is 
very likely that they are going to achieve lower than what they could do in a class with 
regular students. Moreover, although the classroom estimate of percent ELL student is 
also positive and very close to the school level estimate in magnitude, the impact of 
having more ELL peers in the same classroom might work differently from the impact of 
school level ELL peers. Note that in our sample, ELL lottery participants outperform 
other students in mathematics56. Due to the tracking policy in middle school, having more 
ELL classmates may also signal a high average class math achievement in the magnet 
schools where all ELL students are enrolled through admission lotteries.  
                                                 
54 The average prior scores for special education lottery participants are 620 (math) and 646 (reading); and 
the average prior scores for non-lottery participant special education students are 572 (math) and 585 
(reading). The average scores for the special education lottery participants are even higher than the average 
scores for the non lottery participant regular students (623 in math, 635 in reading).  
55 This is most likely to happen in neighborhood schools where many special education lottery participants 
choose to attend and other special education enrollees (the majority) did not participated in the magnet 
school lotteries. 
56 Although the average prior math achievement for ELL lottery participants is slightly lower than other 
lottery participants, they achieve higher math scores in middle schools than other lottery participants in our 
sample. 
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Fifth, average peer disciplinary infractions only show significantly negative impact 
on student achievement at classroom level (model 9). One possibility that causes the 
insignificant school level estimate is also due to the school tracking policy. If students 
with behavioral problems are often placed in the same class (maybe because the teacher 
is experienced with disruptive students), it is likely to find little impact from the average 
school level disciplinary variable.  The big difference in the estimates of average peer 
disciplinary records at both levels again suggests that peer group influence on student 
achievement mostly comes from classroom level instead of school level. 
Finally, although the estimates of average peer absence behavior are not statistically 
significant at both school and classroom levels, the signs of the coefficients are opposite. 
Moreover, the heterogeneous peer effect models at the classroom level (Table 5.5) find 
that some groups of students, such as non-Blacks, high income students, boys, and 
students at the two ends of achievement distributions, are negatively impacted by average 
peer absence rate (significant at 5% level). For example, if the class teacher has to spend 
disproportional time helping a frequent absent student catch up with school work, it will 
definitely slow down the study of other students in the same class. However, this negative 
impact is unlikely to be spread to students in other classes of the same school.  
Overall, the comparison of peer effect estimates between school level and classroom 
level suggests that stronger and direct influence of peers on student academic 
achievement comes from classrooms where the direct peer interaction in learning mostly 
takes place. The school level peer composition, however, has a relatively moderate 
impact on student academic outcomes through shaping school culture and atmosphere.   
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CHAPTER VI 
 
PEER EFFECTS ON BEHAVIORAL OUTCOMES --- RESULTS FROM  
BOTH SCHOOL AND CLASSROOM LEVEL ANALYSES 
 
Although a large body of research has extensively examined the presence of peer 
effects in education, most studies have focused on student academic outcomes. Due to 
data limitations, the question of whether peers influence student non-scholastic outcomes 
in school is much less studied in literature. In this project, I am able to derive two 
behavioral outcome variables from the district admission data. The two outcomes of 
interest include student discipline and attendance, which are considered as important 
indicators of student social engagement and participation in schools. (Rowley, 2005) 
This chapter seeks to explore the impacts of peer groups on student disciplinary and 
attendance behaviors in school. The first part of this chapter presents some descriptive 
statistics of the two outcome variables. The second part reports the magnet school 
treatment effects, with no peer variables controlled. The following sections are organized 
to answer the three research questions of: (1) the influence on peer behaviors from 
average peer composition; (2) the impact from the dispersion of peer composition; and 
(3) the heterogeneous peer effects. Different from previous two chapters, the regression 
results from both school and classroom analyses will be reported and discussed together 
in this chapter. 
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Descriptive Statistics of the Outcomes Variables 
 
Disciplinary Infraction 
The district discipline data keep the records of the disciplinary actions given to a 
student as a consequence to his/her misconducts. The actions are taken based on the 
severity of student behavior, including less severe punishments, such as warning, call to 
parents, or corporal punishment, and severe punishments, like suspension (both in school 
and out of school) and expulsion.57  While well behaved students do not have any record 
in the discipline data, many students experienced more than one disciplinary action in a 
given year. To measure student disciplinary infractions, I coded two variables from these 
records: annual number of times punished, which sums all disciplinary actions for every 
student in each year; and annual number of times suspended, counting only in-school and 
out-of-school suspensions. A zero value is given to the students who did not receive any 
disciplinary actions in the school year.  
The current value of the discipline variable is used as dependent variable to measure 
student behavior in middle school. The 4th grade value of the discipline variable is 
included in the regression models as an independent variable, and is also aggregated at 
both school and classroom level to form the peer behavioral variable.  I ran the regression 
analyses on both discipline variables (total punishment numbers and total suspension 
numbers) and obtained very similar conclusions. Following Figlio’s 2005 study in which 
suspension is used as the outcome of interest, I report only the results for the suspension 
variable in this chapter.  
                                                 
57 Since there are only 2 students (among 5 cohorts) expelled from middle schools in our data, I did not 
include the expulsion variable in discipline measures.  
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Table 6.1 Descriptive Statistics of the Dependent Variable: Number of Suspensions 
  
    Suspension Numbers (per student per year) 
        Grade 5         Grade 6         Grade 7         Grade 8 
    Mean  SD    Mean  SD    Mean  SD    Mean  SD 
Lottery Participants                       
All  0.25  0.94    0.35  1.21    0.61  1.81    0.72  1.87 
Academic                       
  Participants  0.14  0.61    0.20  0.92    0.32  1.13    0.39  1.12 
  Enrollees  0.11  0.54    0.10  0.45    0.10  0.54    0.18  0.63 
 
Enrollees in Other 
Magnet Schools  0.19  0.64    0.33  1.35    0.49  1.76    0.57  1.48 
 
Enrollees in Non‐Magnet 
Schools  0.14  0.66    0.25  1.03    0.44  1.20    0.51  1.27 
Composite Non‐Academic                       
  Participants  0.31  1.05    0.42  1.32    0.76  2.07    0.88  2.12 
  Enrollees  0.29  1.02    0.43  1.42    0.75  1.96    0.80  1.69 
 
Enrollees in Other 
Magnet Schools  0.14  0.64    0.13  0.50    0.08  0.47    0.12  0.47 
  
Enrollees in Non‐Magnet 
Schools  0.39  1.20     0.52  1.40     0.99  2.40     1.19  2.63 
*Counted only students who were in the system as 4th graders in the lottery year. 
 
 
Table 6.1 presents the descriptive results of the suspension variable for lottery 
participants. Clearly, the disciplinary infractions increase as the students progress through 
grades. The biggest jump is between 6th grade and 7th grade --- the average number of 
suspensions for 7th graders is almost double the number for 6th graders. While this 
suggests that older students are more likely to have disciplinary problems in school, it 
may also reflect that schools become stricter with student behavioral problems in higher 
grades and issue more suspensions. Academic magnet school enrollees appear to receive 
fewer suspensions than their counterpart students enrolled in neighborhood schools; this 
pattern is also true of non-academic magnet lottery participants. The large standard 
deviation of this variable suggests that there is a great variation in behaviors among all 
lottery participants.   
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Absence Rate 
The district keeps a daily base attendance record for each student. For each required 
school day, I code the absence variable as 1 if a student was absent (either unexcused or 
excused), 0 otherwise. I then sum the values of the absence variable across the days in the 
school year that the student was enrolled in the district. The total is then divided by the 
days enrolled for each student to calculate the annual absence rate.  
Similar to other outcome variables, the current value of this variable enters the 
regression model as a dependent variable. The lagged measure (4th grade) of this variable 
is employed to form the peer variable measuring peer attendance behavior, and is also 
included as an individual control in the regression. 
 
Table 6.2 Descriptive Statistics of the Dependent Variable:  Absence Rate 
    Annual Absence Rate 
        Grade 5         Grade 6         Grade 7         Grade 8 
Absence Rate                       
    Mean  SD    Mean  SD    Mean  SD    Mean  SD 
Lottery Participants                       
All  0.03  0.05    0.03  0.04    0.04  0.05    0.04  0.05 
Academic                       
Participants  0.03  0.04    0.03  0.03    0.03  0.05    0.04  0.04 
Enrollees  0.03  0.03    0.03  0.03    0.03  0.03    0.03  0.03 
Enrollees in Other Magnet 
Schools  0.03  0.04    0.03  0.03    0.03  0.05    0.03  0.03 
Enrollees in Non‐Magnet Schools  0.04  0.06    0.04  0.04    0.04  0.06    0.04  0.05 
Composite Non‐Academic                       
Participants  0.03  0.04    0.03  0.05    0.04  0.05    0.04  0.05 
Enrollees  0.03  0.03    0.03  0.03    0.03  0.04    0.03  0.03 
Enrollees in Other Magnet 
Schools  0.03  0.03    0.03  0.03    0.03  0.03    0.03  0.03 
  
Enrollees in Non‐Magnet Schools  0.04  0.06     0.04  0.06     0.04  0.06     0.05  0.06 
*Counted only students who were in the system as 4th graders in the lottery year. 
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As shown in Table 6.2, the average absence rate of the lottery participants is 0.035 
across grades. The difference in average absence rate between magnet school enrollees 
and lottery participants enrolled in other schools is small --- the average gap is 0.01 for 
both academic and non-academic magnet schools. If all lottery participants were enrolled 
in the district for a full school year (175 school days)58, a difference of 0.01 in absence 
rate would mean that lottery participants enrolled in neighborhood schools were absent 
1.75 days more than the winners enrolled in the magnet programs. There is also more 
variation in attendance rate among the lottery losers in non-magnet schools than among 
the magnet school enrollees. 
 
Magnet School Treatment Effects 
Although academic outcome improvement is often used to evaluate the effectiveness 
of school choice programs, many studies also suggest that choice schools outperform 
their counterpart neighborhood schools in issues like student behavior and parental 
satisfaction (e.g., Cullen et al., 2003; Peterson, 1998; Smrekar and Goldring, 1999). This 
section examines whether the magnet schools in the district reduce student misconduct in 
middle schools and improve student attendance. The regression strategy is the same as 
the one used in the academic achievement models.  
 
Disciplinary Infractions 
Table 6.3 presents the estimated treatment effects on student disciplinary infractions 
from the models using both the small sample and the large sample. When I estimate the 
model using the sample of 5th and 6th graders, I do not find significant treatment effects 
                                                 
58 The school year length varies across years, from 169 to 180 days. 
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for either the academic or non-academic magnet schools. However, results for the large 
sample indicate that enrolling in a magnet school substantially reduces the number of 
suspensions. The estimated treatment effect is larger for the non-academic magnet 
composite --- with all individual background variables held constant, students who enroll 
in the non-academic magnet composite schools are likely to receive 0.4 fewer 
suspensions than lottery losers who attend a neighborhood school.  
The second panel of Table 6.3 shows the coefficients on individual characteristics. 
Compared to other students, black students, special education program students, and 
students from low SES families are more likely to receive disciplinary actions. Female 
students, and students with higher prior test scores, not surprisingly, appear to behave 
better. Also as it is expected, prior behavioral outcome is strongly correlated to student 
current behavior problems in middle school.  
 
Table 6.3 Magnet School Treatment Effects on Disciplinary Infractions 
         Suspension Numbers 
  First 2 Grades    All 4 Grades 
Independent Variables       
Academic Magnet Treatment       
Academic   ‐0.043    ‐0.262*** 
  (0.06)    (0.07) 
Non‐Academic Magnet Treatment       
Composite  0.066    ‐0.401* 
  (0.14)    (0.19) 
Student Characteristics       
Black  0.229***    0.375*** 
  (0.03)    (0.04) 
Hispanic  0.035    0.048 
  (0.11)    (0.11) 
Special Education  0.397***    0.561*** 
  (0.07)    (0.07) 
Low SES 0.198***    0.348*** 
  (0.03)    (0.03) 
ELL  ‐0.196    ‐0.13 
  (0.14)    (0.17) 
Female  ‐0.190***    ‐0.245*** 
  (0.03)    (0.03) 
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Table 6.3 Continued      
Grade 4 Reading  ‐0.051*    ‐0.058** 
  (0.02)    (0.02) 
Grade 4   Math  ‐0.062**    ‐0.069*** 
  (0.02)    (0.02) 
Grade 4 Absence  0.61    0.975 
  (0.48)    (0.50) 
Grade 4 Suspension  0.593***    0.669*** 
   (0.04)     (0.04) 
Over-Identification Test 0.06    0.3 
N 6558     12286 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001    
 
 
Absence Rate 
The estimated magnet school treatment effects on student attendance are reported in 
Table 6.4. In neither sample do I find significant magnet school effects on student 
absence rate. The coefficients on individual characteristics suggest that with all other 
factors held constant, blacks, girls, and ELL students are less likely to be absent from 
schools. Special education program students and students from low SES background, 
however, have higher absence rates than other students. As expected, students with 
higher prior math scores show better attendance behavior, and students who were more 
often absent in 4th grade continue to have higher absence rates in middle school. 
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Table 6.4 Magnet School Treatment Effects on Attendance Behavior 
         Absence Rate 
  First 2 Grades    All 4 Grades 
Independent Variables  Model1    Model2 
Academic Magnet Treatment       
Academic   ‐0.005    ‐0.004 
  (0.00)    (0.00) 
Non‐Academic Magnet Treatment       
Composite  0.000    ‐0.003 
  (0.01)    (0.01) 
Student Characteristics       
Black  ‐0.008***    ‐0.008*** 
  (0.00)    (0.00) 
Hispanic  0.007    0.002 
  (0.00)    (0.00) 
Special Education  0.011***    0.011*** 
  (0.00)    (0.00) 
Low SES 0.005***    0.010*** 
  (0.00)    (0.00) 
ELL  ‐0.015**    ‐0.013* 
  (0.01)    (0.01) 
Female  ‐0.002*    ‐0.002** 
  (0.00)    (0.00) 
Grade 4 Reading  ‐0.001    0.001 
  (0.00)    (0.00) 
Grade 4   Math  ‐0.002**    ‐0.003*** 
  (0.00)    (0.00) 
Grade 4 Absence  0.603***    0.587*** 
  (0.02)    (0.01) 
Grade 4 Suspension  ‐0.000    0.002 
   (0.00)     (0.00) 
Over-Identification Test 0.34    0.31 
N 6558     12286 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
 
Impacts from Average Peer Characteristics 
This section presents the estimated effects of average peer characteristics on student 
discipline and attendance behaviors. As in the previous two chapters, I present the results 
from the large sample models only. 
 
Disciplinary Infractions 
1. School Level Analysis 
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The coefficients on school level peer characteristics are reported in Table 6.5. Each 
peer characteristic is examined separately in Model 1 to Model 10, while all peer 
variables are incorporated in Model 11.  
The top 2 rows of Table 6.5 present the estimated magnet school treatment. These 
effects continue to be negative, which indicates that students in the magnet schools have 
fewer behavioral problems even with peer variables controlled. Indeed, the magnet 
school treatment effects are even stronger in many equations.  
Many of the estimated effects have unexpected coefficients. First, Increases in the 
percent low income (column 2), percent Hispanic (column 4), and percent special 
education students (column 5), are associated with fewer incidences of measured 
misbehavior (measured by the numbers suspended). Second, average school peer 
academic achievement (measured by 4th grade test scores in both math and reading) is 
positively correlated with measured misbehavior. A 1 point (in standardized scores) 
difference in average peer prior math achievement produces 1.5 suspensions. Third, 
students whose peers were more frequently absent appear to behave better in middle 
school. Finally, model 9 suggests that there is no significant correlation between school 
peer prior disciplinary records and individual behavioral outcomes in middle schools.  
There are some possible reasons for the unexpected coefficients on the school level 
peer variables. First, although district has a uniform discipline code, it is the school that 
takes disciplinary actions based on student behavior. The way in which each school deals 
with misbehaving students can vary: the same kind of misconduct may receive different 
consequences in different schools. Second, it is possible that the student body 
composition influences a school’s discipline decisions. For example, a neighborhood 
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school with a higher proportion of low-income and low achieving students may be less 
willing to punish a lottery participant for his misbehavior just because this student 
performs and behaves better than other students in this school. However, if this student 
enrolled in a magnet school, it is less likely that he will get an exemption.  
Although most peer characteristics have a significant influence on individual 
behaviors in the single variable models, this is true less often in column 11 where all peer 
characteristics are included. Due to the high collinearity among the peer variables, the 
estimated effects of most peer characteristics are insignificant. As shown in Column 11, 
there are three significant coefficients. The estimated effects of percent female students 
and average peer math achievement are positive and significant at 5% statistical level. 
Average peer prior disciplinary record shows a strong and positive impact on individual 
behaviors while all school peer characteristics are controlled.  
Six residence based peer attributes show significant impact on student disciplinary 
infractions. Although the estimates of residence based peer effects are less sizeable than 
the estimates of lottery based peer effects, they all have expected coefficient signs. In 
none of the 11 models does the inclusion of school peer characteristics overturn the 
magnet school effects; rather, the treatment effects are even bigger in most models with 
school peer variables controlled.  
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Table 6.5 Average School Peer Effects on Disciplinary Infractions 
 
              Total Suspension Numbers             
Independent 
Variables  Model1  Model2  Model3  Model4  Model5  Model6  Model7  Model8  Model9  Model10  Model11 
Magnet School Effect                   
Academic  ‐0.23*  ‐0.65***  ‐0.42**  ‐0.39***  ‐1.26***  ‐0.46***  ‐2.39***  ‐2.04***  ‐0.29**  ‐0.61***  ‐2.82*** 
  (0.11)  (0.19)  (0.14)  (0.10)  (0.33)  (0.14)  (0.48)  (0.46)  (0.10)  (0.16)  (0.70) 
Non‐Academic 
Composite  ‐0.40*  ‐0.58**  ‐0.52*  ‐0.53*  ‐0.92**  ‐0.51*  ‐0.99***  ‐0.97***  ‐0.42*  ‐0.71**  ‐1.40*** 
  (0.19)  (0.21)  (0.23)  (0.21)  (0.29)  (0.20)  (0.27)  (0.28)  (0.19)  (0.25)  (0.37) 
Peer Effect (Lottery Based)          
Black (proportion)  0.13             0.45 
  (0.35)             (0.94) 
Low SES (proportion)  ‐1.02*           1.34 
    (0.42)           (0.99) 
Female (proportion)    2.28         2.94* 
      (1.35)         (1.47) 
Hispanic (proportion)   ‐3.24*              ‐3.06 
       (1.55)              (5.83) 
Special ED (proportion)     ‐8.96***            ‐6.12 
       (2.64)            (5.38) 
ELL (proportion)         ‐5.23          2.55 
         (2.78)          (8.97) 
Grade 4 Math (Mean)        1.97***        1.74* 
              (0.41)        (0.76) 
Grade 4 Reading (Mean)          1.50***      0.62 
                (0.36)      (0.92) 
Grade 4 Suspension (Mean)            ‐0.21    2.21** 
                  (0.46)    (0.73) 
Grade 4 Absence (Mean)              ‐34.32**  7.95 
                 (11.08)  (18.20) 
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Table 6.5 (Continued) 
Peer Effects (Residence Based) 
Black (proportion)  0.22*             0.10 
  (0.10)             (0.14) 
Low SES (proportion)  0.36***           0.06 
    (0.10)           (0.23) 
Female (proportion)    ‐0.14         ‐0.40 
      (0.31)         (0.34) 
Hispanic (proportion)   0.36*              0.44 
       (0.17)              (0.23) 
Special ED (proportion)     0.67***            0.20 
       (0.18)            (0.25) 
ELL (proportion)         0.05          ‐0.23 
         (0.13)          (0.18) 
Grade 4 Math (Mean)         ‐0.27***        ‐0.70** 
             (0.05)        (0.23) 
Grade 4 Reading (Mean)           ‐0.22***      0.45 
               (0.05)      (0.23) 
Grade 4 Suspension (Mean)             0.12    ‐0.55** 
                 (0.15)    (0.18) 
Grade 4 Absence (Mean)               4.64  1.88 
                   (2.42)  (3.50 
Student Characteristics                   
   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  yes 
Over‐
identification Test  0.3  0.51  0.25  0.26  0.4  0.41  0.85  0.78  0.35  0.33  0.54 
Sample Size  12195  12195  12195  12195  12195  12195  12195  12195  12195  12195  12195 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001                   
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2. Classroom Level Analysis 
Although most middle school students in the district rotate through classes on 
different subjects, a student’s classroom peers are relatively stable across subjects given 
that many schools practice tracking or ability grouping59. Therefore, the interactions 
between one student and his classmates are more frequent than the interactions with the 
average school peers; and the impacts from one’s class peers are expected to be stronger 
and more meaningful even on discipline and attendance outcomes.  
Because the classroom peer variables are subject based, there are two sets of peer 
variables from math classes and reading/language arts classes. I ran separate models 
using peers in both subjects and obtained very similar estimates of peer effects. Here I 
report the results for only math class peers. 60 
Table 6.6 presents estimates of models that include classroom peer variables. The 
estimated effects of peer characteristics at the classroom level are quite different from 
those at school level and all of the significant coefficients have the expected signs. A 
higher proportion of black and low SES classmates is associated with more disciplinary 
infractions: a student is likely to receive 1 more suspension if he moves from a class with 
no low income peers to a class with 80% low income students61. Second, peer academic 
ability (measured by prior reading achievement) appears to decrease individual 
misdemeanors. A 1 point increase in peer prior reading scores (standardized scores) 
yields a 0.4 decrease in student suspension times. Third, classmates’ prior disciplinary 
records are strongly correlated with individual behavioral problems in middle school. The 
                                                 
59 In some schools, there is less ability-grouping in 5th and 6th grades, and students tend to stay with the 
same group of peers for all subjects just like elementary schools.   
60 The results from the reading class peer models are included in Appendix F. 
61 The estimated effect is quite large given that about 78% lottery participants never received any 
suspension during the years of investigation.  
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estimated effect of peer’s prior behavioral problems is very substantial --- if every peer in 
the same class received 1 more suspension in 4th grade, the average class number 
suspended in middle school increase by 1.8. Finally, being with classmates with past 
history of higher absence rates also increases individual misconduct as measured by 
suspension numbers. Overall, the single variable models find significant and expected 
peer effects on student disciplinary infractions from both peer racial/SES composition 
variables and peer prior behaviors.  
Model 11 incorporates all classroom peer characteristics. Most peer variables are 
individually insignificant in the full model except peers’ prior absence rate, which 
remains positive and weakly significant. Some of this may be due to the collinearity 
among the class peer variables, which increase the standard errors.  
In an equation where a classroom peer characteristic has a significant influence on 
student behavior, magnet school treatment effects are insignificant. One exception is 
model 9, where the estimated treatment effect of the academic magnet program remains 
negative and significant, but less sizeable than the estimate in Table 6.3. When the model 
controls all peer characteristics, the point estimate of the non-academic magnet effect 
falls nearly to zero. 
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Table 6.6 Average Classroom Peer Effects on Disciplinary Infractions (Math Class) 
 
              Total Suspension Numbers             
Independent 
Variables  Model1  Model2  Model3  Model4  Model5  Model6  Model7  Model8  Model9  Model10  Model11 
Magnet School Effect                   
Academic  ‐0.10  0.05  ‐0.28**  ‐0.36***  ‐0.25**  ‐0.33*  ‐0.13  0.05  ‐0.18*  ‐0.08  0.13 
  (0.08)  (0.11)  (0.09)  (0.10)  (0.09)  (0.13)  (0.12)  (0.13)  (0.08)  (0.11)  (0.17) 
Non‐Academic 
Composite  ‐0.33  ‐0.21  ‐0.36  ‐0.45*  ‐0.35  ‐0.39  ‐0.33  ‐0.24  ‐0.33  ‐0.09  0.02 
  (0.20)  (0.20)  (0.20)  (0.21)  (0.21)  (0.21)  (0.20)  (0.21)  (0.20)  (0.24)  (0.26) 
Peer Effect (Lottery Based)                   
Black (proportion)  0.96***                  0.85 
  (0.21)                    (1.01) 
Low SES (proportion)  1.23***                0.76 
    (0.24)                  (0.79) 
Female (proportion)    0.12                0.03 
      (0.57)                (0.62) 
Hispanic (proportion)      ‐3.05              ‐4.12 
        (1.64)              (2.56) 
Special ED (proportion)        1.30            0.83 
          (0.82)            (1.24) 
ELL (proportion)            ‐1.92          3.63 
            (2.95)          (5.97) 
Grade 4 Math (Mean)        ‐0.22        0.97 
              (0.13)        (0.52) 
Grade 4 Reading (Mean)          ‐0.42***    ‐0.51 
                (0.11)      (0.33) 
Grade 4 Suspension (Mean)            1.75***  0.60 
                  (0.46)    (0.69) 
Grade 4 Absence (Mean)              28.37**  36.48* 
                    (9.58)  (16.68) 
Peer Effects (Residence Based)                 
  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Student Characteristics                   
   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  yes 
Over‐
identification Test  0.11  0.1  0.2  0.28  0.2  0.18  0.18  0.14  0.35  0.21  0.26 
Sample Size  10369  10369  10369  10369  10369  10369  10368  10368  10368  10368  10368 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001               
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The results from both school and classroom level analyses on student discipline 
problems are very interesting. Although the school level results suggest many 
unfavorable peer attributes decreasing student misdemeanors, the classroom level results 
find the opposite. Moreover, classroom analyses find strong and expected effects from 
peer prior achievement and behaviors. Again, the results suggest that the stronger and 
direct impacts of peer group effects come from classroom level, even on individual 
disciplinary outcomes. The estimates of school level peer effects, in this case, reflects 
more about how school student composition impact one’s chances of receiving 
disciplinary actions (suspensions, as measured in this section). 
 
Attendance Behavior 
1. School Level Analysis 
Table 6.7 reports the effects of school level peers on student attendance behavior. 
Only one peer characteristic is found significantly correlated with student attendance 
behavior: peers with a history of behavioral problems tend to increase the individual 
absence rate in middle schools. Specifically, the coefficient suggests that a student will be 
absent for 2.5 more days from school if peer prior suspensions increase by 0.5 on 
average.  
Several residence-based peer characteristics have shown significant associations with 
student absence rate. Students who are from a neighborhood with more low SES families, 
or more Hispanic and ELL peers, or more special education peers, are more likely to be 
absent from schools than other students. Residence-based peer math achievement is 
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negatively correlated with student absence rate. But the magnitudes of the coefficients are 
quite small. 
Finally, including peer characteristics does not change the estimated magnet school 
treatment effects, which remain insignificant in all models.  
 
Table 6.7 Average School Peer Effects on Absence Rate 
               Absence Rate                
Independent 
Variables  Model1  Model2  Model3  Model4  Model5  Model6  Model7  Model8  Model9  Model10  Model11 
Magnet School Effect                   
Academic  ‐0.01  ‐0.00  ‐0.01  ‐0.00  ‐0.01  ‐0.01  0.01  0.01  ‐0.00  ‐0.00  0.01 
  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.02) 
Non‐Academic 
Composite  ‐0.00  ‐0.00  ‐0.01  ‐0.00  ‐0.01  ‐0.01  ‐0.00  0.00  0.00  ‐0.00  ‐0.01 
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Peer Effect (Lottery Based)                   
Black (proportion)  ‐0.00                    ‐0.03 
  (0.01)                    (0.03) 
Low SES (proportion)  0.01                  ‐0.03 
    (0.01)                  (0.03) 
Female (proportion)    0.01                0.01 
      (0.04)                (0.04) 
Hispanic (proportion)      0.02              0.00 
        (0.05)              (0.15) 
Special ED (proportion)        ‐0.07            ‐0.25 
          (0.08)            (0.14) 
ELL (proportion)            ‐0.02          ‐0.14 
            (0.08)          (0.22) 
Grade 4 Math (Mean)          ‐0.00        ‐0.01 
              (0.01)        (0.02) 
Grade 4 Reading (Mean)            ‐0.01      ‐0.04 
                (0.01)      (0.02) 
Grade 4 Suspension (Mean)              0.03*    0.05** 
                  (0.01)    (0.02) 
Grade 4 Absence (Mean)                0.32  0.15 
                   (0.33)  (0.50) 
Peer Effects (Residence Based)                   
Black (proportion)  0.00                    0.00 
  (0.00)                    (0.00) 
Low SES (proportion)  0.01**                  0.02*** 
    (0.00)                  (0.01) 
Female (proportion)    ‐0.01                ‐0.01 
      (0.01)                (0.01) 
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Table 6.7 Continued 
Hispanic (proportion)      0.013*              (0.00) 
        (0.01)              (0.01) 
Special ED (proportion)        0.01*            0.01 
          (0.01)            (0.01) 
ELL (proportion)          0.01**          0.00 
            (0.00)          (0.00) 
Grade 4 Math (Mean)          ‐0.00*        ‐0.01* 
              (0.00)        (0.01) 
Grade 4 Reading (Mean)            0.00      0.02** 
                (0.00)      (0.01) 
Grade 4 Suspension (Mean)              0.01    0.00 
                  (0.00)    (0.01) 
Grade 4 Absence (Mean)                0.10  ‐0.08 
                   (0.07)  (0.09) 
Student Characteristics                   
   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Over‐
identification Test  0.26  0.21  0.27  0.3  0.25  0.2  0.24  0.23  0.22  0.23  0.29 
Sample Size  12195  12195  12195  12195  12195  12195  12195  12195  12195  12195  12195 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001                   
 
 
2. Classroom Level Analysis 
Classroom estimates of peer characteristic effects on student absence behavior are 
presented in Table 6.8. None of the ten single variable models has found significant 
coefficients on the lottery-based exogenous classroom peer variables. The full-variable 
model (model 11) at classroom level finds that a student has higher absence rate if his/her 
peers had higher rates of suspension in 4th grade. Otherwise, student attendance behavior 
is quite impervious to peer influences. 
Interestingly, although the classroom level models do not find significant peer effects 
on student participation behavior, controlling for classroom peer characteristics leads to 
significant magnet school effects in most models, especially for the academic magnet 
school. The implication is that a lottery loser enrolled in a neighborhood middle school 
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tends to be absent from school for 2 more days even if he/she attends a class whose peers 
are identical to the class peers in the academic magnet.  
 
Table 6.8 Average Classroom Peer Effects on Absence Rate (Math Class) 
              Absence  Rates             
Independent 
Variables  Model1  Model2  Model3  Model4  Model5  Model6  Model7  Model8  Model9  Model10  Model11 
Magnet School Effect                   
Academic  ‐0.01**  ‐0.00  ‐0.01**  ‐0.00**  ‐0.01**  ‐0.00  ‐0.01*  ‐0.01  ‐0.00**  ‐0.01**  ‐0.01* 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Non‐Academic 
Composite  ‐0.01  ‐0.01  ‐0.01*  ‐0.01  ‐0.01*  ‐0.01  ‐0.01*  ‐0.01  ‐0.01  ‐0.01*  ‐0.01 
  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Peer Effect (Lottery Based)                   
Black (proportion)  0.00                    0.03 
  (0.01)                    (0.03) 
Low SES (proportion)  0.00                  ‐0.01 
    (0.01)                  (0.02) 
Female (proportion)    0.02                0.03 
      (0.01)                (0.02) 
Hispanic (proportion)      0.04              0.02 
        (0.04)              (0.07) 
Special ED (proportion)        ‐0.03            ‐0.00 
          (0.02)            (0.03) 
ELL (proportion)            0.08          0.20 
            (0.07)          (0.15) 
Grade 4 Math (Mean)          0.00        0.02 
              (0.00)        (0.01) 
Grade 4 Reading (Mean)            0.00      ‐0.00 
                (0.00)      (0.01) 
Grade 4 Suspension (Mean)              0.02    0.04* 
                  (0.01)    (0.02) 
Grade 4 Absence (Mean)                ‐0.34  ‐0.05 
                    (0.24)  (0.43) 
Peer Effects (Residence Based)                   
  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Student Characteristics                   
   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Over‐
identification Test  0.12  0.11  0.11  0.11  0.14  0.15  0.15  0.14  0.15  0.1  0.19 
Sample Size  10369  10369  10369  10369  10369  10369  10368  10368  10368  10368  10368 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001                   
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Impacts from Dispersion of Peer Characteristics 
In this section, I examine whether the variance of peer academic abilities and peer 
behavioral outcomes impacts student discipline and participation behaviors.  
 
Disciplinary Infractions 
1. School Level Analysis 
In Table 6.9, peer heterogeneity is measured as the standard deviation of prior peer 
test scores (in math and reading), prior suspensions, and prior absence rate. Since the 
conclusions regarding magnet school effects and the residence-based peer variables are 
very similar to previous findings, Table 6.9 reports only the coefficients on the 
exogenous peer variables (means and standard deviations). 
Columns 1-2 show the effect of peer achievement. The coefficient on the mean is 
positive, but the coefficient on the standard deviation is negative. The implication is that 
a lottery participant tends to have fewer measured misbehaviors (indicated by fewer 
suspensions received by the student) in a school where there is a greater variation in 
student academic ability. Recall my hypothesis that the misbehavior of a lottery 
participant enrolled in a neighborhood school may be overlooked because he performs 
better than his peers, while the participants enrolled in a magnet school are less lucky 
because students in the magnet school are more alike (e.g., all high performers). The 
negative coefficient on the standard deviation of peer achievement lends support to this 
explanation --- more dispersion in peer ability is associated with less individual 
disciplinary infractions as measured by number of suspensions. 
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Table 6.9 Impacts from Dispersion of Peer Characteristics on Disciplinary Infractions 
(School Level) 
 
  
 
Total Suspension Numbers 
Independent Variables  Model1  Model2  Model3  Model4 
Magnet School Effect         
  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Peer Effect ( Mean, Lottery Based)         
Grade 4 Math (Mean)  1.88***       
  (0.29)       
Grade 4 Reading (Mean)    1.38***     
    (0.35)     
Grade 4 Suspension (Mean)      0.33   
      (1.07)   
Grade 4 Absence (Mean)        ‐27.77* 
        (13.53) 
Peer Effect (Dispersion, Lottery Based)       
Grade 4 Math (Standard Deviation)  ‐1.26***       
  (0.33)       
Grade 4 Reading (Standard Deviation)  ‐1.63***     
    (0.32)     
Grade 4 Suspension (Standard Deviation)    ‐0.22   
      (0.40)   
Grade 4 Absence (Standard Deviation)      ‐6.65 
        (5.44) 
Peer Effects (Residence Based)         
  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Student Characteristics         
   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
P‐value for Over‐identification Tests  0.86  0.89  0.31  0.31 
Sample Size  12192  12192  12192  12192 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001         
 
 
Neither the mean nor the standard deviation of prior peer suspensions is significantly 
associated with student disciplinary infractions in middle school.  Moreover, model 4 
suggests no significant effect from the heterogeneity in peer attendance behavior on 
student disciplinary infractions, although the estimated effect from average peers 
attendance rate is still negative and significant. 
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2. Classroom Level Analysis 
The results from the classroom level dispersion models are presented in Table 6.10. 
The heterogeneity of peer academic abilities (Model1 and model 2) does not exert 
significant impact on individual discipline behaviors, nor does its inclusion alter the 
coefficients on mean peer characteristics. 
There is no evidence that the dispersion of peer disciplinary infractions at the 
classroom level has any significant impact on individual behaviors. However, controlling 
for the dispersion term overturned the effect of the average peer disciplinary record. This 
again is due to the high collinearity between the mean and the standard deviation, though 
now both terms have positive coefficient.  When I test a linear combination of these two 
variables, I find a strong and positive correlation between the classmates’ disciplinary 
records and individual behavior.   
The standard deviation of peers’ prior absentee has a significant negative effect on 
measured misconduct. However, notice that with the dispersion term in the model, the 
coefficient on the average peer attendance variable increases by almost 40 (28.3 in Table 
6.6). Again, collinearity between the mean and the standard deviation is likely to cause 
this change.  
The omnibus over-identification tests suggest that instruments used in all the models 
in both Table 6.9 and Table 6.10 are exogenous.  
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Table 6.10 Impacts from Dispersion of Peer Characteristics on Disciplinary Infractions 
(Math Class) 
 
      Suspension Times    
  Model1  Model2  Model3  Model4 
Magnet School Effect         
  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Peer Effect ( Mean, Lottery Based)         
Grade 4 Math (Mean)  ‐0.21       
  (0.12)       
Grade 4 Reading (Mean)    ‐0.43***     
    (0.11)     
Grade 4 Suspension (Mean)      0.22   
      (1.51)   
Grade 4 Absence (Mean)        67.25** 
        (22.62) 
Peer Effect (Dispersion, Lottery Based)         
Grade 4 Math (Standard Deviation)  0.53       
  (0.50)       
Grade 4 Reading (Standard Deviation)    ‐0.63     
    (0.89)     
Grade 4 Suspension (Standard 
Deviation)      0.70   
      (0.70)   
Grade 4 Absence (Standard Deviation)        ‐40.65* 
        (15.86) 
Peer Effects (Residence Based)         
  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Student Characteristics         
   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
P‐value for Over‐identification Test  0.19  0.14  0.30  0.25 
Sample Size  10359  10359  10359  10359 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001      
 
 
Attendance Behavior 
1. School Level Analysis 
Table 6.11 shows the estimates of school level models on student attendance 
behavior. The firs 2 columns report the results from the peer achievement models. 
Neither the mean nor the standard deviation of peer academic abilities has significant 
influence on student absence rate in middle school. Similarly, there is no significant 
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effect from either the mean or the standard deviation of peer prior disciplinary infractions 
(Model 3). In model 4, the average peer absence rate and its standard deviation work in 
opposite directions: while the average peer absence rate tends to raise the possibility of 
absence, its standard deviation dispersion has a negative effect. Again, the much larger 
and significant coefficient on the average peer absence rate is likely to be due to the high 
collinearity between the average term and the variance term. 
 
Table 6.11 Impacts from Variance of Peer Characteristics on Absence Rate        
(School Level) 
 
      Absence Rate    
  Model1  Model2  Model3  Model4 
Magnet School Effect         
  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Peer Effect ( Mean, Lottery Based)         
Grade 4 Math (Mean)  ‐0.01       
  (0.01)       
Grade 4 Reading (Mean)    ‐0.01     
    (0.01)     
Grade 4 Suspension (Mean)      0.04   
      (0.03)   
Grade 4 Absence (Mean)        0.80* 
        (0.40) 
Peer Effect (Dispersion, Lottery Based)         
Grade 4 Math (Standard Deviation)  ‐0.01       
  (0.01)       
Grade 4 Reading (Standard Deviation)    ‐0.02     
    (0.01)     
Grade 4 Suspension (Standard Deviation)    ‐0.01   
      (0.01)   
Grade 4 Absence (Standard Deviation)      ‐0.47** 
        (0.16) 
Peer Effects (Residence Based)         
  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Student Characteristics         
   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
P‐value for Over‐identification Tests  0.23  0.21  0.19  0.27 
Sample Size  12192  12192  12192  12192 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001         
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2. Classroom Level Analysis 
There is little evidence that changes in the heterogeneity of peer achievement or past 
behavior at the classroom level affects student attendance behavior. The coefficients on 
the average peer outcome variables remain insignificant, too. Although not shown in the 
table, controlling for peer heterogeneity does not change the coefficients on other 
variables: particularly, attending the academic magnet school appears to decrease student 
absenteeism.  
 
Table 6.12 Impacts from Variance of Peer Characteristics on Absence Rate           
(Math Class) 
 
      Absence Rate      
Independent Variables  Model1  Model2  Model3  Model4   
Magnet School Effect           
  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   
Peer Effect ( Mean, Lottery Based)           
Grade 4 Math (Mean)  0.00         
  (0.00)         
Grade 4 Reading (Mean)    0.00       
    (0.00)       
Grade 4 Suspension (Mean)      0.07     
      (0.04)     
Grade 4 Absence (Mean)        ‐0.07   
        (0.55)   
Peer Effect (Dispersion, Lottery Based)           
Grade 4 Math (Standard Deviation)  ‐0.00         
  (0.01)         
Grade 4 Reading (Standard Deviation)    ‐0.00       
    (0.02)       
Grade 4 Suspension (Standard Deviation)    ‐0.02     
      (0.02)     
Grade 4 Absence (Standard Deviation)        ‐0.23   
        (0.39)   
Peer Effects (Residence Based)           
  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   
Student Characteristics           
   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   
P‐value for Over‐identification Test  0.14  0.14  0.16  0.11   
Sample Size  10359  10359  10359  10359   
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001       
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Heterogeneous Peer Effects 
This section examines whether peer group characteristics effects on student discipline 
and attendance behaviors differ depending on individual background. The results in this 
part answer the third research question --- to whom do peer effects matter more. 
 
Disciplinary Infractions 
1. School Level Analysis 
Many estimates of average school level peer effects are having unexpected coefficient 
signs in previous Table 6.5. This part will find out if different subgroups of students are 
impacted homogeneously by school level peer compositions. Regression results are 
reported in Table 6.13, which includes coefficients on both the mean peer terms and the 
interaction terms.   
The first peer variable examined in this table is percent black students. Model 1 
suggests that although other students are not significantly influenced by school black 
population (even with a negative coefficient), black students tend to have more 
suspensions while being in a school with disproportionately more Blacks. A similar 
conclusion can be drawn from model 2, wherein the peer variable of percent black 
students is found having a stronger and positive impact on students from low income 
families. The linear combination of the coefficients on main effect and the interaction 
with low SES variable is 0.9 (p<0.05), suggesting that low income students are likely to 
receive 1 more suspension if they attend a school where the population is 100% Black 
rather than 0% Black. Compared to boys, female students’ behaviors are less influenced 
by black peers; and the influence from percent black students are stronger on low 
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achieving students than on high achieving students. However, the linear combinations of 
the coefficients on the main effect and the interaction are not statistically significant.  
 
Table 6.13 Heterogeneous Peer Effects on Disciplinary Infractions (School Level) 
          Suspension Times       
    Model1  Model2  Model3  Model4  Model5  Model6  Model7 
    Black  LSES  Female 
Low 
Reading 
achiever 
High 
Reading 
Achiever 
Low Math 
achiever 
High 
Math 
Achiever 
Peer Effects (Lottery Based)             
Percent Black Students             
Mean Effect  ‐0.50  ‐0.12  0.48  0.09  0.13  0.03  0.08 
    (0.41)  (0.37)  (0.37)  (0.36)  (0.35)  (0.36)  (0.35) 
Heterogeneous Effect  1.06***  1.02***  ‐0.65***  0.16*  ‐0.01  0.20**  0.17 
    (0.22)  (0.23)  (0.16)  (0.07)  (0.11)  (0.07)  (0.11) 
Percent Low SES Students             
Mean Effect  ‐1.35**  ‐1.31**  ‐0.56  ‐1.09*  ‐1.03*  ‐1.16**  ‐1.09* 
    (0.44)  (0.43)  (0.44)  (0.43)  (0.43)  (0.43)  (0.43) 
Heterogeneous Effect  1.02***  1.12***  ‐0.67***  0.19*  ‐0.02  0.29**  0.19 
    (0.23)  (0.31)  (0.19)  (0.09)  (0.13)  (0.09)  (0.13) 
Peer Prior Math Achievement             
Mean Effect  1.99***  1.91***  1.73***  1.97***  1.94***  2.13***  1.99*** 
    (0.41)  (0.41)  (0.42)  (0.41)  (0.41)  (0.42)  (0.41) 
Heterogeneous Effect  ‐0.37***  ‐0.32***  0.19*  0.02  0.20**  ‐0.29**  0.21* 
    (0.10)  (0.13)  (0.08)  (0.09)  (0.07)  (0.09)  (0.07) 
Peer Prior Reading Achievement             
Mean Effect  1.42***  1.39***  1.19***  1.41***  1.38***  1.51***  1.41*** 
    (0.36)  (0.36)  (0.36)  (0.36)  (0.36)  (0.36)  (0.36) 
Heterogeneous Effect  ‐0.43***  ‐0.41***  0.20**  0.02  0.21**  ‐0.32**  0.21** 
    (0.09)  (0.11)  (0.07)  (0.08)  (0.06)  (0.08)  (0.06) 
Peer Prior Disciplinary Records             
Mean Effect  ‐0.77  ‐0.49  ‐0.14  ‐0.36  ‐0.22  ‐0.71  ‐0.35 
    (0.53)  (0.49)  (20.55)  (0.47)  0.47   (0.47)  (0.48) 
Heterogeneous Effect  1.19**  0.73  ‐0.11  0.31  ‐0.19  1.17***  0.36 
    (0.47)  (0.52)  (0.44)  (0.28)  (0.40)  (0.28)  (0.39) 
Peer Prior Absence Rate             
Mean Effect  ‐34.81**  ‐32.61**  ‐32.57**  ‐35.18**  ‐34.78**  ‐35.20**  ‐35.04** 
    (11.46)  (11.17)  (12.00)  (11.12)  (11.10)  (11.11)  (11.10) 
Heterogeneous Effect  2.37  ‐7.79  ‐2.59  1.85  1.95  1.76  4.18** 
      (9.53)  (10.46)  (8.04)  (1.19)  (1.47)  (1.18)  (1.44) 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001           
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The second peer variable shown in this table is percent Low SES students. Recall that 
in Table 6.5, school percent Low SES population reduces suspensions. The models in 
Table 6.13 show that the negative association between percent low SES student variable 
and student disciplinary infractions does not hold for every group of students. First, black 
and low SES students appear to be not impacted by school low SES population: the 
positive coefficients on the interaction term almost cancel out the negative coefficients on 
the main effects in model 1 and model 2. Second, the negative impact of school percent 
low SES students is not significant on male students. Third, although both high and low 
achieving lottery participants seem to have fewer disciplinary infractions when there is a 
high proportion of low SES students in the school, the negative impact is stronger on 
students with higher prior test scores.  
Both school level peer academic ability variables were found to increase student 
disciplinary infractions in our sample. There are some significant heterogeneous effects 
from both peer achievement variables. For example, the positive impact of peer 
achievement is weaker on Blacks, low income students (model 1 and model 2), and low 
performing students (model 6), but it is stronger on students with high prior achievement 
(model 5 and model 7). 
Average school peer prior disciplinary records do not have a significant impact on 
student behaviors (as shown in Column9, Table 6.5). Although model 1 and model 6 
show significant heterogeneous effect on Blacks and low math achievers, the linear 
combination of the coefficients on the main effect and the interaction finds no evidence 
that either of these groups is significantly influenced by peer prior disciplinary 
infractions.  
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The last peer variable reported in Table 6.13 is peer prior attendance record, which is 
negatively associated with individual disciplinary infractions for all groups of students. 
The effect is slightly weaker on students with higher math scores.  
Again, the estimates from the heterogeneous models on school level peer 
characteristics support my previous hypothesis that advantaged students (e.g., students 
from non-low-income families or high performing students) are less likely to receive 
disciplinary actions if he is in a school with disproportional disadvantaged peers.  
2. Classroom Level Analysis 
Table 6.14 presents the estimates of classroom level heterogeneous peer effect 
models. As before, only results from math class peer variables are reported given that the 
conclusions from peer variables in reading classes are very similar.  
First, although high percentage of Black or low SES class peers tends to increase 
individual misconduct for all students, the size of the impact is much stronger on Blacks, 
students from low income families, and low achieving students. For example, combined 
main effect and interaction for percent black students is 1.88 for low income students, 
almost 3 times of the estimated effect (0.66) on students from affluent families. Girls are 
less impacted by black or low SES peers than boys, although combined main effect and 
interaction is still positive and significant for girls for both variables.  
Second, average peer math achievement significantly reduces the number of 
suspensions only for Blacks, boys, and low income students. However, the main effect of 
peer reading achievement is significant and negative in all models. There is also 
significant heterogeneity in this effect: Blacks and low income students appear to be 
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more negatively impacted by class average peer reading achievement; the negative 
impact, however, is weaker on girls and students with high math scores.   
 
Table 6.14 Heterogeneous Peer Effects on Disciplinary Infractions    (Math Class) 
 
          Suspension Times       
    Model1  Model2  Model3  Model4  Model5  Model6  Model7 
    Black  LSES  Female 
Low 
Reading 
achiever 
High 
Reading 
Achiever 
Low Math 
achiever 
High Math 
Achiever 
Peer Effects (Lottery Based)             
Percent Black Students             
Mean Effect  0.62**  0.66**  1.20***  0.88***  0.96***  0.87***  0.92*** 
    (0.24)  (0.22)  (0.22)  (0.22)  (0.22)  (0.22)  (0.22) 
Heterogeneous 
Effect  0.81***  1.22***  ‐0.49***  0.23**  ‐0.01  0.27***  0.19 
    (0.19)  (0.20)  (0.14)  (0.08)  (0.14)  (0.08)  (0.13) 
Percent Low SES Students             
Mean Effect  0.79**  0.83***  1.60***  1.11***  1.25***  1.08***  1.24*** 
    (0.25)  (0.25)  (0.25)  (0.24)  (0.24)  (0.24)  (0.24) 
Heterogeneous 
Effect  1.29***  1.43***  ‐0.71***  0.34***  ‐0.10  0.36***  ‐0.03 
    (0.21)  (0.25)  (0.17)  (0.10)  (0.17)  (0.10)  (0.16) 
Peer Prior Math Achievement             
Mean Effect  ‐0.14  ‐0.13  ‐0.33*  ‐0.18  ‐0.25  ‐0.19  ‐0.26 
    (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.13) 
Heterogeneous 
Effect  ‐0.36***  ‐0.56***  0.22**  ‐0.17*  0.14*  ‐0.13  0.11* 
    (0.13)  (0.10)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.06)  (0.07)  (0.06) 
Peer Prior Reading Achievement             
Mean Effect  ‐0.30**  ‐0.34**  ‐0.52***  ‐0.38**  ‐0.44***  ‐0.38**  ‐0.45*** 
    (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.11)  (0.12)  (0.11) 
Heterogeneous 
Effect  ‐0.41***  ‐0.50***  0.18**  ‐0.13  0.11*  ‐0.13*  0.11* 
    (0.08)  (0.09)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.05) 
Peer Prior Disciplinary Records             
Mean Effect  0.55  1.42*  2.10***  1.4**  1.76***  1.34*  1.68*** 
    (0.56)  (0.62)  (0.52)  (0.52)  (0.45)  (0.53)  (0.48) 
Heterogeneous 
Effect  2.35***  0.66  ‐0.81  0.65  ‐0.11  0.89*  0.35 
    (0.58)  (0.62)  (0.52)  (0.39)  (0.87)  (0.40)  (0.73) 
Peer Prior Absence Rate             
Mean Effect  6.77  29.31**  20.24*  27.75**  28.08**  27.64**  27.47** 
    (8.83)  (9.69)  (8.35)  (9.54)  (9.66)  (9.54)  (9.73) 
Heterogeneous 
Effect  76.70***  ‐4.40  16.61  3.22*  1.23  2.02  2.11 
      (14.81)  (13.35)  (11.06)  (1.41)  (1.80)  (1.38)  (1.73) 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001           
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Third, although the overall lottery participants seem to have more disciplinary 
incidents if they are placed in a class with more misbehaving peers, two subgroups of 
students seem to be impacted by peer disciplinary behaviors differently from other 
students. A black student tends to receive 2.4 more suspensions if the average prior peer 
suspensions increase by 1, while the coefficient on this variable is 0.55 and insignificant 
for non-black students.  Also, the effect is larger on students with low math achievement: 
compared to other students, the students at the bottom quarter receive 1 more suspension 
if the average prior peer suspensions increase by 1.   
Finally, conclusions from the models of peer prior absence rates are very similar to 
those from peer suspensions. The positive association between peer absence rate and 
individual disciplinary infraction works mainly on black students, and the positive impact 
is slightly larger on students with low reading achievement. Other models find no 
significant heterogeneity in the effect of prior peer absences.  
 
 Attendance Behavior 
1. School Level Analysis 
Results for student attendance are presented in Table 6.15. Most peer characteristics 
examined, including percent black students, percent low income students, average peer 
math scores, average reading scores, and average prior absence rate, do not show a 
significant influence on student attendance.  
Interestingly, although Table 6.7 (column 9) suggests that average peer prior 
disciplinary infractions increase student absence rate, the heterogeneous models find that 
the estimated peer disciplinary record effect is not significant on every group of students. 
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For example, the attendances of black students, boys, and students in the middle quartiles 
of achievement distributions are not significantly influenced by peer behavioral records, 
but the linear combination test (see Appendix E) suggests that low income students, girls, 
and low achievers are likely to be more absent if the school peers received more 
suspensions in 4th grade.    
 
Table 6.15 Heterogeneous Peer Effects on Absence Rate    (School Level) 
          Absence Rate       
    Model1  Model2  Model3  Model4  Model5  Model6  Model7 
    Black  LSES  Female 
Low 
Reading 
achiever 
High 
Reading 
Achiever 
Low 
Math 
achiever 
High 
Math 
Achiever 
Peer Effects (Lottery Based)             
Percent Black Students        
Mean Effect  0.00  0.00  0.00  ‐0.00  ‐0.00  ‐0.00  ‐0.00 
   (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Heterogeneous Effect  ‐0.01  ‐0.01  ‐0.01  0.00  0.01*  ‐0.00  ‐0.00 
   (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Percent Low SES Students             
Mean Effect  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
   (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Heterogeneous Effect  ‐0.02*  ‐0.01  0.01  0.01*  0.01*  0.00  ‐0.00 
   (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Peer Prior Math Achievement             
Mean Effect  ‐0.00  ‐0.00  ‐0.00  ‐0.00  ‐0.01  ‐0.00  ‐0.00 
   (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Heterogeneous Effect  0.00  ‐0.00  ‐0.00  ‐0.00  0.00  ‐0.00  0.00 
   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Peer Prior Reading Achievement             
Mean Effect  ‐0.01  ‐0.01  ‐0.01  ‐0.01  ‐0.01  ‐0.01  ‐0.01 
   (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Heterogeneous Effect  0.00  ‐0.00  ‐0.00  ‐0.00  0.00  ‐0.00  0.00 
   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Peer Prior Disciplinary Records             
Mean Effect  0.04**  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.04** 
   (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Heterogeneous Effect  ‐0.02  0.03  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.01  ‐0.02 
   (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Peer Prior Absence Rate             
Mean Effect  0.42  0.34  ‐0.07  0.30  0.31  0.32  0.32 
   (0.34)  (0.33)  (0.35)  (0.33)  (0.33)  (0.33)  (0.33) 
Heterogeneous Effect  ‐0.44  ‐0.10  0.58*  0.05  0.10*  ‐0.01  ‐0.01 
     (0.28)  (0.31)  (0.24)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.04) 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001        
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2. Classroom Level Analysis 
As shown in Table 6.16, the estimates of heterogeneous peer effect models on student 
attendance behavior are quite simple: overall, most peer variables do not show significant 
impacts on individual attendance; there are no significant heterogeneous effects in most 
models either. Two exceptions are from average class prior absence rate. Non black 
students and male students seem to be less absent when class absence rate is higher.    
Again, neither the heterogeneous peer effect models nor the average peer effect 
models (at both school and classroom levels) suggest that individual attendance behavior 
change significantly in response to the changes in school or class peer composition. 
 
Table 6.16 Heterogeneous Peer Effects on Absence Rate (Math Class) 
 
          Absence Rate       
    Model1  Model2  Model3  Model4  Model5  Model6  Model7 
    Black  LSES  Female 
Low 
Reading 
Achiever 
High 
Reading 
Achiever 
Low Math 
Achiever 
High Math 
Achiever 
Peer Effects (Lottery Based)             
Percent Black Students             
  Mean Effect  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
    (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Heterogeneous Effect  ‐0.00  ‐0.00  ‐0.01**  0.00  0.00  ‐0.00  0.00 
    (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Percent Low SES Students             
  Mean Effect  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.01 
    (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Heterogeneous Effect  ‐0.00  0.00  ‐0.01  0.00  0.00  ‐0.01  0.00 
    (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Peer Prior Math Achievement             
  Mean Effect  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
    (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Heterogeneous Effect  0.00  0.00  0.00  ‐0.00  0.004*  0.00  0.00 
    (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Peer Prior Reading Achievement             
  Mean Effect  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  ‐0.00  0.00  0.00 
    (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Heterogeneous Effect  0.00  ‐0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  ‐0.00  0.00 
    (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Peer Prior Disciplinary Records             
  Mean Effect  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02 
    (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Heterogeneous Effect  0.01  0.02  ‐0.00  0.02  0.01  0.00  ‐0.02 
    (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.02) 
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Table 6.16 Continued            
Peer Prior Absence Rate             
  Mean Effect  ‐0.49*  ‐0.24  ‐0.43*  ‐0.34  ‐0.35  ‐0.32  ‐0.36 
    (0.21)  (0.24)  (0.21)  (0.24)  (0.24)  (0.24)  (0.24) 
Heterogeneous Effect  0.49  ‐0.35  0.20  0.06  0.06  ‐0.03  0.06 
      (0.36)  (0.33)  (0.28)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.04) 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001           
 
 
Robustness Checks 
Similar to the work on student academic achievement, I checked whether the 
estimates of peer group effects on student behavioral outcomes are confounded with 
heterogeneous treatment effects and teacher effects. There is no significant evidence that 
the estimated peer effects on student discipline or attendance behaviors are confounded 
heterogeneous treatment effects or teacher effects. In particular, with teacher fixed effects 
in the model, the coefficients on class peer characteristics in the discipline outcome 
models are even larger. Although including teacher fixed effect does not change the 
estimated peer effects on student absence behavior, the academic magnet school 
treatment effect became insignificant.  
In addition, I also ran a set of school fixed effect models to see if the unexpected 
coefficients on school level peer variables are impacted by some time-invariant school 
factors (such as discipline policies). However, the conclusions regarding school level 
peer characteristics remained unchanged.   
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CHAPTER VII 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This dissertation investigates the peer group effects on student outcomes (both 
academic and behavioral outcomes). Relying on the admission lotteries that randomly 
assign students to a magnet school or a neighborhood school, this study implements 
credible methods to identify peer effects free from selection bias and omitted variable 
bias; it also circumvents the simultaneity bias by using lagged values of student 
achievement and behavior records to form peer variables. The investigation of peer 
effects answers three research questions: 
 What is the impact from average peer characteristics on individual 
student outcomes at both school and classroom levels?  
 What is the impact of peer heterogeneity on student outcomes at both 
levels?  
 To whom do peer effects matter the most?  --- That is, which 
subgroups of students are more impacted by peer characteristics? 
This chapter will summarize the key findings, implications, and limitations of this study. 
 
Review of Findings 
Average Peer Effects 
This study examines peer group effects from a large set of specifications of peer 
characteristics at both school and classroom levels. Although both level analyses find 
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some large estimates of peer effects, there are many differences between the school level 
estimates and the classroom estimates. The comparison of estimated peer effects at two 
levels shows that the stronger peer influences come from classroom.  
First, student achievement tends to be lower if they are surrounded by more black 
peers at both school and classroom levels. The negative effect of percent black students 
agrees with the findings from some recent literature, such as the Texas studies by Hoxby 
(2004) and Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (2009). However, the two Texas studies also find 
stronger intra-racial effects of average school percent black students. In this study, the 
heterogeneous effect model does not suggest that black students are more negatively 
impacted by school or classroom black population. One possibility is that the sample in 
my study is limited to magnet school lottery participants. The black students in our 
sample may be different from other black students in motivations and parental support, 
and less susceptible to the influence of black peers. 
 Although school percent black students does not show significant impact on student 
disciplinary behavior, classroom level analysis finds that having more black students in a 
class increases disciplinary incidents. There is no evidence that school or classroom black 
population influences individual attendance behavior in middle school. 
Second, the effect of low income peers is not significant at the school level. The 
school level finding agrees with previous studies by Hanushek et al (2003) and McEwan 
(2004) which did not find significant impacts of percent low income students. However, 
classroom level analysis found that percent low income student is associated with lower 
academic achievement. The estimated effect at the classroom level is substantial: a 50% 
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change in classroom low income students leads to a 0.4 point decline in standardized 
score changes in student math scores, and a 0.35 point decline in reading scores.  
Third, although school level estimates of average peer achievement are not 
significant, the average class peer achievement has a positive impact on student test 
scores in both subjects. Because this study examines peer effects on middle school 
students who are often grouped for classes based on academic abilities, it is likely that 
average school level peer achievement has minimum impact on student outcomes.62 The 
positive estimate of classroom peer achievement effect echoes the findings in some 
literature, such as Betts and Zau (2004), and Lefgren (2007).  
Interestingly, the school level analyses find that percent low SES students decreases 
disciplinary problems in middle school and average peer achievement increases 
individual disciplinary infractions. However, the estimated effects of the same peer 
variables at  the classroom level yield totally opposite conclusions: middle school 
students are more likely to misbehave (measured by number of suspensions) if there are 
more peers from low income families; and students tend to behave better if the classmates 
have higher prior test scores (significant only for peer reading achievement). These 
results suggest that the effects of peers are stronger and more direct at the classroom 
level. The estimates of school level peer effects may well reflect how school student 
composition impacts disciplinary actions (suspensions, as measured in this section).  
Fourth, while classroom level prior peer disciplinary infractions significantly decrease 
individual academic achievement and increase individual misconducts in middle school, 
                                                 
62 Both Hoxby (2001) and Hanushek et al (2000) found that school level average peer achievement 
improves student test scores. However, their studies focus on elementary school students. Given that there 
is often general teaching and few ability tracking, the mix of students in any class may just mirror the 
school as a whole in elementary schools. 
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the effect of peer disciplinary records at school level is not significant at all. This again 
suggests that a stronger and more direct peer effect happens at the classroom level.  
Finally, there is no evidence in our data that percent female students improves student 
academic achievement or decreases disciplinary incidences; and average peer attendance 
behavior does not show any significant impact on individual achievement or behavior at 
either the school or classroom level. 
Another important finding from the peer effect models is that adding peer 
characteristics into the model totally overturn the significant treatment effect of the 
academic magnet school in many models. In particular, when the average classroom peer 
reading achievement is controlled, the estimate of academic magnet treatment effect on 
student math achievement becomes significantly negative. This implies that lottery losers 
who attend the neighborhood schools can do even better in academics than the academic 
magnet enrollees if the classroom peers are the same. It also indicates that superior peer 
composition makes a large contribution to the success of magnet programs.  
 
Effects of peer heterogeneity 
School level analyses find some significant effects of peer heterogeneity. The average 
student test scores in both subjects tend to increase if the variation in prior peer reading 
achievement is larger; and student disciplinary incidents decrease when the variation in 
peer academic qualities is larger.  
However, there is little evidence that changes in the heterogeneity of classroom peer 
characteristics (prior peer achievement, disciplinary records, or attendance records) 
impact student academic achievement or behavioral outcomes. The findings at the 
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classroom level do not suggest that within school ability grouping has a significant 
influence on student outcomes. 
 
Heterogeneous peer effects 
The estimates of peer group effects are different on some students depending on their 
demographic characteristics and academic abilities. First, although no evidence shows 
that academic achievement of black or low income students decline with a high 
proportion of peers from the same group, there is a strong intra-group impact on 
individual disciplinary outcomes for Blacks and low income students at both the school 
and classroom levels.  
Second, the estimates of peer group effects are less strong on female students than on 
male students. This is true of both academic achievement and disciplinary outcomes at 
both the school and classroom levels. 
Third, academically, both high and low performing students appear to be more 
negatively impacted by percent black or low income students, but less positively 
impacted by average peer academic achievement. However, a significant heterogeneous 
effect on disciplinary outcomes is only found for low performing students, who are more 
likely to receive suspensions if there is a high proportion of disadvantaged peers. 
Finally, there is no significant heterogeneous peer effect on student attendance 
outcomes, either with respect to mean peer characteristics or their variance within the 
classroom.  
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Implications and Limitations 
 
Research Implications 
This dissertation yields its research implications on two fronts. First, this study adds 
an empirical piece to the growing literature that implements credible strategies to identify 
peer group effects on student outcomes. Second, the various methods used in this study to 
deal with complications in randomized data have important implications for research with 
experimental design.  
Empirical studies on peer effects are plagued by the critical issues of selection bias 
and simultaneity bias. This dissertation improves on previous attempts to eliminate self 
selectivity by employing both randomization and instrument variable methods. In 
specific, the identification strategies used in this study ensures the estimation of peer 
effects free of selectivity by exploiting randomly determined lottery outcomes to 
construct exogenous sources of variation in peer characteristics.  
In recent years, two pieces of federal legislation the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 
(NCLB) and the Education Sciences Reform Act of 2002 (ESRA) have led to a rising 
demand of experimental research using random assignment to produce more rigorous 
evidences in evaluating education intervention programs. While randomization through 
experiments is considered as the most promising method to obtain unbiased estimates of 
causal effects, there are many complications in social experiments that may threat the 
validity of the randomness, such as non-compliance, selective attrition, and 
heterogeneous responses to treatment effects. This study presents detailed discussions of 
the complications that arise in the magnet program admission lotteries. The solutions to 
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these complications adopted here contribute to the education research by offering 
workable approaches to using these sorts of data to address policy questions.   
 
Policy Implications 
From the perspective of practice, this study also has important policy implications. 
Although attending the academic magnet program in the district studied improves student 
academic achievement in both math and reading, this effect can be entirely accounted for 
by the peer characteristics. While this finding suggests that peer group characteristics 
make a large contribution to the magnet school success, it also implies that district 
administrators or policy makers need alternative assessment models while evaluating 
schools and teachers based on student test scores. Student characteristics or peer 
compositions should be incorporated in the models assessing teacher (school) 
effectiveness, or schools and teachers will be held accountable for factors that are beyond 
their control.   
Second, scholars have argued that socioeconomic isolation of poor, minority students 
in urban school systems is a major cause of the continuing achievement gap (see 
Kahlenberg (2001) for a summary). Magnet program has been considered as an important 
mechanism to reform urban districts through decreasing racial or social-economical 
segregation as well as improving student achievement. However, this study finds that 
students from magnet schools are mostly benefiting from superior peer groups. This 
finding provides some evidences to the policy makers that magnet schools have not 
actually reduced the socioeconomic isolation but may have exacerbated the within-
district inequality by creaming off good students from conventional schools.  
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Third, this study finds large and negative impact of average peer disciplinary 
infractions on student outcomes (both academic and behavior), which indicates that 
middle school students are very sensitive to the misconducts of their peers. Therefore, in 
addition to the standard test scores of students, reduction of student misbehavior and 
improvement of safe school environment should also be an important element in 
assessing school effectiveness.  
Finally, there is no evidence from either the school level or classroom level analyses 
that change in the heterogeneity of peer composition influences student outcomes. 
Moreover, the heterogeneous effect models do not find that any specific student group is 
significantly impacted by the heterogeneity of peer characteristics. These findings 
suggest that ability tracking per se has no impact on student achievement, at least not on 
the lottery participants in the district studied.    
 
Limitations 
This study is limited in several respects. First, the investigation of peer effects in this 
study relies on data from only one district. Compared to other studies using state-wide 
data (such as the Texas studies by Hanushek et al. and Hoxby, and the North Carolina 
study by Vigdor and Nechby etc), this study contains far less observations. Although the 
district examined in this study is similar to other urban school systems in many ways, 
how well these findings generalized is unknown. 
Second, because the research design relies on lottery randomization to estimate peer 
effects, the inferences are limited to a subset of students who participate in the lotteries. 
This strategy excludes the large number of students who do not express an interest in 
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attending magnet schools, and the smaller number of students who are admitted in other 
ways (e.g., through sibling preferences or neighborhood zone preferences). Similarly, the 
conclusions about peer effects from this study can not be fully extended to students 
unlike those participating in the lotteries.  
Third, in order to circumvent the simultaneity bias, this project does not estimate the 
endogenous peer effects --- contemporaneous peer achievement or behavioral measures. 
Instead, the investigation of peer effects focuses on contextual effects, represented by 
peer academic ability (measured by lagged academic outcomes) and other predetermined 
peer characteristics. While endogenous peer effects imply potentially large social 
multiplier effects and efficiency gains through the feedback in the behavior of individuals 
within an existing social network (e.g., Hoxby argues that positive student behavior leads 
to more positive behavior in the network), contextual peer effects do not have these 
dynamic implications. 
Finally, using lagged values of peer scores and behavioral records may not 
completely remove the reflection problems due to the serial correlations between the 
measurement errors in the lagged outcomes and those in current outcomes. However, 
controlling for student prior outcomes in the data greatly reduces the correlation between 
current outcomes and the measurement errors in lagged peer outcomes. Moreover, given 
the facts that we use students’ 4th grade scores to construct peer academic ability 
measures and most students in the district go to a new middle school after 4th grade, the 
serial correlation are less likely to cause significant simultaneity bias in the estimation of 
the effects from current peers.  
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Appendix A 
 
Prediction of Peer Characteristics in Neighborhood Schools ( )NP  
 
As introduced in Chapter III, although the admission lottery randomly assigns lottery 
participants to a treatment group (a magnet school) or a control group (a neighborhood 
school), neighborhood schools still vary across lottery participants. The neighborhood 
school where a lottery participant is expected to attend if not admitted by a magnet school 
reflects family residence choices, and is very likely to be related to unobserved factors 
that also influence student outcomes. In order to eliminate the selection bias arising from 
neighborhood choices, we include the variable NP as an independent variable in the 
regression.  
However, NP is not observable for students who are enrolled in the magnet schools. 
Therefore, we need to predict the value of NP . The prediction of NP is based on the 
sample of students who lost all middle school lotteries and attended regular public 
schools in the district. The prediction model can be specified as: 
iglNP , )( , igligl SXf                 (A.1) 
where iglNP , is a set of neighborhood school peer variables for lottery loser i in grade g 
and lottery year l (cohort indicator), iglX is a vector of lottery losers’ demographic 
characteristics and prior achievements, iglS indicates the elementary school where lottery 
loser i attended in 4th grade. As indicated by the model, the prediction models are run for 
every grade and every lottery cohort separately. Although the regression is only limited to 
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the sample of lottery losers, the predicted value of NPˆ is assigned to all lottery 
participants in the same grade and same cohort63. For example, if student A and student B 
are from the same elementary school and share very similar demographic attributes (race, 
gender, SES, special ed, and ELL) as well as 4th grade test scores, each of them is 
assigned a predicted NPˆ with close values regardless of their lottery outcomes.   
The following table provides some descriptive statistics of predicted counterfactual 
neighborhood school peer variables ( NPˆ ) for 5
th graders in two cohorts: lottery year 2000 
and lottery year 2001. The second column (“Group”) indicates that students are from the 
same 4th grade school, same ethnicity group and same social economic status group. As 
we can see from the table, regardless of their lottery outcomes, the predicted value of 
neighborhood school peer characteristics are very similar for students sharing same 
attributes in race, SES and elementary schools. 
 
Table A.1 Counterfactual School Peer Variables for 5th graders 
Lottery 
Year  Group 
Lottery 
outcomes  Obs       
Predicted Neighborhood 
school Peer Variables       
        Black  Low SES  Grade 4 Math  Grade 4 Reading 
        Pct  SD  Pct  SD  Mean  SD  Mean  SD 
2000  1  Win  11  33.1  2.7  11.4  1.9  0.67  0.06  0.82  0.07 
    Lose  13  32.9  2.4  11.1  1.7  0.67  0.07  0.84  0.08 
2000  2  Win  18  28.5  1.5  18.1  2.5  0.44  0.04  0.61  0.05 
    Lose  7  28.9  1.4  19.1  2.2  0.42  0.04  0.58  0.05 
2001  3  Win  20  31.6  1.9  30.0  2.3  0.42  0.02  0.42  0.02 
    Lose  13  32.7  2.3  31.7  3.2  0.43  0.03  0.44  0.03 
2003  4  Win  25  31.3  7.6  31.3  5.5  0.16  0.03  0.30  0.03 
      Lose  8  30.6  4.4  31.0  4.4  0.15  0.01  0.29  0.02 
Note: Lottery outcome 'WIN' means the student won at least one lottery;       
 'LOSE' means the student lost all lotteries.               
                                                 
63 In order to avoid introducing a difference between students whose NP is observed (lottery losers) and 
students whose NP is a counterfactual prediction, the predicted NPˆ are used in all final models for all 
students.  
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Appendix B 
 
Prediction of Enrollment Probability ( )ˆiMd   
and Construction of School Level Peer Variable Instruments 
 
I. Prediction of Enrollment Probability 
In order to eliminate the endogeneity of the peer term )1( iNiM dPdP  ,64 we 
instrumented the peer variable with an exogenous instrumental variable 
)]ˆ1(ˆˆ[ iMNiMM dPdP  . The external peer term )]ˆ1(ˆˆ[ iMNiMM dPdP   contains three parts: 
the mean value of magnet school peer characteristics MP ; the predicted counterfactual 
neighborhood school peer characteristics NPˆ , and the magnet school enrollment 
probability iMdˆ . Since there are two magnet programs in this study --- the academic 
magnet and the non-academic composite, the instrument for peer variables is actually 
constructed as )ˆ1(ˆˆ   MjNMjMj dPdP , where Mjdˆ is an estimate of the probability that 
a student attends magnet school j (j=A for the academic magnet, j=NA for the non-
academic magnet as defined in this part).  
Because winning the lottery is the only way through which a lottery participant got 
admitted by a magnet school, the prediction of magnet school enrollment probability is 
mainly based on lottery outcomes. First, we separate all lottery participants into 4 groups 
based on lottery outcomes65: 
Group1: win_academic=1; win_nonacademic=0 
                                                 
64 As introduced in chapter III, the endogeneity arises from the non-compliances among the lottery 
participants.  
65 The win variable is defined as 1 if either outright win or delayed win variable is 1. 
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Group2: win_academic=0, win_nonacademic=1 
Group3: win_academic=1; win_nonacademic=1 
Group4: win_academic=0; win_nonacademic=0 
Accordingly, each student received 4 group indicators: group1=1 for students in the 1st 
group, 0 otherwise, and till group4.  
Second, we define 4 magnet school enrollment probability variables for every lottery 
participants in the sample: 1AMd  and 2AMd as the enrollment probabilities in the academic 
magnet school; and 1NAMd  and 2NAMd as the non-academic magnet composite enrollment 
probabilities. The initial values of all four probability variables are set to be zero.  
Third, we run the regression models to predict magnet school enrollment probabilities 
for students in each group separately. In specific, the equations are: 
For Group1 students: 
iAM1 ),,,( iiii GLOLXf                                                           (B.1) 
For Group3 students: 
iAM 2 ),,,( iiii GLOLXf                                                           (B.2) 
For Group2 students: 
iNAM1 ),,,( iiii GLOLXf                                                           (B.3) 
For Group3 students: 
iNAM 2 ),,,( iiii GLOLXf                                                           (B.4) 
where iAM1 is a dichotomous variable indicating whether student i from group 1 is 
enrolled in the academic magnet school, iAM 2 for student i from group 3; 
iNAM1 indicates the non-academic magnet enrollment from students from group 2, 
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iNAM 2  for students from group 3. Other variables included in the models are: iX is a 
vector of individual characteristics; iL is a lottery indicator which combines the 
information of lottery year and lottery application; iLO is the lottery outcome indicator 
including outright win and delayed win for both magnet programs; and iG is a grade 
indicator. The predicted value of the dependent variable in each model is then assigned to 
every student to replace the initial zero value of the enrollment probability: 1ˆAMd = iMA 1ˆ , 
2
ˆ
AMd = iMA 2ˆ ; 1ˆNAMd = iMAN 1ˆ , 2ˆNAMd = iMAN 2ˆ .  
Based on the predicted magnet school enrollment probabilities, we also defined 4 
variables representing the enrollment probabilities in non-magnet schools: 
1ˆ 1NMd 1ˆAMd ; 1ˆ 2NMd 1ˆNAMd ; 1ˆ 3NMd 2ˆAMd - 2ˆNAMd ; 1ˆ 4 NMd . Therefore, each 
student in our sample has 4 group indicator variables, 4 magnet school enrollment 
probability variables, and 4 non-magnet school enrollment probability variables. Finally, 
the enrollment probabilities for the academic magnet school, the non-academic magnet 
composite and non magnet schools are: 
Academic Magnet School:    3*ˆ1*ˆˆ 21 groupdgroupdd AMAMAM             (B.5) 
Non-academic Magnet School:   3*ˆ2*ˆˆ 21 groupdgroupdd NAMNAMNAM   (B.6) 
Non Magnet School:    
4*ˆ3*ˆ2*ˆ1*ˆˆ 4321 groupdgroupdgroupdgroupdd NMNMNMNMNM                (B.7) 
The following Table B.2 presents the predicted enrollment probabilities for 5th grade 
students in different groups across lottery years. The predicted values of enrollment 
probabilities reveal similar messages as shown in Table 3.3 (magnet school lotteries and 
5th grade enrollment) in Chapter III: there is a high non-compliance rate among lottery 
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participants of the non-academic magnet composite; most students who won both 
lotteries chose to attend the academic magnet.   
 
Table B.2 Enrollment Probability by lottery outcome Groups (5th Grade) 
          Enrollment Probability    
Lottery Year  Group  Academic  Non‐Academic  Non Magnet 
    Mean  SD  Mean  SD  Mean  SD 
1999  1  0.77  0.09  0.00  0.00  0.23  0.09 
  2  0.00  0.00  0.54  0.08  0.46  0.08 
  3  0.74  0.20  0.04  0.12  0.22  0.13 
  4  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.00 
2000  1  0.76  0.12  0.00  0.00  0.24  0.12 
  2  0.00  0.00  0.59  0.08  0.41  0.08 
  3  0.68  0.13  0.07  0.05  0.26  0.10 
  4  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.00 
2001  1  0.82  0.09  0.00  0.00  0.17  0.09 
  2  0.00  0.00  0.57  0.07  0.43  0.07 
  3  0.71  0.16  0.16  0.12  0.13  0.09 
  4  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.00 
2002  1  0.87  0.07  0.00  0.00  0.13  0.07 
  2  0.00  0.00  0.64  0.08  0.36  0.08 
  3  0.84  0.12  0.06  0.06  0.11  0.08 
  4  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.00 
2003  1  0.86  0.07  0.00  0.00  0.14  0.07 
  2  0.00  0.00  0.66  0.08  0.34  0.08 
  3  0.70  0.16  0.10  0.13  0.20  0.09 
   4  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00  0.00 
Note: Group1 students only won the academic magnet lottery;    
Group2 students only won the non‐academic lottery;      
Group3 won both lotteries; Group4 students lost both lotteries    
 
II. Construction of School Level Peer Variable Instrument 
After predicting the enrollment probability, the next step is to construct the 
instrumental variable )ˆ1(ˆˆ   MjNMjMj dPdP , or .ˆˆˆ NMNMjMj dPdP   In specific, the 
instrumental variable for peer characteristics is constructed as: 
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)ˆ1(ˆˆ   MjNMjMj dPdP  = 
)4*ˆ3*ˆ2*ˆ1*ˆ(*ˆ
)3*ˆ2*ˆ(*)3*ˆ1*ˆ(*
4321
2121
groupdgroupdgroupdgroupdP
groupdgroupdPgroupdgroupdP
iNMiNMiNMiNMN
iNAMiNAMNAMiAMiAMAM


     (B.8) 
where AMP is the mean value of school peer variable in the academic magnet school, 
NAMP represents mean school peer variable in the non-academic composite, and NPˆ is the 
predicted neighborhood school peer characteristics.  
Note that there are 4 schools in the non-academic magnet composite. Therefore, the 
values of NAMP is a weighted mean of the average peer characteristics in each non-
academic magnet school, wherein the weight is the fraction of numbers of outright 
winner in each school over the total numbers of outright winners in the composite: 
NAMP = jNAMjNAM
j
winnersoutrightNoP _.(*
4
1


 )_.
4
1
jNAM
j
winnersoutrightNo

(B.9) 
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Appendix C 
 
Construction of Instruments for Classroom Level Peer Variables 
 
In order to eliminate the endogeneity of the classroom peer variable cijP , we 
instrumented this variable using the model 
iiiMcNiMcMcij XdPdPP   )]ˆ1(ˆˆˆ[         (1st stage IV model) 
where )ˆ1(ˆˆˆ iMcNiMcM dPdP   serves as the external instrumental variable. There are three 
components in this instrumental variable: iMdˆ is an prediction of the probability that 
student i attend the magnet school; cMPˆ  is the predicted classroom peer variable in magnet 
schools, which serves as the counterfactual class peers that lottery losers would encounter 
in classes if they had won the magnet school lottery; cNPˆ  is the predicted classroom peer 
variable in neighborhood schools, which serves as the counterfactual class peers that 
lottery winners would encounter in classes if they had lost the magnet school lottery and 
enrolled in a neighborhood school.  
Since the prediction of the first component iMdˆ has been introduced in Appendix B, 
this part will focus on explaining the procedures predicting cMPˆ  and cNPˆ . The prediction of 
cMPˆ  is done separately for each magnet school (the academic magnet and the four non-
academic magnet schools) by cohort and by grade --- for example, the models that predict 
class peer characteristics in the academic magnet school cAMPˆ  are only limited to a sample 
of students enrolling in this academic magnet school. Moreover, because students in 
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middle schools are often grouped for instructions based on their academic ability (or 
possibly based on behavioral problem), the prediction models include all individual 
demographic variables as well as prior outcomes (academic and behavior outcomes); the 
prediction also controls for a set of student 4th grade school indictors given that student 
elementary school may carry some unobserved information influencing both outcomes 
and class assignments in middle school. The prediction model for cMP  can be expressed as 
the following: 
),(, igligliglcjM SXfP                    (C.1) 
where 
iglcjM
P
,
indicates the classroom peer characteristics in magnet school j for student i 
in grade g and lottery year (cohort) l, iglX is a vector of individual demographic variables 
and prior outcomes, and iglS represents 4
th grade school indicators. Although the 
prediction of cjMP  is only limited to students enrolled in magnet school j, the predicted 
value is assigned to every student in the same grade and cohort regardless of the lottery 
status and enrollment status. Similarly, the predicted classroom peer characteristics in the 
non-academic magnet composite is a weighted mean of the class peer variables in all 
non-academic magnet schools 
cNAMPˆ = jNAMcjNAM
j
winnersoutrightNoP _.(*ˆ
4
1


 )_.
4
1
jNAM
j
winnersoutrightNo

(C.2)+ 
The prediction of classroom peer characteristics in the neighborhood schools cNPˆ  
focuses on the sample of lottery losers. Different from models predicting cjMP , the 
prediction of cNP  is conducted within each elementary school, so that there are more 
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heterogeneous class assignments for students from the same elementary school. In 
specific, the prediction model is:  
)(, igsligslcN XfP                      (C.3) 
where igslcNP ,  is the classroom peer characteristics for lottery loser i (who is from 
elementary school s in 4th grade)  in grade g  and lottery year l , and igslX is a set of 
individual factors. After each prediction, the predicted value of cNPˆ  is assigned to both 
lottery winners and lottery losers in the same grade and cohort. 
Each student in our sample is assigned both predicted values of cMPˆ  and cNPˆ , which 
are incorporated with the enrollment probabilities to construct instrumental variables for 
the true classroom peer characteristics: 
)ˆ1(ˆˆˆ iMcNiMcM dPdP   = 
)4*ˆ3*ˆ2*ˆ1*ˆ(*ˆ
)3*ˆ2*ˆ(*ˆ)3*ˆ1*ˆ(*ˆ
4321
2121
groupdgroupdgroupdgroupdP
groupdgroupdPgroupdgroupdP
iNMiNMiNMiNMicN
iNAMiNAMNAMiciAMiAMAMic

   (C.4) 
As Table 3.4 in chapter III already shows, the instrumental variables for classroom peer 
characteristics are very close to the true values of classroom peer variables.   
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Appendix D 
 
Validity of the Instrumental Variables 
 
A valid instrumental variable has to meet two requirements: first, the IV must be 
orthogonal to the error term; second, the IV must be correlated to the endogenous 
regressor of interest. All peer effect models in this study include two sets of external 
instruments: lottery outcomes ( ), 21 ii rr as instruments for the magnet school treatment 
effect id ; )ˆ1(ˆˆ iMNiMM dPdP   as the instruments for school level peer characteristics, or 
)ˆ1(ˆˆˆ iMcNiMcM dPdP  as the instruments for classroom level peer characteristics. 
The omnibus over-identification tests of all regression models in Chapter IV to 
Chapter VI (As shown at the bottom of the result tables) have provided strong evidence 
that both sets of external instruments are orthogonal to the error terms and meet the first 
validity requirement of exogeneity. Therefore, in this part, I will examine whether the 
instruments meet the second validity requirement: correlated with the regressors of 
interest.  
As introduced in Chapter II, the estimates of peer effect are yielded from a 2 Stage 
Lease Square (2SLS), wherein the first level model predicts the endogenous peer 
variables from the instrumental variables. Therefore, the coefficients on the instrumental 
variables from the first stage regression represent the correlation between the instruments 
and the regressors of interest.  
Table D.1 presents the estimates of first stage models of school level peer effects on 
math achievement (the single variable models in Table 4.6 in Chapter IV). There are 10 
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regression models included in the table: one for each school level peer characteristics. 
Each regression model includes three endogenous regressors: the academic magnet 
school treatment indicator, the non-academic composite treatment indicator, and the peer 
variable. Accordingly, there are three separate first stage models for each regression. The 
first 1st stage model (dependent variable is iAMd , the academic magnet treatment 
indicator) includes two external instruments: outright_winAM, delayed_winAM; the second 
1st model (dependent variable is iNAMd , the non academic composite treatment indicator) 
also includes two external instruments: outright_winNAM, delayed_winNAM; the third 1st 
stage model (dependent variable is each school level peer variable) has the instrument 
constructed as )ˆ1(ˆˆ   MjNMjMj dPdP . 
As we can see from Table D.1, the three sets of external instruments are significantly 
correlated with the regressors of interest in all 10 models at 0.1% statistical level, which 
implies that the instruments meet the second validity requirement. The magnitude of the 
coefficients on lottery outcome variables for the academic magnet school is much larger 
than for the non-academic composite. This is because of the high non-compliance rate 
among non-academic composite applicants and the multiple lotteries (students who won 
both the academic magnet and the non-academic composite rarely chose to attend the 
latter one). The coefficients on most peer variable IVs are larger than 0.75, suggesting a 
high correlation between the instruments and the endogenous peer variables. The 
coefficients on the peer variables Percent Special ED students, Percent Hispanics, and 
Percent ELL students are less sizeable, due to the high non-compliance rate among these 
students.  
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Table D.1 First Stage Regression (School Level): Correlations between Endogenous 
Regressors and the Instrumental Variables 
 
    Model1  Model2  Model3  Model4  Model5  Model6  Model7  Model8  Model9  Model10 
Magnet School Treatment Indicators               
Academic Magnet                   
Outright Win  0.67***  0.62***  0.73***  0.73***  0.76***  0.76***  0.53***  0.54***  0.74***  0.73*** 
    (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Delayed Win  0.57***  0.53***  0.63***  0.62***  0.65***  0.65***  0.46***  0.46***  0.63***  0.62*** 
    (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Non‐Academic Composite                 
Outright Win   0.27***  0.29***  0.25***  0.28***  0.29***  0.29***  0.29***  0.29***  0.29***  0.26*** 
    (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Delayed Win  0.24***  0.26***  0.22***  0.25***  0.26***  0.27***  0.26***  0.26***  0.26***  0.23*** 
    (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Peer Variables                   
Black (Proportion)                   
Black IV  0.80***                   
    (0.02)                   
Low SES (Proportion)                   
Low SES IV  0.81***                 
      (0.02)                 
Female (Proportion)                   
Female IV    0.78***               
        (0.02)               
Special ED (Proportion)                   
Special ED IV      0.29***             
          (0.02)             
Hispanic (Proportion)                   
Hispanic IV        0.42***           
            (0.02)           
ELL (Proportion)                   
ELL IV          0.19***         
              (0.01)         
Mean G4 Math                   
Mean G4 Math IV            0.67***       
                (0.03)       
Mean G4 Reading                   
Mean G4 Reading IV              0.69***     
                  (0.01)     
Mean G4 Suspension                   
Mean G4 Suspension IV              0.94***   
                    (0.03)   
Mean G4 Absence                   
Mean G4Absence IV                0.76*** 
                                 (0.03) 
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Table D.2 reports the estimates of first stage models of classroom level peer effects 
on math achievement (the single variable models in Table 5.1 in Chapter V). The 
coefficients on the lottery outcomes for both magnet programs are very similar to the 
estimates from school level models in last Table D.1, suggesting that the instruments and 
the endogenous magnet school treatment variables are highly correlated. Although the 
estimates of the classroom peer variable IVs are less sizeable than those from school level 
models, the coefficients from all 10 models are significant at 0.1% statistical level. The 
results again prove that the external instruments in our classroom level peer effect models 
meet the second validity requirement of high correlation with the regressors.  
 
Table D.2 First Stage Regression (Classroom Level): Correlations between 
Endogenous Regressors and the Instrumental Variables 
 
    Model1  Model2  Model3  Model4  Model5  Model6  Model7  Model8  Model9  Model10 
Magnet School Treatment Indicators                 
Academic Magnet                 
Outright Win  0.76***  0.75***  0.77***  0.77***  0.77***  0.77***  0.76***  0.74***  0.77***  0.77*** 
    (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Delayed Win  0.68***  0.67***  0.69***  0.69***  0.69***  0.69***  0.67***  0.66***  0.69***  0.69*** 
    (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Non‐Academic Composite                 
Outright Win   0.29***  0.29***  0.29***  0.30***  0.29***  0.30***  0.29***  0.29***  0.29***  0.29*** 
    (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Delayed Win  0.27***  0.28***  0.28***  0.28***  0.28***  0.28***  0.28***  0.27***  0.28***  0.27*** 
    (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Peer Variables                   
Black (Proportion)                   
Black IV  0.56***                   
    (0.01)                   
Low SES (Proportion)                   
Low SES IV  0.54***                 
      (0.01)                 
Female (Proportion)                   
Female IV    0.34***               
        (0.01)               
Special ED (Proportion)                   
Special ED IV      0.23***             
          (0.02)             
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Table D.2 (Continued)                 
Hispanic (Proportion)                   
Hispanic IV        0.15***           
            (0.02)           
ELL (Proportion)                   
ELL IV          0.12***         
              (0.01)         
Mean G4 Math                   
Mean G4 Math IV            0.42***       
                (0.01)       
Mean G4 Reading                   
Mean G4 Reading IV            0.56***     
                  (0.02)     
Mean G4 Suspension                   
Mean G4 Suspension IV              0.28***   
                    (0.01)   
Mean G4 Absence                   
Mean G4Absence IV                  0.24*** 
                                 (0.01) 
 
In conclusion, the results from both the over-identification tests and the 1st stage 
models suggest that the three sets of external instrumental variables in our peer effect 
models are valid: they are exogenous to the error terms; and they are correlated with the 
endogenous regressors.   
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Appendix E 
 
Linear Combination Results of Heterogeneous Peer Effects 
 
Both school level and classroom level analyses find that some students are impacted 
by their peers more strongly than other students. The tables in Chapter IV (Table 4.10 
and Table 4.11) and Chapter V (Table 5.5 and Table 5.6) present the estimates of 
heterogeneous effects for seven different student groups. This part will report the 
coefficients on peer variables from the linear combination tests, which shows the 
estimates of peer effects on different students depending on their own background.  
Since I have discussed many of the linear combination test coefficients in Chapter IV 
to Chapter VI, this part will only reports the results. 
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I. Math Achievement 
School Level 
Table E.1 School Level Peer Effects on Math Achievement (Linear Combination Tests) 
          Math Scores          
    Model1  Model2  Model3  Model4  Model5  Model6  Model7 
    Black  LSES  Female 
Low 
Reading 
Ahiever 
High 
Reading 
Achiever 
Low 
Math 
Achiever 
High 
Math 
Achiever 
Peer Effects (Lottery Based)             
Proportion Black Students        
Mean + Interaction  ‐0.53***  ‐0.52***  ‐0.34*  ‐0.56***  ‐0.61***  ‐0.61***  ‐0.64*** 
   (0.14)  (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.16)  (0.15)  (0.15) 
Proportion Low SES Students             
Mean + Interaction  ‐0.33  ‐0.22  ‐0.26  ‐0.42*  ‐0.48*  ‐0.49**  ‐0.49** 
   (0.18)  (0.20)  (0.18)  (0.18)  (0.18)  (0.18)  (0.18) 
Peer Prior Math Achievement             
Mean + Interaction  0.09  0.03  0.06  ‐0.02  ‐0.04  0.01  ‐0.10 
   (0.16)  (0.17)  (0.17)  (0.17)  (0.17)  (0.16)  (0.17) 
Peer Prior Reading Achievement           
Mean + Interaction  0.14  0.07  0.10  0.04  0.04  0.07  ‐0.01 
   (0.14)  (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.15) 
Peer Prior Disciplinary Records             
Mean + Interaction  0.01  0.02  0.02  ‐0.22  ‐0.32  ‐0.44*  ‐0.62** 
   (0.21)  (0.25)  (0.20)  (0.21)  (0.24)  (0.21)  (0.22) 
Peer Prior Attendance Records             
Mean + Interaction  5.83  6.36  2.91  0.65  ‐0.42  ‐0.44  ‐1.16 
     (5.40)  (6.15)  (4.89)  (4.69)  (4.71)  (4.69)  (4.73) 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** 
p<0.001        
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Classroom Level 
Table E.2 Heterogeneous Class Level Peer Effects on Math Achievement (Linear 
Combination Tests) (Math Class) 
 
          Math Scores          
    Model1  Model2  Model3  Model4  Model5  Model6  Model7 
    Black  LSES  Female 
Low 
Reading 
Achiever 
High 
Reading 
Achiever 
Low 
Math 
Achiever 
High 
Math 
Achiever 
Peer Effects (Lottery Based)             
Proportion Black Students       
Mean + Interaction  ‐0.63***  ‐0.59***  ‐0.58***  ‐0.71***  ‐0.76***  ‐0.78***  ‐0.83*** 
   (0.10)  (0.11)  (0.10)  (0.09)  (0.10)  (0.09)  (0.10) 
Proportion Low SES Students           
Mean + Interaction  ‐0.81***  ‐0.73***  ‐0.69***  ‐0.86***  ‐0.94***  ‐0.93***  ‐0.91*** 
   (0.11)  (0.13)  (0.11)  (0.10)  (0.11)  (0.10)  (0.11) 
Peer Prior Math Achievement           
Mean + Interaction  0.37***  0.35***  0.29***  0.30***  0.25***  0.29***  0.25*** 
   (0.06)  (0.07)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06) 
Peer Prior Reading Achievement           
Mean + Interaction  0.41***  0.40***  0.37***  0.36***  0.36***  0.36***  0.34*** 
   (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05) 
Peer Prior Disciplinary Records          
Mean + Interaction  ‐0.44  ‐0.58**  ‐0.60**  ‐0.77***  ‐0.71  ‐0.92***  ‐0.77* 
   (0.23)  (0.21)  (0.23)  (0.21)  (0.40)  (0.20)  (0.32) 
Peer Prior Attendance Records           
Mean + Interaction  ‐5.08  ‐0.57  ‐5.49  ‐8.53*  ‐8.77*  ‐8.99*  ‐8.43* 
     (7.28)  (6.32)  (5.65)  (4.18)  (3.94)  (4.10)  (3.99) 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001      
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II. Reading Achievement 
School Level 
Table E.3 Heterogeneous School Level Peer Effects on Reading Achievement 
(Linear Combination Tests) 
          Reading Scores          
    Model1  Model2  Model3  Model4  Model5  Model6  Model7 
    Black  LSES  Female 
Low 
Reading 
Achiever 
High 
Reading 
Achiever 
Low 
Math 
Achiever 
High 
Math 
Achiever 
Peer Effects (Lottery Based)             
Proportion Black Students        
Mean + Interaction  ‐0.23  ‐0.15  ‐0.11  ‐0.33**  ‐0.53***  ‐0.24  ‐0.24 
   (0.13)  (0.15)  (0.14)  (0.14)  (0.15)  (0.14)  (0.14) 
Proportion Low SES Students             
Mean + Interaction  0.02  0.06  0.09  ‐0.12  ‐0.34*  ‐0.01  0.02 
   (0.17)  (0.19)  (0.17)  (0.17)  (0.17)  (0.17)  (0.17) 
Peer Prior Math Achievement             
Mean + Interaction  ‐0.24  ‐0.30  ‐0.27  ‐0.39*  ‐0.38*  ‐0.26  ‐0.32* 
   (0.15)  (0.17)  (0.16)  (0.17)  (0.16)  (0.16)  (0.16) 
Peer Prior Reading 
Achievement             
Mean + Interaction  ‐0.24  ‐0.30*  ‐0.29*  ‐0.41**  ‐0.39**  ‐0.28  ‐0.33* 
   (0.14)  (0.15)  (0.14)  (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.14)  (0.14) 
Peer Prior Disciplinary Records           
Mean + Interaction  ‐0.29  ‐0.12  ‐0.37  ‐0.65***  ‐0.95***  ‐0.33  ‐0.55** 
   (0.20)  (0.23)  (0.19)  (0.20)  (0.23)  (0.20)  (0.21) 
Peer Prior Attendance 
Records             
Mean + Interaction  10.69*  7.72  11.36*  9.45*  7.36  11.54**  11.59** 
     (5.12)  (5.84)  (4.65)  (4.45)  (4.46)  (4.47)  (4.50) 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001           
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Classroom Level 
Table E.4 Heterogeneous Class Level Peer Effects on Reading Achievement (Linear 
Combination Tests) (Reading Class) 
 
          Reading Scores          
    Model1  Model2  Model3  Model4  Model5  Model6  Model7 
    Black  LSES  Female 
Low 
Reading 
Achiever 
High 
Reading 
Achiever 
Low 
Math 
Achiever 
High 
Math 
Achiever 
Peer Effects (Lottery Based)             
Proportion Black Students        
Mean + Interaction  ‐0.50***  ‐0.49***  ‐0.39***  ‐0.62***  ‐0.83***  ‐0.54***  ‐0.51*** 
   (0.10)  (0.11)  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.09)  (0.10) 
Proportion Low SES Students             
Mean + Interaction  ‐0.74***  ‐0.71***  ‐0.54***  ‐0.85***  ‐1.07***  ‐0.76***  ‐0.63*** 
   (0.11)  (0.12)  (0.11)  (0.10)  (0.11)  (0.10)  (0.11) 
Peer Prior Math Achievement             
Mean + Interaction  0.28***  0.25***  0.20**  0.17**  0.10  0.24**  0.20** 
   (0.07)  (0.08)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.08)  (0.07)  (0.08) 
Peer Prior Reading Achievement           
Mean + Interaction  0.35***  0.31***  0.29***  0.24***  0.20***  0.31***  0.29*** 
   (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.05) 
Peer Prior Disciplinary Records             
Mean + Interaction  ‐1.22***  ‐0.96***  ‐0.81***  ‐1.36***  ‐1.61***  ‐1.05***  ‐0.85** 
   (0.20)  (0.19)  (0.21)  (0.17)  (0.33)  (0.17)  (0.28) 
Peer Prior Attendance Records             
Mean + Interaction  ‐1.50  ‐5.39  3.71  ‐3.21  ‐4.57  ‐1.16  ‐0.69 
     (9.78)  (9.04)  (8.44)  (6.05)  (5.83)  (5.99)  (5.88) 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001           
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III. Disciplinary Infractions 
School Level 
Table E.5 Heterogeneous School Level Peer Effects on Disciplinary Infractions     
(Linear Combination Tests) 
          Suspension Times       
    Model1  Model2  Model3  Model4  Model5  Model6  Model7 
    Black  LSES  Female 
Low 
Reading 
Achiever 
High 
Reading 
Achiever 
Low Math 
Achiever 
High 
Math 
Achiever 
Peer Effects (Lottery Based)             
Proportion Black Students        
Mean + Interaction  0.56  0.90*  ‐0.17  0.25  0.12  0.24  0.26 
   (0.34)  (0.36)  (0.36)  (0.35)  (0.36)  (0.35)  (0.36) 
Proportion Low SES Students             
Mean + Interaction  ‐0.33  ‐0.19  ‐1.23**  ‐0.91*  ‐1.05*  ‐0.87*  ‐0.90* 
   (0.43)  (0.48)  (0.43)  (0.43)  (0.43)  (0.43)  (0.43) 
Peer Prior Math Achievement             
Mean + Interaction  1.57***  1.50***  1.93***  1.99***  2.15***  1.82***  2.20*** 
   (0.40)  (0.43)  (0.41)  (0.43)  (0.43)  (0.41)  (0.42) 
Peer Prior Reading Achievement           
Mean + Interaction  1.13***  1.09***  1.50***  1.50***  1.65***  1.36***  1.68*** 
   (0.35)  (0.37)  (0.36)  (0.38)  (0.38)  (0.36)  (0.36) 
Peer Prior Disciplinary Records             
Mean + Interaction  0.42  0.24  ‐0.25  ‐0.05  ‐0.42  0.46  0.01 
   (0.50)  (0.57)  (0.48)  (0.50)  (0.57)  (0.49)  (0.52) 
Peer Prior Attendance Records             
Mean + Interaction  ‐32.44*  ‐40.50**  ‐35.17**  ‐33.33**  ‐32.83**  ‐33.45**  ‐30.85** 
     (12.81)  (14.22)  (11.55)  (11.08)  (11.13)  (11.11)  (11.19) 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** 
p<0.001        
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Classroom Level 
Table E.6 Heterogeneous Class Level Peer Effects on Disciplinary Infractions 
(Linear Combination Tests) (Math Class) 
 
          Suspension Times       
    Model1  Model2  Model3  Model4  Model5  Model6  Model7 
    Black  LSES  Female 
Low 
Reading 
Achiever 
High 
Reading 
Achiever 
Low 
Math 
Achiever 
High 
Math 
Achiever 
Peer Effects (Lottery Based)             
Proportion Black Students        
Mean + Interaction  1.43***  1.88***  0.71**  1.11***  0.95***  1.15***  1.11*** 
   (0.23)  (0.26)  (0.23)  (0.21)  (0.24)  (0.22)  (0.23) 
Proportion Low SES Students             
Mean + Interaction  2.09***  2.26***  0.88***  1.45***  1.15***  1.44***  1.21*** 
   (0.27)  (0.29)  (0.26)  (0.24)  (0.27)  (0.24)  (0.26) 
Peer Prior Math Achievement             
Mean + Interaction  ‐0.50**  ‐0.69***  ‐0.12  ‐0.35**  ‐0.11  ‐0.32*  ‐0.14 
   (0.14)  (0.15)  (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.14)  (0.13)  (0.14) 
Peer Prior Reading Achievement           
Mean + Interaction  ‐0.72***  ‐0.84***  ‐0.38**  ‐0.51***  ‐0.33*  ‐0.51***  ‐0.33** 
   (0.12)  (0.13)  (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.13)  (0.12)  (0.13) 
Peer Prior Disciplinary Records             
Mean + Interaction  2.90***  2.09***  1.28*  2.10***  1.65  2.23***  2.03** 
   (0.53)  (0.48)  (0.53)  (0.46)  (0.95)  (0.45)  (0.75) 
Peer Prior Attendance Records             
Mean + Interaction  83.47***  24.91  36.84**  30.97**  29.31**  29.66**  29.57** 
     (17.71)  (14.69)  (13.43)  (9.86)  (9.31)  (9.71)  (9.43) 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001      
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IV. Attendance Behavior 
School Level 
Table E.7 Heterogeneous School Level Peer Effects on Attendance Behavior (Linear 
Combination Tests) 
          Absence Rate       
    Model1  Model2  Model3  Model4  Model5  Model6  Model7 
    Black  LSES  Female 
Low 
Reading 
Achiever 
High 
Reading 
Achiever 
Low 
Math 
Achiever 
High 
Math 
Achiever 
Peer Effects (Lottery Based)             
Proportion Black Students        
Mean + Interaction  ‐0.00  ‐0.01  ‐0.00  0.00  0.00  ‐0.00  ‐0.00 
   (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Proportion Low SES Students             
Mean + Interaction  ‐0.00  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.01 
   (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Peer Prior Math Achievement             
Mean + Interaction  ‐0.00  ‐0.00  ‐0.00  ‐0.01  ‐0.01  ‐0.01  ‐0.01 
   (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Peer Prior Reading Achievement           
Mean + Interaction  ‐0.00  ‐0.01  ‐0.00  ‐0.01  ‐0.00  ‐0.01  ‐0.00 
   (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Peer Prior Disciplinary Records             
Mean + Interaction  0.02  0.04**  0.03*  0.04**  0.05**  0.03*  0.01 
   (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Peer Prior Attendance Records             
Mean + Interaction  ‐0.02  0.24  0.50  0.35  0.41  0.31  0.30 
     (0.37)  (0.42)  (0.34)  (0.33)  (0.33)  (0.33)  (0.33) 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** 
p<0.001        
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Classroom Level 
Table E.8 Heterogeneous Class Level Peer Effects on Attendance Behavior     
(Linear Combination Tests) (Math Class) 
 
          Absence Rate       
    Model1  Model2  Model3  Model4  Model5  Model6  Model7 
    Black  LSES  Female 
Low 
Reading 
Achiever 
High 
Reading 
Achiever 
Low 
Math 
Achiever 
High 
Math 
Achiever 
Peer Effects (Lottery Based)             
Proportion Black Students        
Mean + Interaction  0.00  0.00  ‐0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.01 
   (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Proportion Low SES Students             
Mean + Interaction  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.01 
   (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Peer Prior Math Achievement             
Mean + Interaction  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00 
   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Peer Prior Reading Achievement           
Mean + Interaction  0.00  ‐0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
   (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Peer Prior Disciplinary Records             
Mean + Interaction  0.02  0.03*  0.02  0.03*  0.02  0.02  0.00 
   (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.02) 
Peer Prior Attendance Records           
Mean + Interaction  ‐0.00  ‐0.60  ‐0.23  ‐0.29  ‐0.29  ‐0.36  ‐0.30 
     (0.42)  (0.36)  (0.33)  (0.25)  (0.23)  (0.24)  (0.24) 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001      
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Appendix F 
 
Reading Classroom Peer Effects on Behavioral Outcomes 
 
Chapter VI reports and discusses the estimates of math class peer effects on student 
disciplinary infractions and attendance rates. This part presents the regression results of 
reading class peer effects on student behavioral outcomes. As usual, estimates of peer 
effects from all three parts (the average peer effects, the effects from dispersion of peer 
variables, and the heterogeneous peer effects) are reported in order. Although there are 
some differences in the magnitudes of the coefficients on some peer variables between 
math class estimates and reading class estimates, the overall conclusions are very similar. 
Therefore, I am not going to discuss the results again in this part since Chapter VI has 
provided detailed discussions. 
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I. Average Peer Effects 
Disciplinary Infractions 
Table F.1 Average Classroom Peer Effects on Disciplinary Infractions (Reading Class) 
 
              Suspension Numbers             
Independent 
Variables  Model1  Model2  Model3  Model4  Model5  Model6  Model7  Model8  Model9  Model10  Model11 
Magnet School Effect                   
Academic  ‐0.11  0.00  ‐0.24**  ‐0.32**  ‐0.21*  ‐0.24  ‐0.09  0.16  ‐0.20*  0.05  0.47* 
  (0.08)  (0.11)  (0.09)  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.15)  (0.16)  (0.13)  (0.08)  (0.15)  (0.23) 
Non‐
Academic 
Composite  ‐0.34  ‐0.25  ‐0.33  ‐0.40  ‐0.33  ‐0.35  ‐0.31  ‐0.22  ‐0.33  0.06  0.27 
  (0.20)  (0.20)  (0.20)  (0.21)  (0.21)  (0.22)  (0.21)  (0.21)  (0.20)  (0.27)  (0.31) 
Peer Effect (Lottery Based)                   
Black 
(proportion)  0.82***                    0.84 
  (0.24)                    (0.76) 
Low SES 
(proportion)    1.03***                  ‐0.38 
    (0.25)                  (0.75) 
Female (proportion)    ‐0.49                ‐0.52 
      (0.63)                (0.69) 
Hispanic 
(proportion)        ‐1.63              ‐4.94 
        (2.15)              (3.91) 
Special ED (proportion)        2.52*            1.24 
          (1.26)            (1.88) 
ELL 
(proportion)            1.21          8.43 
            (4.82)          (8.38) 
Grade 4 Math (Mean)            ‐0.25        1.01 
              (0.18)        (0.56) 
Grade 4 Reading (Mean)              ‐0.57***    ‐1.12* 
                (0.12)      (0.52) 
Grade 4 Suspension (Mean)              1.12*    ‐0.64 
                  (0.44)    (0.68) 
Grade 4 Absence (Mean)                  45.23**  66.04** 
                    (15.52)  (23.90) 
Peer Effects (Residence Based)                   
  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Student Characteristics          
   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 Over‐
identification 
Test  0.14  0.1  0.21  0.22  0.14  0.19  0.16  0.1  0.29  0.36  0.38 
Sample Size  10378  10378  10378  10378  10378  10378  10378  10378  10378  10378  10378 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001           
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Absence Rate 
Table F.2 Average Classroom Peer Effects on Absence Rate (Reading Class) 
  
  
        Absence  Rates         
Independent 
Variables  Model1  Model2  Model3  Model4  Model5  Model6  Model7  Model8  Model9  Model10  Model11 
Magnet School Effect                  
Academic  ‐0.004*  0.00  ‐0.01*  0.00  ‐0.01**  0.00  ‐0.01  0.00  ‐0.01*  ‐0.01*  ‐0.00 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01) 
Non‐
Academic 
Composite  ‐0.01  ‐0.01  ‐0.01  ‐0.01  ‐0.01*  ‐0.01  ‐0.01  ‐0.01  ‐0.01  ‐0.01*  ‐0.01 
  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Peer Effect (Lottery Based)                   
Black 
(proportion)  0.01                    0.03 
  (0.01)                    (0.02) 
Low SES 
(proportion)    0.01                  ‐0.02 
    (0.01)                  (0.02) 
Female (proportion)    ‐0.02                ‐0.02 
      (0.02)                (0.02) 
Hispanic 
(proportion)        0.09              0.00 
        (0.05)              (0.10) 
Special ED (proportion)        ‐0.04            ‐0.00 
          (0.03)            (0.01) 
ELL 
(proportion)            0.31*          0.51* 
            (0.13)          (0.22) 
Grade 4 Math (Mean)            ‐0.00        0.02 
              (0.00)        (0.01) 
Grade 4 Reading (Mean)              ‐0.00      ‐0.01 
                (0.00)      (0.01) 
Grade 4 Suspension (Mean)              0.02    0.03 
                  (0.01)    (0.02) 
Grade 4 Absence (Mean)                  ‐0.43  ‐0.05 
                    (0.38)  (0.62) 
Peer Effects (Residence Based)                   
  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Student Characteristics                   
   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Over‐
identification 
Test  0.11  0.1  0.14  0.12  0.16  0.2  0.14  0.12  0.15  0.09  0.33 
Sample Size  10369  10369  10369  10369  10369  10369  10368  10368  10368  10368  10368 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001                   
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II. Impacts from Dispersion of Peer Characteristics 
Disciplinary Infractions 
Table F.3 Impacts from Variance of Peer Outcomes on Disciplinary 
Infractions (Reading Class) 
 
 
  
Suspension Numbers 
  
  Model1  Model2  Model3  Model4 
Magnet School Effect         
  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Peer Effect ( Mean, Lottery Based)         
Grade 4 Math (Mean)  ‐0.27       
  (0.16)       
Grade 4 Reading (Mean)    ‐0.58***     
    (0.12)     
Grade 4 Suspension (Mean)      ‐0.09   
      (1.36)   
Grade 4 Absence (Mean)        76.18* 
        (36.10) 
Peer Effect (Dispersion, Lottery Based)         
Grade 4 Math (Standard Deviation)  0.08       
  (0.49)       
Grade 4 Reading (Standard Deviation)    ‐0.64     
    (0.62)     
Grade 4 Suspension (Standard Deviation)      0.56   
      (0.54)   
Grade 4 Absence (Standard Deviation)        ‐33.36 
        (22.62) 
Peer Effects (Residence Based)         
  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Student Characteristics         
   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
P‐value for Over‐identification Test  0.17  0.13  0.26  0.28 
Sample Size  10374  10374  10374  10374 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001      
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Absence Rate 
Table F.4 Impacts from Variance in Peer Outcomes on Absence Rate 
(Reading Class) 
 
      Absence Rate    
Independent Variables  Model1  Model2  Model3  Model4 
Magnet School Effect         
  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Peer Effect ( Mean, Lottery Based)         
Grade 4 Math (Mean)  ‐0.00       
  (0.00)       
Grade 4 Reading (Mean)    ‐0.00     
    (0.00)     
Grade 4 Suspension (Mean)      0.03   
      (0.03)   
Grade 4 Absence (Mean)        ‐0.00 
        (0.87) 
Peer Effect (Dispersion, Lottery Based)         
Grade 4 Math (Standard Deviation)  ‐0.00       
  (0.00)       
Grade 4 Reading (Standard Deviation)    0.00     
    (0.02)     
Grade 4 Suspension (Standard Deviation)     ‐0.01   
      (0.01)   
Grade 4 Absence (Standard Deviation)        ‐0.38 
        (0.55) 
Peer Effects (Residence Based)         
  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Student Characteristics         
   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
P‐value for Over‐identification Test  0.13  0.11  0.15  0.10 
Sample Size  10374  10374  10374  10374 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001      
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III. Heterogeneous Peer Effects 
Disciplinary Infractions 
Table F.5 Heterogeneous Class Level Peer Effects on Disciplinary Infractions       
(Reading Class) 
 
          Suspension Numbers       
    Model1  Model2  Model3  Model4  Model5  Model6  Model7 
    Black  LSES  Female 
Low 
Reading 
achiever 
High 
Reading 
Achiever 
Low Math 
achiever 
High Math 
Achiever 
Peer Effects (Lottery Based)             
Proportion Black Students             
  Mean Effect  0.54**  0.54**  1.11***  0.76**  0.81***  0.75**  0.79** 
    (0.27)  (0.25)  (0.25)  (0.24)  (0.24)  (0.24)  (0.24) 
  Heterogeneous Effect  0.64**  1.21***  ‐0.59***  0.19*  0.05  0.21***  0.2 
    (0.20)  (0.20)  (0.15)  (0.08)  (0.14)  (0.08)  (0.13) 
Proportion Low SES Students             
  Mean Effect  0.63*  0.65*  1.43***  0.93***  1.04***  0.90***  1.02*** 
    (0.27)  (0.27)  (0.27)  (0.26)  (0.26)  (0.26)  (0.26) 
  Heterogeneous Effect  1.11***  1.46***  ‐0.77***  0.27***  ‐0.05  0.32***  0.05 
    (0.21)  (0.26)  (0.18)  (0.10)  (0.17)  (0.10)  (0.16) 
Peer Prior Math Achievement             
  Mean Effect  ‐0.12  ‐0.14  ‐0.37*  ‐0.20  ‐0.26  ‐0.22  ‐0.29 
    (0.18)  (0.18)  (0.18)  (0.18)  (0.17)  (0.18)  (0.17) 
  Heterogeneous Effect  ‐0.47***  ‐0.77***  0.25**  ‐0.21**  0.14  ‐0.13  0.15* 
    (0.09)  (0.11)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.07)  (0.08)  (0.06) 
Peer Prior Reading Achievement             
  Mean Effect  ‐0.42*  ‐0.45**  ‐0.66***  ‐0.53***  ‐0.58***  ‐0.53***  ‐0.59*** 
    (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.13)  (0.12)  (0.13)  (0.12) 
  Heterogeneous Effect  ‐0.44***  ‐0.61***  0.17**  ‐0.13  0.08  ‐0.11  0.12* 
    (0.08)  (0.09)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.05) 
Peer Prior Disciplinary Records             
  Mean Effect  ‐0.20  0.5  1.55**  0.66  1.16**  0.52  1.07* 
    (0.55)  (0.57)  (0.49)  (0.53)  (0.45)  (0.53)  (0.45) 
  Heterogeneous Effect  2.48***  1.24*  ‐0.98  0.91*  ‐0.36  1.17**  0.29 
    (0.55)  (0.57)  (0.50)  (0.38)  (0.76)  (0.41)  (0.64) 
Peer Prior Absence Rate             
  Mean Effect  11.27  54.71***  26.61*  44.48**  45.30**  44.51**  44.98** 
    (13.28)  (15.60)  (11.80)  (15.49)  (15.64)  (15.60)  (15.70) 
  Heterogeneous Effect  95.09***  ‐34.14  33.84*  2.39  ‐0.19  1.57  1.01 
      (20.50)  (20.42)  (16.11)  (1.48)  (1.93)  (1.48)  (1.81) 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001           
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Absence Rate 
Table F.6 Heterogeneous Class Level Peer Effects on Attendance Behavior       
(Reading Class) 
 
          Absence Rate       
    Model1  Model2  Model3  Model4  Model5  Model6  Model7 
    Black  LSES  Female 
Low 
Reading 
Achiever 
High 
Reading 
Achiever 
Low 
Math 
Achiever 
High 
Math 
Achiever 
Peer Effects (Lottery Based)             
Proportion Black Students             
  Mean Effect  0.01  0.01  0.01*  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
    (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
 
Heterogeneous 
Effect  ‐0.01  ‐0.00  ‐0.01**  0.00  0.00  ‐0.00  0.00 
    (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Proportion Low SES Students             
  Mean Effect  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
    (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
 
Heterogeneous 
Effect  ‐0.00  0.00  ‐0.01  0.00  0.00  ‐0.00  0.00 
    (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Peer Prior Math Achievement             
  Mean Effect  ‐0.00  ‐0.00  ‐0.00  ‐0.00  ‐0.00  ‐0.00  ‐0.00 
    (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
 
Heterogeneous 
Effect  ‐0.00  ‐0.00  0.00  ‐0.00  0.00*  ‐0.00  0.00 
    (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Peer Prior Reading Achievement             
  Mean Effect  ‐0.00  ‐0.00  ‐0.01  ‐0.00  ‐0.00  ‐0.00  ‐0.01 
    (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
 
Heterogeneous 
Effect  0.00  ‐0.00  0.00  ‐0.00  0.00  ‐0.00  0.00 
    (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Peer Prior Disciplinary Records             
  Mean Effect  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02 
    (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
 
Heterogeneous 
Effect  0.02  0.02  ‐0.01  0.02*  0.02  ‐0.00  ‐0.02 
    (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.02) 
Peer Prior Absence Rate             
  Mean Effect  ‐0.63*  ‐0.26  ‐0.56*  ‐0.45  ‐0.45  ‐0.42  ‐0.45 
    (0.31)  (0.38)  (0.29)  (0.38)  (0.38)  (0.38)  (0.39) 
 
Heterogeneous 
Effect  0.34  ‐0.64  0.19  0.06  0.07  ‐0.03  0.05 
      (0.48)  (0.50)  (0.39)  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001        
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